As the Strait of Hormuz faces blockade, the lifeline of global oil markets now rests on two pipelines. These are currently the only significant alternative routes for Middle Eastern crude to enter international markets, and their operational status is critical to global energy supply stability.

The two pipelines are: Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which transports crude westward to the Red Sea port of Yanbu; and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz and delivers oil to the port of Fujairah.

Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Aramco, stated on Tuesday that this is the most severe crisis the regional oil and gas industry has faced to date. The company expects to push the East-West Pipeline to its maximum capacity of 7 million barrels per day within days, with approximately 5 million barrels available for international markets and the remainder supplying domestic refineries.

According to IEA data, the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline has a maximum capacity of about 1.8 million barrels per day and was operating at around 1.1 million barrels per day prior to the conflict.

However, this lifeline comes with new vulnerabilities. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline has never operated at full capacity over an extended period. Analysts warn that Iran may shift its targets from the strait to onshore pipelines and ports—Fujairah port was already damaged in a recent attempted drone attack.

Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely low, with at least 25 vessels rerouted to the Red Sea.

A previous report noted that, based on a Morgan Stanley daily tracking report from March 10, only three crude and refined product tankers transited the Strait of Hormuz out of the Persian Gulf that day, while LNG and LPG vessel transits were zero. The normal daily average is around 35 vessels, indicating that traffic remains severely depressed.

In contrast, a Goldman Sachs report cited by the Wall Street Journal indicated a slight increase in oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, with vessel numbers recovering to about 20% of pre-conflict daily levels.

Goldman cautioned that data may be volatile and that tracking tanker traffic has become difficult as many vessels have turned off transponders to avoid detection.

Meanwhile, Saudi Aramco is nearing the 7 million barrels per day maximum capacity on its East-West Pipeline, while exports from the UAE’s Fujairah port surged 45% month-on-month. At least 25 tankers have been redeployed via the Red Sea port of Yanbu.

The two pipelines are the "only scalable alternatives," but they can only mitigate—not fully offset—the supply gap.

With the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the Saudi East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline are seen as the only two routes capable of moving significant volumes of crude to international markets while bypassing the strait.

However, these pipelines cannot replace all the disrupted flows. The IEA noted that Saudi Aramco still needs to ship about 800,000 barrels per day of refined products via the strait, which cannot be rerouted. Additionally, crude from Kuwait, Iraq, and Bahrain remains stranded.

According to Sparta Commodities, even if both pipelines operate at full capacity, approximately 10 million barrels per day of crude could still be trapped in the Persian Gulf. Neil Crosby of Sparta stated, "We’ve only solved about half the problem."

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline is pushing toward 7 million barrels per day, with Yanbu loadings reaching record levels.

The Saudi East-West Pipeline is the core alternative supply route. Amin Nasser said Saudi Aramco expects to operate the 746-mile pipeline at its maximum capacity of 7 million barrels per day, with about 2 million barrels supplying domestic refineries and roughly 5 million barrels available for export.

The IEA indicated that this volume represents most of Saudi Arabia’s pre-conflict crude exports via the Strait of Hormuz.

However, this also constitutes a stress test for the infrastructure. The IEA emphasized that the pipeline has never operated at full capacity over an extended period. According to LSEG data, average daily loadings at Yanbu port in the first nine days of March reached 2.2 million barrels, up significantly from 1.1 million barrels per day in February.

Kpler data suggest that March loadings could involve at least 40 vessels, potentially pushing exports above 4 million barrels per day. Traders noted that Yanbu port has a handling capacity exceeding 4.5 million barrels per day but has historically rarely exceeded 2.5 million barrels.

Historical context: A pipeline built for wartime needs.

The Saudi East-West Pipeline was originally constructed in response to Persian Gulf crises. In the early 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war threatened shipping safety in the Persian Gulf, prompting Saudi Arabia to build this trans-Arabian pipeline to ensure crude could bypass conflict zones and reach the Red Sea directly.

According to a 1983 Saudi Aramco internal newsletter, more than 7,000 workers completed the project over four years, supervised by a division of Mobil Oil. The first crude was delivered in 1981. To lay accompanying natural gas byproduct pipelines, the construction team used 2,000 tons of explosives to blast a trench across the Arabian Peninsula.

The pipeline was designed to bring Saudi exports closer to Western markets, though today the majority of Saudi crude exports go to Asia.

There was also a missed expansion opportunity in the past. In early 1990, Iraq and Saudi Arabia jointly opened a large pipeline intended to transport Iraqi crude directly to Yanbu, further expanding Red Sea export capacity. However, just seven months later, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the pipeline was abandoned, never entering operation.

The Fujairah route offers a "second export path," but shifting freight costs and price differentials are reshaping trade dynamics.

The UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline transports Abu Dhabi crude to Fujairah port on the Gulf of Oman, providing another Hormuz bypass option.

IEA data show the pipeline’s maximum capacity is around 1.8 million barrels per day, with pre-conflict flows at approximately 1.1 million barrels per day.

Companies are also feeling cost pressures. Petrobras noted that Saudi Arabia has fulfilled supply commitments via the pipeline, but rising shipping costs are becoming a major concern.

The scarcity of alternative crude is reflected in price structures. One signal is the premium for Omani crude, which can be loaded outside the strait, over the Dubai benchmark, which is loaded from the Fateh terminal inside the strait and is difficult to reroute.

Security risks are spreading beyond the strait: pipelines, ports, and Red Sea routes are new weak points.

Alternative routes are not "safe corridors." Market participants worry that as the importance of these pipelines grows, they may become more direct targets.

Analysts warn that little prevents Tehran from shifting its focus to Saudi and UAE pipelines.

Port-level risks have already emerged. Fujairah port was damaged in a recent attempted drone attack, prompting some fuel suppliers to withdraw from contracts.

Risks also extend to the Red Sea. In 2024, the Iran-aligned Houthi group in Yemen launched dozens of attacks on commercial vessels. Although they have not resumed attacks during the current conflict, the threat remains. British maritime security firm Ambrey has advised vessels linked to the U.S. and Israel to avoid the Red Sea.

A March 5 report highlighted that France, Italy, and Greece are coordinating military deployments to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, underscoring the route’s importance and the complex military dynamics in the region.

These factors are introducing new variables into current oil prices.

Against the backdrop of the Strait of Hormuz disruption, loading schedules at Yanbu and Fujairah, the stable operation of the East-West and Habshan–Fujairah pipelines, and any security incidents targeting these facilities will collectively determine whether the supply gap widens or narrows.

For investors, the focus has shifted from strait transit alone to the capacity utilization of alternative routes, regional price differentials and freight costs, and any new signs of infrastructure damage.