Is POP MART a sustainable IP platform with continuous value creation, or merely a hitmaker that happened to catch a favorable trend? A plush creature has sparked two contrasting narratives.
On the evening of April 30th, POP MART's first refrigerator product went on sale simultaneously on JD.com and Tmall. The 'THE MONSTERS Life Series' refrigerators, with two versions each limited to 999 units, were priced at 5,999 yuan. By the time of sale, over 60,000 people had registered interest on JD.com, and the product sold out immediately.
The secondary market erupted instantly. Some media reported that prices on the 'dewu' platform briefly surged to 20,999 yuan. Some buyers explicitly stated they wouldn't even plug the refrigerator in, planning to display it next to their toy cabinets.
Six days later, on May 6th, Wang Ning, founder and CEO of POP MART, appeared on a podcast, revealing that internally, they had been "rationally cooling down" since the peak of LABUBU's popularity last year. He disclosed that to prevent透支 of traffic, the company had paused new product releases for LABUBU, offline marketing, and various store opening and licensing collaborations. Many products originally slated for 2025 have been pushed back to 2026.
This move of applying the brakes highlights two realities.
On March 25th, POP MART released its 2025 report card: revenue of 37.12 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 184.7%; adjusted net profit of 13.08 billion yuan, up 284.5%; gross profit margin of 72.1%. On the day of the earnings release, the stock price plummeted 22.5%, followed by another 10.46% drop the next day, resulting in a cumulative decline of over 30% in two trading sessions.
As of the close on May 8th, POP MART's stock price was 168.10 Hong Kong dollars. Although there has been some recent recovery, the price has halved from its historical peak of 339.80 Hong Kong dollars in August last year, erasing over 200 billion Hong Kong dollars in market capitalization.
Just as the market worried that POP MART's growth神话 was ending, the plot took a dramatic turn. Duan Yongping, known for value investing, began publicly supporting POP MART on the 'Xueqiu' platform since March, declaring himself a fan of Wang Ning. On May 7th, Duan Yongping announced he had sold his entire position in China Shenhua and used the full proceeds to buy POP MART stock.
The market's恐慌 contrasts sharply with Duan Yongping's contrarian move, making POP MART's long-term value worthy of deeper analysis.
Over the past year, POP MART seemingly caught every favorable trend. LABUBU evolved into a global消费符号, with THE MONSTERS series annual revenue surpassing 14 billion yuan, directly driving the company's gross margin above 72%. Overseas stores saw a net increase of 100, revenue from the Americas market grew 748% year-on-year, and the TikTok channel topped US sales charts. Employee headcount surpassed 10,000, and the company's market capitalization一度突破 420 billion Hong Kong dollars.
However, internal pressure accumulated alongside this high-speed operation. POP MART's inventory膨胀 from 1.5 billion yuan to 5.473 billion yuan, the cash conversion cycle lengthened by nearly a month, and the efficiency of converting profits into cash flow declined. When the growth rate fell from triple digits to what Wang Ning described in the earnings call as "not less than 20%," the market's pricing logic for the company was reset.
When a sports car shifts from full-throttle冲刺 to巡航 mode, every unusual engine sound is amplified. Wang Ning's inward-focused restructuring moves against the prevailing热潮. He gave the company's 2025 performance a score of 90 to 95, but only 70 for organizational management. He likened the past year's growth to "a novice driving an F1 car"—it looks爽 from the outside, but the internal pressure is immense. He described 2026 as a "pit stop year."
To sustain high growth on a scale of tens of billions in revenue, expanding production capacity and increasing distribution density are necessary. However, large-scale mass production持续侵蚀 IP稀缺性,蚕食 consumer收藏信心, and ultimately反噬毛利率 and brand调性. This is POP MART's growth悖论. During this period, Wang Ning also faces a more fundamental question: how can an organization resist the expansion惯性 formed by rapid growth?
Is POP MART a sustainable IP platform that can create value and穿越周期, or a hitmaker that happened to catch a trend and will eventually回归平庸? From a financial perspective, the truth lies somewhere in between. POP MART is indeed evolving towards platformization, but the trend of LABUBU's contribution比例不降反升 also indicates that this platform capability is not yet fully mature.
This article will deconstruct the causes and boundaries of this value reassessment from three dimensions: valuation logic, growth structure, and business model, based on a financial perspective.
Market Panic: A Perfect Report Card with Three Warning Signs Capital markets trade not on the past, but on pricing the future. The earnings report released on March 25th sent three signals that prompted swift investor action.
The first signal is the落差 in growth guidance. With 2025 revenue growth at 184.7%, Wang Ning's growth target for 2026 given during the earnings call was "not less than 20%." The骤降 from triple digits to the 20% range directly shattered POP MART's valuation foundation as a growth stock.
Within the framework of a discounted cash flow model, when the market compresses the assumption for the high-growth period from 5 years to 3-5 years, and lowers the perpetual growth rate from 5%-8% to 3%-5%, a company's valuation undergoes a systematic downward shift. Taking POP MART as an example, valuation estimates based on狂热期 parameters could reach as high as 3.8 trillion Hong Kong dollars, but switching to理性假设 brings it down to around 220 billion Hong Kong dollars.
The second signal is that 37.1 billion yuan "fell slightly short." POP MART's actual 2025 revenue of 37.12 billion yuan was about 800 million yuan less than the market's普遍预期 of 37.96 billion yuan. Under normal circumstances, such a gap would be ignored. However, at a moment of tense market sentiment, both the业绩 and guidance falling short of expectations directly动摇 investor信心 in盈利能见度.
The third signal is the orderly撤离 by institutions. On the day of the earnings release, short-selling成交额 reached 4.63 billion Hong Kong dollars, a record high since listing. Foreign席位 like Citibank and Guotai Junan International were the main净卖出方, while southbound capital was consistently净买入. The激烈分歧 between多方 and空方 indicates one thing: POP MART stands at a十字路口 of valuation范式切换. Some see a泡沫破裂, others see a错杀机会.
Overall, by reassessing enterprise value through the DCF model, this stock price回调更像一次迟到的估值与基本面的重新匹配.
Looking back at 2025, POP MART's stock price rose from around 90 Hong Kong dollars at the beginning of the year to a peak of 339.80 Hong Kong dollars, a maximum increase of over 350%. Behind this涨势 was the market's过度乐观预期 regarding its "IP神话," "globalization breakthrough," and "category upgrade," which pushed the valuation to form a溢价脱离基本面. The current回调 is also the必然结果 of the market switching from狂热期假设 to理性调整.
Growth Model "Becoming Heavier": Where Did the Money Go? If the growth guidance was the导火索, the details in the balance sheet and cash flow statement are the炸药. From the financial report, POP MART's income statement依然光芒万丈, but marginal changes have appeared in the quality of growth.
The膨胀速度 of inventory is the most直观. Inventory at the end of 2025 was 5.473 billion yuan, a 258.9% increase from 1.525 billion yuan the previous year, far exceeding the 184.7% revenue growth rate. Inventory turnover days lengthened from 100.98 days to 121.63 days, and the turnover rate dropped from 3.56 times to 2.96 times. The speed of producing goods has already surpassed the speed of selling them.
POP MART's inventory is already at a high level. Once the热度 of core IPs回落, inventory pressure could shift from a growth推力 to a去化压力 and even a减值风险.
More值得关注的 is the efficiency of converting profits into cash flow. In 2025, net profit was 12.776 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 308.8%. However, net cash flow from operating activities was only 10.865 billion yuan, with a growth rate of 119.3%,明显落后于 profit growth. The ratio of operating cash flow to net profit dropped from 1.59 times in 2024 to 0.85 times. For every 1 yuan of账面利润 earned, the actual cash回笼缩水 from 1.59 yuan to 0.85 yuan.
Where did the money go? POP MART's working capital变动 turned from a positive 246 million yuan to a negative 3.55 billion yuan, with大量现金被锁定 in inventory and operational items. The cash conversion cycle also lengthened. Accounts receivable turnover days decreased from 11.03 days to 6.78 days, indicating an actual improvement in collection efficiency. However, accounts payable turnover days decreased from 60.49 days to 49.86 days, meaning the company is paying its upstream suppliers faster and not using extended payment terms to缓冲现金压力.
This change至少说明 that during the rapid business expansion phase, the company未能有效借助 supply chain credit to对冲营运资本占用, and its reliance on自有资金反而有所增强.
Overall, the company's cash conversion cycle lengthened from 51.52 days to 78.55 days. For a consumer company in a high-growth stage whose valuation highly依赖于 future expansion expectations, a lengthening cash conversion cycle is often more值得警惕 than单纯的利润波动. This is because it意味着 that every additional unit of future revenue requires占用更多资金去支撑.
For high-valuation growth stocks, what the market is most sensitive to is often not the absolute value of profit, but the兑现质量 of profit. Profit growth certainly enhances valuation想象力, but if cash flow cannot keep up and working capital持续吞噬现金, then the market begins to质疑 how long such growth can be maintained and at what cost.
POP MART's 2025 financial report reveals a切换 in growth mode. The income statement依然强劲, but pressure on the balance sheet and cash flow statement同步上升. Previously, the market viewed it as a high-margin, high-turnover, high-elasticity IP consumer company. As inventory, working capital, and the cash conversion cycle face同步承压, the market has shifted to审视 its growth path from a "heavy operational constraints" perspective.
In summary, inventory growth exceeding revenue growth, slowing inventory turnover, working capital consuming大量现金, a lengthening cash conversion cycle, and operating cash flow growth明显落后于 net profit growth... These indicators do not yet constitute financial risks, as the company's current ratio and quick ratio remain in safe ranges. However, they意味着 the growth model is changing, and POP MART is transitioning from "light爆发" to "负重前行."
Especially when management's增速预期也回归到 the 20% range, the market valuation锚点 will shift from profit growth rate to asset turnover efficiency and cash flow兑现质量.
Awaiting the Next LABUBU: How Far Can Growth Sustained by a Single Hit Go? POP MART is IP-centric, building a comprehensive operational platform covering the entire潮玩 industry chain across five areas: global artist discovery, IP incubation and operation, consumer触达,潮玩文化 promotion, and关联产业 investment and integration.
The定价分歧 in the market regarding POP MART本质上 is a clash between two商业认知.
Bulls are drawing a blueprint for an IP platform company, believing it has built high-stickiness user assets and a diverse IP matrix. Bears are replaying the script of a hit cycle stock, believing潮玩消费热度易逝 and难以穿越周期.
POP MART's cumulative registered member总数 in mainland China jumped from 19.58 million at the end of 2021 to 72.58 million at the end of 2025, an increase of over 270% in 5 years. The company's core sales almost entirely originate from its membership system, with会员贡献销售占比始终保持在 above 90%, reaching 93.7% in 2025.
Although the repurchase rate has fluctuated, it显著回升至 55.7% in 2025, demonstrating POP MART's high会员黏性和忠诚度. This意味着 POP MART is no longer selling单纯的玩具, but a ticket to the情感消费 of the young generation. POP MART确实在向平台化进化, but the trend of LABUBU's占比不降反升 also表明 that this平台化能力尚未完全成熟.
Specifically: 1. LABUBU: Half the Kingdom and the Problem of Contingency THE MONSTERS series revenue in 2025 was 14.161 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 365.72%, marking the birth of POP MART's first十亿级 IP. Its revenue增量贡献 accounted for nearly half of the company's annual增量. Plush product pricing is higher than traditional blind boxes, coupled with higher溢价 for overseas goods, directly拉高 the company's overall毛利率 to 72.10%.
However, the偶然性 of hits is evident. Wang Ning has多次公开表达 that LABUBU's global爆红 began with an unexpected明星效应, and such "意外爆款"难以标准化复制. The capital market始终在审慎怀疑: Can POP MART持续孵化出 the next IP of同等体量? With the release of THE MONSTERS 4.0 series and放大 of supply, some普通款 have already跌破官方售价 in the二级市场,弱化 the金融炒作属性 of the IP.
In an interview this May, Wang Ning透露 that the company主动暂停 new product releases, offline marketing, and various对外合作 during LABUBU's peak热度, stating "letting it自然降温反而能延长生命周期." This说明 management已意识到 the脆弱性 of超级IP热度 and is choosing to主动控速.
2. IP Matrix: One Superstar and Many Strong Players, with a Structural断层 On the surface, POP MART has built a庞大的 IP matrix.
In 2025, 17 of the company's IPs generated over 100 million yuan in revenue. Six IPs, including SKULLPANDA (3.54 billion yuan), CRYBABY (2.929 billion yuan), MOLLY (2.897 billion yuan), DIMOO (2.777 billion yuan), and 星星人 (2.056 billion yuan), entered the 2-billion-yuan club.
However, upon closer inspection, the second梯队离领头羊差得还是太远. The revenue gap between SKULLPANDA and LABUBU is高达 10.6 billion yuan, almost the annual体量 of a medium-sized IP. Once LABUBU's growth rate slows, other IPs难以平滑 the company's overall growth curve.
The增速分化 between new and old IPs is also警醒. 星星人, signed in 2024, saw revenue暴增 1601.81% to 2.056 billion yuan in 2025, showcasing POP MART's IP孵化潜能. However, the growth rate of the classic IP MOLLY同期 was only 38.41%,显著低于 the company's overall level.
The consumer base for mature IPs趋于稳定, and the增量动能 driven by新鲜感正在衰减. Can单纯靠形象迭代 maintain long-term high growth? This is a problem POP MART cannot绕不开.
MOLLY's "precedent" is worth参考. In 2017, MOLLY一度占 POP MART's own-brand revenue by 89.4%,支撑起近乎全部 company growth. Subsequently, its热度回落, with revenue占比 dropping to 62.9% in 2018 and further to 32.9% in 2019.
After the 2021 peak, POP MART's stock price fell from over 70 Hong Kong dollars to less than 10 Hong Kong dollars at one point. Currently, LABUBU's revenue占比已近 40%, becoming the new超级顶流. Could it potentially重蹈 MOLLY覆辙? Once its热度褪去, can the company quickly find the next接替者?
3. Overseas Market: Growth Shifting Gears on a High Base Overseas was a key引擎 for POP MART's 2025 performance: overseas revenue was 16.268 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 291.89%, with revenue占比 rising from 31.80% to 43.80%. Revenue from the Americas market was 6.806 billion yuan, up 748.40%; revenue from the European market was 1.451 billion yuan, up 506.30%.
However, the pressure of a high base has already materialized in the first quarter of 2026. Bloomberg, citing Bloomberg Second Measure credit card transaction data, reported that POP MART's US market grew 130% year-on-year in January, dropped to 41% in February, and turned negative year-on-year in March, declining 45%. Analysts pointed out that new products集中上线 in January-February, with动能快速衰减, and consumer acceptance of non-LABUBU IP products remains limited.
Behind the高速增长, the隐忧 of边际放缓 growth has already emerged, especially as operational复杂性持续提升. The rapid store expansion overseas places更高要求 on supply chain response speed, localization marketing capabilities, and international talent储备. After粗放式扩张, improving operational efficiency will become关键 for the sustained growth of POP MART's overseas business.
Management has already begun adjusting its North American strategy. According to an April expert interview纪要 from BOC International, the North American team focused on铺货与开店 in 2025, leading to a错配 between product supply and local消费偏好.修复方向 includes: signing North American local artists to develop products, increasing production capacity at the Mexico factory to cover about 85% of North American supply, and shifting from online channels to flagship store/large store experience-driven brand认知.
The Paradox of Growth and Scarcity: How Long Can an IP Stay Hot? POP MART's long-term maintenance of超高毛利率根源在于情感溢价, and the core支撑 of情感溢价 is稀缺性. The收藏属性 brought by this稀缺性 is closer to a "Veblen good" in economics—the stronger the稀缺性, the higher the溢价, and反而越大 the吸引力.
Reviewing the performance of the past 5 years, POP MART's gross margin climbed from 61.4% in 2021 to 72.1% in 2025, relying precisely on头部IP爆款效应 and稀缺机制—but商业扩张要求持续扩产放量.
In 2025, LABUBU's monthly production capacity提升至 50 million units.大规模铺货 directly led to收窄溢价 in the二级市场. Early MOLLY隐藏款溢价 could reach over 10 times, but now most series have缩水至 2-3 times, with some styles跌破发行价.
This is POP MART's growth悖论: to支撑百亿级营收的高增长, it must扩大产能、提高铺货密度. But大规模量产会持续侵蚀 IP稀缺性,蚕食消费者的收藏信心, and ultimately反噬毛利率与品牌调性.
Wang Ning once said: "Our success is not the success of blind boxes, but the success of balancing商业 and艺术. Art seeks uniqueness, but商业 seeks universality. This is a矛盾, and what we do is try to achieve balance." When the speed of规模扩张越过平衡的临界点, this矛盾以前所未有的锐度暴露出来.
The潮玩 industry has a规律: IP lifecycles generally follow a curve of孵化、成长、成熟、衰退, with the average热度周期 for hits around 18 to 24 months. The vast majority of IPs remain at a浅层 of形象驱动、产品变现, lacking long-term叙事支撑与情感内核,难以穿越周期成为经典. This is the "Achilles' heel" of the industry's IP lifecycle, and also a结构性短板 that POP MART cannot回避.
Compared to the mature "content-first, world-building foundation" model of global IP giants like Disney, POP MART's IP operation path is "形象出圈、盲盒爆卖、多品类延伸." Consumer喜爱 for LABUBU and MOLLY更多停留在 visual and emotional层面, lacking深度认同 with the characters.
POP MART显然意识到了这一短板 and has明显加大 content and场景投入 in recent years: announcing cooperation with Sony Pictures to create a live-action/animation film for LABUBU;推进 the opening of Phase 1.5 of POP LAND theme park;同时布局 small appliances, desserts, accessories, and other多元业态, attempting to use场景延长 IP寿命.
But whether the film can be made well is未知数. Especially since LABUBU's爆火同样依赖 design style and social传播, rather than积累 based on mature stories. Transforming a visual symbol into a银幕故事 that can打动大众 is难度远超 product iteration. POP MART's expertise lies in IP工业化孵化, product落地, and渠道销售. It is几乎从零起步 in film/TV screenwriting, world-building, and long-content operation; its content工业化能力尚待培育.
However, in a recent interview, Wang Ning offered a different解释. He likened LABUBU to a "Messi-style sports star," not a Disney-style影视角色. He believes LABUBU is not driven by stories, but by universal aesthetic appeal,高频产品迭代, and long-term陪伴感. "People don't need Messi to have a story; he can make people happy just by being there. The logic for LABUBU is the same."
This定位明确切割 POP MART's IP model from Disney's: the former follows the "image as content" sports star route, the latter follows the "story-driven image"影视工业 route. Which path can支撑更长的 IP生命周期 is currently尚无定论. But at least, this比喻为理解 POP MART's IP model提供了一个新刻度.
POP MART's股价重挫 is a切换 in valuation范式. The market is重新定价 it from an unpredictable爆发式增长股 to a稳健成长股 with higher可见度. When growth回落至 the 20% range from triple digits, cash flow quality, profitability, and护城河宽度 will become更重要的估值定价因子.
In the future, market attention on POP MART will focus on three indicators: Can the revenue占比 of a single IP drop below 30%, proving the platform's抗风险能力? Can the overseas单店模型 deliver精细化 data, verifying that globalization is not "烧钱换增长"? Can content建设 achieve实质进展, injecting a穿越周期的文化内核 into IPs?
"Respect time, respect operations." These eight words spoken by Wang Ning或许正是 the注脚 for the潮玩产业 to穿越周期. Disney spent decades establishing Mickey's cultural status; Sanrio has cultivated Hello Kitty for over half a century. It took POP MART nearly 8 years from its founding in 2010 for MOLLY to破圈, and LABUBU's global爆火 has been less than 2 years.
But now, the market doesn't只看过去了. After experiencing估值泡沫与理性回归, companies truly possessing IP运营能力 will ultimately赢得 "时间的复利." Before that, every wave of market热情 may be浇上一盆冷水 by理性预期.