The once-quiet Gracewine (Gracewine) has re-emerged prominently in the industry spotlight.

On December 15, 2025, as 1919 (Sichuan Yijiujiujiu Platform Technology Co., Ltd.) was embroiled in controversy over "franchisee debt collection," its founder, Yiling Jiang, made a counter-cyclical move. He acquired a 73.63% stake in Gracewine through related holding platforms, becoming the controlling shareholder and actual controller of this Hong Kong-listed company.

Just over a month after the change in control, on February 3, 2026, Gracewine announced a board reshuffle. Executives with 1919 experience—Yunqiang Liu, Xia Xiong, and Mingjun Zhao—were appointed as executive directors, with Guodong Zhao as a non-executive director. Industry experts spanning FMCG strategy, capital market operations, and winemaking R&D—Renrong Wang, Mingshu Liang, and Yan Xu—were appointed as independent non-executive directors.

More intriguingly, on May 12, 2026, Gracewine established six wholly-owned subsidiaries in Qionglai, Chengdu: Yiniang, Yijiu, Yilian, Yiwang, Yidian, and Yishu. The legal representative for all six is Gracewine's board chairman, Yunqiang Liu.

The business scope of these companies covers core areas including alcoholic beverage production, brand operations, B2B trading platforms, premium wine sales, retail stores, e-commerce, data assets, and IT system services, signaling a comprehensive transformation into an integrated wine industry platform.

At a time when 1919 is under intense market scrutiny for "tight capital chains" and "franchisee debt collection," why did Yiling Jiang personally take control of Gracewine?

What is the strategic intent behind establishing six companies at once? Is this a meticulously planned strategy or a high-stakes gamble by Yiling Jiang?

**A Look at the Company's Financial History**

Why did Yiling Jiang choose Gracewine?

Founded in 1997, Gracewine has a 29-year history. Headquartered in the Taigu Green Ecological Agriculture Demonstration Zone in Jinzhong, Shanxi, it focuses on a boutique winery model.

In June 2018, Gracewine successfully listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, becoming the first listed boutique winery in China and the first listed wine company from Shanxi.

However, its performance since listing has been unremarkable, fluctuating between profit and loss. Out of eight years listed (2018-2025), it reported losses for four years, with the highest annual net profit attributable to shareholders reaching only RMB 10.22 million.

A key reason was its deviation from its core business through盲目扩张. In 2019, Gracewine acquired 100% of Wanhao Asia for HKD 15 million, bringing its subsidiary, Fujian Dexi Wine Co., Ltd. (focusing on whisky and gin production), into the fold to enter the whisky赛道.

This move did not boost revenue; that year, the company saw increased revenue but profits plummeted to just RMB 30,000.

In 2020, Gracewine continued investing in whisky, injecting approximately RMB 78.6 million into its distillery operations. Due to declining wine sales and the drag from the whisky venture, Gracewine recorded its first post-listing loss.

Performance recovered somewhat in 2021 but fell back into loss in 2022. It was not until the second half of 2023 that Gracewine's distillery officially began whisky production and launched a gin series, allowing the company to return to profitability.

In 2024, Gracewine posted its largest loss since listing, as its diversification strategy failed to deliver as expected. Consequently, just months after the whisky distillery became fully operational, Gracewine剥离了 it, selling the distillery business and related assets to controlling shareholder Fang Chen for HKD 71.28 million, recording an impairment loss of approximately HKD 25.7 million.

In 2025, Gracewine's performance improved, with revenue reaching RMB 34.881 million, a 9.4% year-on-year increase. Its net loss attributable to shareholders narrowed by 94.73%, but it remained unprofitable, with a net loss of RMB 2.163 million.

Compared to industry leaders like张裕 and长城, Gracewine is smaller in scale and has weaker risk resilience. In terms of channels, it primarily relies on high-end outlets like星级酒店, lacking deep布局 in traditional distributor channels, supermarket channels, and e-commerce.

Objectively, Gracewine possesses solid foundational capabilities. It holds the distinction of being "the first listed domestic winery," has an annual production capacity of 3,000 tons, and has gained a foothold in the高端 market with series like "Chateau Reserve" and "Deep Blue," even being selected as the business class wine for Cathay Pacific. It is one of China's earliest boutique wineries.

For Yiling Jiang,介入 at this point aligns with "value investment" logic, acquiring a港股上市 platform with production capabilities at a relatively low cost.

Yiling Jiang founded 1919, one of China's earliest酒类即时零售 brands, with over 3,000 stores nationwide covering more than 300 cities and累计融资 exceeding RMB 4 billion. A RMB 2 billion strategic investment from Alibaba in 2018 once propelled it to its peak.

Regrettably, the path for 1919's independent listing is largely closed. In recent years,监管 for domestic酒类企业 IPOs and capitalization has tightened. For 1919, which focuses on distribution, traditional avenues are almost blocked.

Listing in Hong Kong is feasible, but 1919's historical equity structure is complex and multi-layered. Direct操作 could face obstacles in audit and legal processes.

Taking a company public has been Yiling Jiang's long-held ambition. 1919 listed on the New Third Board in 2014, aiming for the capital markets, but failed to achieve an A-share listing before delisting in June 2023. Yiling Jiang has not given up,多次公开表示 he will continue推进资本化进程.

From an industry perspective, Yiling Jiang is confident in the capabilities accumulated over 20+ years and the full industry chain he built. He hopes the industry will embrace and integrate into his "CBF Strategy" (Consumer端 - Channel端 - Production端).

With 1919's上市困难, Gracewine's platform is ready-made. As a Hong Kong-listed酒企, its clean equity structure, mature酿造 assets, and compliant capital通道恰好 become a compliant, low-cost, high-certainty vehicle for industry and capital.

Based on this, it's不难理解 why Yiling Jiang counter-cyclically acquired control of Gracewine. His true ambition extends beyond just a wine company; gaining control is merely the first step towards his goal.

**Strategic Intent Behind the Six New Entities**

What exactly does Yiling Jiang intend to do with Gracewine? The market has waited nearly half a year for an answer, which now seems apparent.

Judging by the post-reshuffle board structure, Yiling Jiang is not seeking a shell to "inject 1919 into" but rather to autonomously重建 the entire distribution system within Gracewine.

On May 12, 2026, Yilian, Yishu, Yijiu, Yiniang, Yiwang, and Yidian—these six wholly-owned subsidiaries were established on the same day, all with Gracewine's board chairman Yunqiang Liu as legal representative. Their registered addresses are all in Qionglai, Chengdu, the same city as 1919's headquarters.

An examination of these six companies' business scopes reveals they align perfectly with Yiling Jiang's "CBF模式" strategy, covering production to logistics, mid-office to channels, retail to consumption: Yiniang handles production/brewing; Yilian manages supply chain and procurement; Yishu builds the digital底层; Yijiu operates a B2B matching platform; Yiwang covers全域电商; and Yidian handles终端门店 management.

Thus, Gracewine is no longer merely a wine producer but an integrated酒业 platform encompassing production, channels, and sales.

Furthermore, industry sources indicate Qionglai has long played a "super奶妈" role in China's酒业 landscape. At its peak, it hosted over 1,600酒企, accounting for 70% of Sichuan's原酒外输量.

Registering all six subsidiaries in Chengdu's Qionglai may allow Gracewine to leverage the region's成熟的代工全产业链, providing ammunition for its全渠道 retail布局.

This approach is not the并购 or借壳 previously speculated by the industry, but rather能力复用. Yiling Jiang is deconstructing the商业方法论 tested at 1919 and重新 "transferring" it into Gracewine.

Establishing six subsidiaries is essentially not innovation from scratch but the rapid replication of成熟能力 on a new载体. Gracewine remains Gracewine, and 1919 remains 1919.

On the new platform of Gracewine, Yiling Jiang is implementing能力复用 and模式延展 of the models, capabilities, and resources验证 over two decades in酒类流通,重新 executing business ideas he couldn't complete at 1919 for various reasons.

Gracewine now fully possesses the capabilities of 1919. However, whether the CBF model can truly succeed remains to be tested by time and the market.

**Assessing the Risks and Potential Outcomes**

Yiling Jiang is moving aggressively, leading some to compare the current Gracewine to a Chinese version of "Diageo." However, no matter how elegant the model, execution is key.

Can such a庞杂的 CBF model truly be implemented? Yiling Jiang's management style is characterized by strong执行力, daring行动, and a preference for冒险, leading to relatively激进经营动作.

Since June 2025, 1919 and Yiling Jiang have faced a信任危机. Reports indicate 1919大规模拖欠加盟商资金, with多地加盟商集中诉求讨回欠款. In response to追讨, 1919 proposed "settling debts with goods," but most franchisees found this unacceptable. This issue remains unresolved.

Recently, a former 1919 franchisee, Mr. Li, stated on social media that he joined in 2023, paying an annual加盟费 of RMB 60,000 and a保证金 of RMB 50,000. Initial加盟 required purchasing approximately RMB 300,000 worth of 1919 private-label products, but the酒卖不出去,积压在仓库.

Mr. Li began the闭店流程 in May 2025. 1919 was supposed to refund the RMB 50,000保证金 and pay RMB 40,000 in平台分成 for online sales and RMB 10,000 in开店补贴 (total RMB 100,000) by November 2025. He is now pursuing维权 through legal channels.

According to industry media, 1919 recently imposed new requirements on franchisees: to continue cooperation, they must purchase RMB 600,000 worth of private-label专供酒水.

The contrast between 1919 facing舆论压力 and Yiling Jiang taking control of listed Gracewine adds controversy to his profile.

Although Yiling Jiang is Gracewine's实际控制人, his name does not appear on the new board list. The newly established six-subsidiary system also completely lacks any visible connection to 1919.

This is likely to avoid the信任危机 associated with 1919 franchisees and reduce渠道端抵触情绪. However, the market is not an信息孤岛.

In his handling of Gracewine, Yiling Jiang再次体现出了 his一贯的操盘风格. In less than half a year, not only were six companies established, but as early as March of this year, Gracewine also signed a cooperation agreement with the Renhuai Municipal Government in Guizhou, focusing on the development of酱香型白酒, brand共建, and supply chain协同.

According to Gracewine's 2025 annual report, it will extend from wine to全酒类发展,明确布局 Chinese白酒, whisky, Japanese清酒,精酿啤酒,预调鸡尾酒等品类.

Objectively, Gracewine's "CBF模式"确实直击 current industry pain points like "high inventory, long channels, difficulty reaching consumers." It also aligns with trends like酒企酒商全面向C,顺应数字化浪潮, and全链路整合.

However, currently, Gracewine is undertaking a massive商业模式盘, requiring跨渠道,跨品类,跨消费场景运营, with significant pressures from团队磨合 and资源分散.

Furthermore, operating six subsidiaries simultaneously while Gracewine is in a亏损状态, with短期难盈利, creates substantial资金压力. If现金流承压, it could重蹈1919覆辙.

Attempts to inquire with Gracewine about how the six subsidiaries will协同运营 and ensure渠道健康发展 went unanswered as of publication.

According to Gracewine's financial report, as of the end of 2025, its total number of employees was 118, a year-on-year decrease of 32.18%, equivalent to losing one-third of its workforce. Whether its人力资源配备 can承载 the多重任务 of six subsidiaries and全品类转型 remains未知.

Regarding the "CBF模式," this is not an industry-exclusive innovation. Leading酒企 like茅台 and汾酒 are also推进渠道数字化与去中间化. This model lacks绝对壁垒 and is容易被复制.

纵观 Yiling Jiang's全盘布局 with Gracewine, this counter-cyclical资本运作 is essentially a "破局豪赌" following 1919's development setbacks and受阻上市梦, and an极致延伸 of his over-two-decade深耕酒业产业链思维.

Leveraging Gracewine's港股上市资质 and mature酿造资产, Yiling Jiang can跳出 1919's发展困局, attempting to复刻 success on a new载体,规避旧疾,重新落地 his refined CBF model, and重启 his产业野心.

However, Gracewine's持续亏损业绩现状,紧张的资金压力,激烈的行业竞争, coupled with the市场信任隐患 from the 1919风波, all pose obstacles in this strategic game.

The酒业 never rewards构想 alone. The ability to execute the商业模式, sustained资金供血,团队承载能力, and市场认可度 are the keys determining the outcome of this "豪赌."

The new chapter for Gracewine has only just begun.