So Young announced its entry into the offline medical aesthetics clinic business, extending its reach into the upstream supply chain. This move has caused public rifts and conflicts of interest throughout the medical aesthetics industry.

So Young's recent second-quarter results show that So Young Youth Clinics generated total revenue of 144 million yuan, a year-over-year increase of 426.1%. This marks the seventh consecutive quarter of growth for So Young's chain business, which has become the group's largest revenue source for the first time.

However, behind this growth lies widespread criticism from numerous medical aesthetics institutions accusing So Young of "betrayal" and "biting the hand that feeds," including some of its own advertising clients. One industry practitioner publicly criticized So Young, stating: "They don't understand business rules. They were supposed to be the referee, but now the referee has entered the game. This is particularly unseemly behavior in business."

Regarding the criticism of "acting as both referee and player," So Young acknowledged that this move has caused resistance from some partner institutions in the short term, with some leading institutions withdrawing from the So Young platform. "However, management believes that the courage for self-revolution is an advantage rather than a disadvantage. We actively communicate with institutions to explain and jointly seek long-term cooperative win-win models."

**Former Allies Turn Against Platform**

So Young's online and offline businesses are experiencing intense conflicts.

In November 2024, So Young officially launched its self-operated light medical aesthetics chain—SOYOUNG CLINIC So Young Youth Clinics. Reports indicate that as of August 2025, So Young Youth Clinics had 33 locations, with expectations to reach 50 by year-end, and So Young has clearly stated there will be more stores in the future.

As the formerly largest online medical aesthetics platform, So Young's entry into offline medical aesthetics institutions inevitably faces questions of "acting as both referee and player," with deeper issues of trust breakdown and ecosystem backlash from "stealing customers' customers."

In April this year, So Young Group Chairman and CEO Jin Xing stated in a media interview that So Young began planning its transformation several years ago. However, transitioning from online to offline means former customers become competitors, with many medical aesthetics chain executives questioning him: Are you here to "steal business"?

Media previously disclosed that the most intense conflict occurred during the opening of a So Young Youth Clinic in a Beijing shopping mall.

The store next door belonged to a large Chinese private medical aesthetics group, also one of So Young's major clients with annual advertising spending of tens of millions of yuan. The private medical aesthetics group's chairman demanded that the soon-to-open So Young Youth Clinic relocate, threatening to withdraw all cooperation worth tens of millions on the So Young platform. When So Young decided to proceed with the opening, both parties terminated all cooperation.

According to sources, such cases of "turning against former allies" have been common since So Young began attacking the offline market.

Lily (pseudonym), a former So Young employee, revealed: "Some medical aesthetics chains had very close relationships with So Young, some likely had investment activities, or were major clients with annual investments. The bosses often supported each other publicly, but after So Young announced its offline expansion, their relationships haven't been as good."

When the platform becomes a direct competitor, the trust foundation between partner institutions and the platform has cracked, even showing signs of "de-So Young-ization."

She exemplified: "Medical aesthetics institutions' equipment now displays Meituan logos and advertisements everywhere, with So Young's logos barely visible." These changes began after So Young entered the offline clinic business, competing with platform institutions for profits.

"This is 'biting the hand that feeds' behavior," said one medical aesthetics industry practitioner. "So Young's self-built medical aesthetics clinics directly compete with platform partner institutions, inevitably diverting some customers. This impact is more pronounced for small and medium-sized institutions with weaker brand power, potentially threatening their survival space."

**Surface Avoidance, Hidden Traffic Diversion?**

Regarding the criticism of "acting as both referee and player," So Young acknowledged that this move caused resistance from some partner institutions in the short term, with some leading institutions withdrawing from the platform. "However, management believes that courage for self-revolution is an advantage rather than a disadvantage. We actively communicate with institutions to explain and jointly seek long-term cooperative win-win models."

Additionally, So Young responded: "Self-operated chains and platform services are actually complementary rather than zero-sum. Our self-operated business is limited to routine light medical aesthetics projects. For higher-end or personalized needs, users can still find quality doctors and institutions on the So Young platform. The two business segments have different focuses and will jointly meet different levels of medical aesthetics consumption needs."

When asked how to ensure fair platform evaluation of third-party institutions and whether So Young's self-operated Youth Clinic business receives more traffic allocation, So Young stated: "So Young Youth Clinics have not been listed on the So Young App to date."

So Young Youth Clinic customer service further revealed the separation strategy of So Young's business model—the main So Young App maintains platform attributes, aggregating third-party medical aesthetics institution information, while self-operated Youth Clinics operate through independent apps and mini-programs.

However, is this "separation strategy" a sincere effort to maintain boundaries, or sophisticated maneuvering of "surface avoidance, hidden traffic diversion"?

Testing revealed that the So Young App indeed lacks obvious "Youth Clinic" traffic diversion content, and searching "So Young Youth" results in "no related products found."

However, switching to the "Institutions" portal clearly shows So Young Youth Clinic store addresses and contact information. Additionally, under the "Doctors" section, complete information about So Young Youth Clinic physicians is visible, including specialties, professional backgrounds, and user reviews.

This structural design suggests So Young intentionally distinguishes its owned clinic business from third-party platform products, avoiding direct competition impressions at the "product" level while directing traffic to self-operated businesses through institution and doctor portals. This strategy somewhat maintains the platform's neutral image while not truly abandoning user referrals to self-operated clinics.

When asked whether "So Young platform traffic can completely avoid directing to Youth Clinics," So Young Youth Clinic customer service avoided the question, only stating: "We're not clear about that. We haven't launched on the App and haven't competed with them for traffic."

**Why CEO Jin Xing Risks "Universal Opposition"**

Site visits to a So Young Youth Clinic in Beijing revealed steady customer flow even on weekdays, requiring advance appointments for service. Staff disclosed: "Weekends are busier, often requiring queuing."

Regarding differences between Youth Clinics and other market medical aesthetics institutions, staff stated: "We mainly focus on cost-effectiveness. So Young is listed on NASDAQ, and manufacturers are eager to cooperate with us, so they have to offer discounts even if they don't want to."

However, So Young's "price war" has similarly caused dissatisfaction among upstream and downstream partners, even triggering a "war of words."

For example, So Young Youth Clinics' "Miracle Youth" project combines Aivlan youth injections with Haiyuelan hydrating treatments, priced at 5,999 yuan per injection. Aivlan brand owner Changchun Saint-Biomat Biological Materials Co., Ltd. officially guides pricing at 18,800 yuan per injection.

So Young's "price-breaking" behavior has drawn upstream manufacturer criticism. Previously, Saint-Biomat issued an official statement claiming: "Aivlan youth injections sold by So Young's self-operated 'So Young Youth Clinics' were not purchased through authorized channels, and doctors haven't received brand professional training, creating 'authentic product risks and operational hazards.'" Facing Saint-Biomat's accusations, So Young responded: "All products sold support national UDI system verification, and doctor qualifications are legal and compliant." Simultaneously, So Young accused Saint-Biomat of "baseless smearing" and "interfering with pricing rights."

Why does So Young CEO Jin Xing risk "universal opposition" to persistently expand offline business?

Former So Young employee Lily frankly stated: "Under competition from major platforms like Meituan and Douyin, So Young's later advertising service revenue wasn't good, with intermittent layoffs. Since the pandemic, the company has been continuously seeking other paths, planning second curves early, even hiring McKinsey teams for strategy. Various internal experiments were conducted, but later verification showed these approaches weren't viable."

She explained: "Jin Xing didn't suddenly decide to enter offline business on a whim, but through a lengthy process, including acquiring Qizhi Laser in 2021 and later launching the exclusive Korean pavilion, which made many industry people unhappy at the time, feeling So Young organizing Korean doctor teams was stealing others' business. Actually, his offline ambitions involved laying out quite a large strategic game."

Meanwhile, during the transformation painful period, So Young's performance faced a waterloo. Latest financial reports show second-quarter total revenue of 378.7 million yuan, compared to 407.4 million yuan in the same period of 2024, a 7% year-over-year decline; net loss of 36 million yuan, compared to net profit of 18.9 million yuan in the same period of 2024; under Non-GAAP, So Young's adjusted net loss was 30.5 million yuan, compared to net profit of 22.2 million yuan in the same period of 2024.

Regarding the 7% year-over-year revenue decline, company CFO Zhao Hui stated during the earnings call: "This was mainly due to reduced numbers of medical institutions subscribing to platform information services."

So Young responded: "While traditional online information and booking business revenue declined year-over-year, offline light medical aesthetics chain business rose rapidly, with single-quarter revenue surging 426% year-over-year to 144 million yuan, achieving seven consecutive quarters of high growth. Chain revenue first became the group's largest source in June this year, marking a revenue focus shift from pure platform services to self-operated medical services. Youth Clinic chains have become So Young's new growth engine. Leveraging brand recognition and national layout advantages, offline customer traffic increased 85-fold within two years, establishing the group's second growth curve."