A wedding celebration at Laoxiangji (also known as LXJ) has drawn public attention, not just for the happy occasion, but because the bride holds a 15% stake in the company. The daughter of founder Shu Congxuan, Shu Wen, married on September 17th, with the groom's identity still undisclosed. However, the event highlights that this fast-food giant's capital market journey remains stalled after five failed IPO attempts over five years.

Shu Wen, 33, serves as an executive director at Laoxiangji, having joined the company in 2013 after graduating with an animation design degree. She has worked her way up from grassroots positions to oversee financial operations and regulatory compliance. Her non-financial academic background raised questions when first disclosed in earlier IPO prospectuses. More notably, she and her siblings control over 92% of the company's voting rights through a family-held structure.

Shu Xiaolong, the chairman and CEO, holds 70.78% through Constantly Soar Ltd, while Shu Wen holds 15.02% via Jump Spark Ltd, and Shu Xiaolong's wife Dong Xue holds 6.22%. Combined, the three direct heirs control 92.02% of voting power in this company with annual revenue exceeding 4 billion yuan. The founder himself, Shu Congxuan, holds no direct shares, having transferred his entire stake to his children years ago.

This family-dominated governance structure drew regulatory scrutiny during A-share listing attempts, with the prospectus acknowledging that the absence of checks-and-balances decision-making mechanisms remains a core concern for capital markets. Now, with his daughter's wedding marking another generational milestone, the hard battle continues for the Shu family's second generation on the capital markets front.

Why Laoxiangji's IPO keeps failing

The company's capital market saga began in May 2022 with its first A-share filing, when the market valued it at an impressive 18.1 billion yuan, positioning it as the strongest contender for the "first Chinese fast-food stock" title. Yet, regulatory feedback uncovered compliance issues, and the company subsequently withdrew its application in August 2023, citing timing mismatches with its strategic development plans.

The company then filed with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January 2025, July 2025, and January 2026, each time seeing its application lapse after six months due to expired financial data. The fifth failure came on July 8, 2026. Each unsuccessful attempt has eroded the company's valuation, which has shrunk from 18.1 billion yuan in 2022 to approximately 8 billion yuan in 2026 — a nearly 50% decline in four years.

Persistent problems behind the stalled listings

The recurring issues are well-documented in the prospectus. Social insurance and housing fund contribution shortfalls totaled over 100 million yuan between 2022 and the first eight months of 2025, with potential fines exceeding 244 million yuan. Gross margins present another concern: at 22.8% in 2024, they lag significantly behind competitors like Xiaocaiyuan (65%) and Green Tea Group (nearly 69%).

The company's heavy-asset, full-supply-chain model — including three chicken farms, two central kitchens and eight distribution centers — drives raw material costs above 40% of revenue. Growth has decelerated sharply, from 58.38% in 2022 to 11.27% in 2024, and the business remains heavily concentrated in East China, with over 80% of revenue originating from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Shanghai.

External investors have voted with their feet. In January 2024, early institutional backers Maixing Investment and GF Qianghe exited entirely, with the company repurchasing their shares for approximately 153 million yuan. Only Jiahua Capital remains among external shareholders, holding 4.98%.

Can the second generation's new measures solve old problems?

The company's history traces back to 1982 when Shu Congxuan started a chicken farm with 1,800 yuan saved for his wedding. After renaming the brand from "Feixi Laomuji" to Laoxiangji in 2012, the business expanded across provinces. Shu Xiaolong took over as chairman in November 2023, with his father officially retiring in July 2024.

The second generation has pursued digitization, health-focused offerings, international expansion and governance improvements. A seven-member board with three independent directors now meets Hong Kong listing standards. In 2026, the company became a pilot for nutritional labeling in Chinese fast-food and opened its first overseas store in Kuala Lumpur.

However, franchise expansion — the core growth strategy — shows concerning patterns. While franchise outlets grew from 118 in 2022 to 733 by August 2025, many were converted directly from company-owned stores. In 2024 alone, 146 directly-operated locations shifted to franchises, potentially masking rather than solving same-store profitability challenges.

Despite being an industry benchmark for transparency with monthly self-inspection reports since 2021, consumer complaints on the Black Cat platform exceed 1,400, focusing on food contamination, utensil hygiene and ingredient freshness.

Laoxiangji's difficulties echo across the sector. Country Style Cooking has failed three Hong Kong listing attempts, while Laoniangjiu withdrew from both A-share main board and Beijing Stock Exchange filings. As beverage and dining chains like Mixue Bingcheng, Guming, Xiaocaiyuan and Green Tea Group successfully list, mainstream Chinese fast-food still lacks a true industry leader in public markets.

The capital market's pricing logic has shifted from scale premiums to profitability quality, governance standards and supply-chain capability. As Shu Wen's wedding concludes, the second generation must answer not just when they will list, but whether a company with 92% of equity held within one family can sustainably, compliantly and profitably operate at scale. A halved valuation reflects the market's current assessment, and whether this 44-year-old "chicken soup" can be served to capital markets a sixth time remains an open question.