On March 26, 2026, the Hong Kong stock market's beverage sector witnessed a dramatic financial report release. The full-year 2025 results announcement from NAYUKI immediately drew significant market attention. During the reporting period, the company achieved total revenue of 4.331 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 12.0%. Its adjusted net loss narrowed substantially from 919 million yuan in 2024 to 241 million yuan, representing a 73.8% reduction in losses. However, on the day the report was released, NAYUKI's stock price fell by 4.26%, closing at HK$0.900, a 95% decline from its pre-IPO peak over four years ago.

The phrase "polar opposites" perhaps best describes NAYUKI's situation in 2025. On one hand, narrowing losses, improved per-store efficiency, and effective cost control signaled positive outcomes from the company's strategy of "retrenchment for survival." On the other hand, declining revenue, store contractions, sluggish franchise expansion, and continuously falling average spending per customer highlighted the deep-seated challenges faced by this former "first share of new-style tea beverages" amid drastic industry shifts.

The most striking change in NAYUKI's 2025 financial report was the significant contraction in revenue. Data showed annual total revenue of 4.331 billion yuan, down 12% from 4.92 billion yuan in 2024 and 16% lower than the 5.3 billion yuan recorded in 2023. This marked NAYUKI's first revenue decline since its 2021 listing, making it the only brand among five listed Hong Kong tea beverage companies to experience a drop in revenue.

The direct driver of the revenue decline was not weak consumer demand but the company's proactive store optimization plan. By the end of 2025, the total number of NAYUKI stores was 1,646, a net decrease of 152 stores from the end of 2024. The number of directly-operated stores fell from 1,453 to 1,288. This was the first net reduction in store count in recent years. Between 2023 and 2024, NAYUKI was still in an expansion phase, with total stores increasing from 1,655 to 1,798. However, this scale expansion did not lead to profit improvement and instead exposed the fragility of its single-store model.

NAYUKI designated 2025 as an "adjustment year," pausing expansion of both directly-operated and franchised stores to focus on store optimization, product upgrades, and supply chain development. The company established a more comprehensive store evaluation mechanism, assessing all stores based on financial performance, operational metrics, strategic positioning, and external factors. Most underperforming stores were optimized through closures, renovations, or format adjustments, with the remaining stores expected to complete adjustments by 2026.

Another factor contributing to revenue contraction was the sharp decline in the bottled beverage business. In 2025, revenue from NAYUKI's bottled beverages plummeted by 39% from 293 million yuan to 178 million yuan. Facing dominant players like Nongfu Spring and Genki Forest in the retail shelf battle, NAYUKI lacked channel control and strong brand recognition, making contraction of this business line a reluctant choice.

If revenue contraction represents short-term pain, the significant narrowing of losses is a positive outcome of this proactive adjustment. In 2025, NAYUKI's adjusted net loss narrowed from 918.7 million yuan to 240.5 million yuan, a reduction of 73.8%. The adjusted net loss margin improved from -18.7% to -5.6%.

This change clearly demonstrates NAYUKI's core logic of "cost reduction and efficiency improvement." On the cost side, three major expense categories saw significant declines: core raw material costs fell 18.7% year-on-year to 1.47 billion yuan; employee costs decreased 14.8% to 1.222 billion yuan; and depreciation of right-of-use assets dropped sharply by 33.7% to 274 million yuan.

Behind the cost control were both scale-related savings from store reductions and structural optimizations in supply chain management and operational efficiency. NAYUKI established direct procurement partnerships with fruit and vegetable bases in Yunnan, ensuring ingredient freshness while reducing costs. The implementation of an intelligent ordering system reduced raw material waste by 18%.

On the revenue side, after closing underperforming stores, the operational quality of remaining directly-operated stores improved. Average daily sales per directly-operated store increased from 7,300 yuan to 7,700 yuan, up 5.2% year-on-year. Average daily orders rose from 270.5 to 313.0, an increase of 15.7%. Same-store sales grew by 6.3%. The strategy of "trimming down to improve quality" by trading store scale for better per-store efficiency was validated by the data.

However, another aspect of profit improvement is the hidden concern of continuously declining average customer spending. In 2025, NAYUKI's average order value dropped to 24.4 yuan, down approximately 4% year-on-year. Compared to the early peak of 43 yuan, this figure has nearly halved. While growth in order volume partially offset the impact of lower spending per order, the sustainability of this "volume-for-price" model warrants caution.

Changes in revenue structure better illustrate the deep transformation occurring in NAYUKI's business model. In 2025, revenue from delivery orders was 2.009 billion yuan, up 11.2% year-on-year, accounting for 52.6% of total directly-operated store revenue, surpassing 50% for the first time (up from 41.4% the previous year). About 49.1% of this revenue came from orders placed through third-party platforms.

The rapid growth of the delivery channel contributed incremental revenue but came with platform service fees that continued to squeeze profit margins. In 2025, the company's delivery service fees were 462 million yuan (346 million yuan in 2024), increasing to 10.7% of total revenue during the reporting period. The rising proportion of delivery orders significantly reveals the erosion of the "third space" premium. As consumers increasingly prefer ordering tea drinks via delivery platforms rather than visiting stores, the high rents and labor costs associated with NAYUKI's "large-store model" become a heavy operational burden.

Jiang Han, a senior researcher at Pangoal Institution, pointed out that NAYUKI previously relied on the "large-store model" to build a premium brand image. However, in the current context of high rents and labor costs, this asset-heavy model has led to diminishing marginal returns. The significant reduction in directly-operated stores in 2025 essentially removed "negative assets" located in non-core business districts with low sales per square foot. The contrasting trend of growing delivery revenue alongside declining in-store and pick-up orders forms a distinct "scissors gap," revealing the harsh reality that the premium for offline space experience is being eroded by online channels.

In the new-style tea beverage industry, the franchise model has almost become the only path for brands to achieve scale. However, NAYUKI's progress in franchising is severely out of sync with industry trends. By the end of 2025, NAYUKI's franchised stores only increased slightly from 345 at the end of 2024 to 358, a net addition of just 13 stores for the year.

Against the industry backdrop where brands like Guming added a net 3,640 stores and Auntie Shanghai added a net 2,273 stores in 2025, NAYUKI's franchise expansion can almost be considered "stagnant." This is influenced by the historical baggage of NAYUKI's business model. As a representative premium brand, NAYUKI initially rose to prominence with a "third space" model featuring "150-300 square meter large stores + tea drinks + baked goods." However, the large-store model entails not only high initial investment but also significant ongoing rent and labor costs. Even though NAYUKI adjusted its franchise policy in 2024, lowering the initial investment for a single franchise store to start from 580,000 yuan, this figure remains far above the industry average.

For franchisees, the high initial investment lengthens the payback period, while the rising proportion of delivery orders further diminishes the value of the in-store consumption experience, making it harder to justify the high rents and labor costs of the large-store model. The result of franchisees "voting with their feet" is NAYUKI's further marginalization in the race for scale.

If "store closures and downsizing" represent NAYUKI's tactical adjustments at the operational level, then its health-oriented strategy and overseas expansion are key strategic moves to build new moats.

In June 2025, at its "2025 Health Upgrade Launch Event," NAYUKI announced the comprehensive rollout of its "Fresh Fruit Tea, No Added Sugar, Natural Nutrition+ Plan," introducing multiple light beverage and light food products while accelerating the deployment of its Green store format. This decade-old tea brand is transitioning deeply from "one tea, one bun" into the broader health and wellness sector.

The implementation of the health strategy has shown preliminary results in the data. In the first half of 2025, NAYUKI's per-store performance continued to optimize, with average daily sales per store increasing 4.1% compared to the same period in 2024, and average daily orders rising 11.4% year-on-year. The health product lineup maintained strong momentum: the "Small Purple Bottle" series, represented by the 66 Blueberry Mulberry Yogurt Smoothie, sold over 500,000 cups within three days of launch. On the first day of autumn, it ranked as NAYUKI's top-selling single product, with daily sales of 440,000 cups, boosting delivery sales by 500%.

In terms of consumption scenarios, the NAYUKI Green format extends the consumer occasion from just tea drinks to cover breakfast, lunch, and afternoon tea throughout the day. The first store in Qianhai, Shenzhen, achieved sales of 120,000 yuan in its first three days. Over 30 stores nationwide consistently topped regional popularity charts on Dianping. Repurchase rates for key light food items like bagels and energy bowls exceeded 40%. Throughout 2025, NAYUKI launched 70 new freshly-made beverages and 54 new baked goods. Reformulations to reduce oil and sugar in the bakery line drove a 22% sales increase in the afternoon tea period.

In March 2026, the first "Xian · Studio" concept store opened in Shenzhen's Coastal City, featuring a "visible natural ingredients" design concept with a transparent bakery and a fruit and vegetable cold-brew lab. Healthy series products accounted for 65% of the store's SKUs, with average daily foot traffic exceeding 2,000人次 during the opening week. This layout represents a further deepening of NAYUKI's health strategy in store format.

However, crossing over from tea drinks to light food is not without challenges. Xu Lianzheng, founder of Yingzhengtong, noted that NAYUKI's transformation involves a change in brand perception. In a market characterized by intense competition and consumers chasing quality and value, this shift faces the challenge of cognitive migration. The light food sector is itself highly competitive and costly. Whether this new model can achieve sustained profitability at scale remains to be seen by the market.

Against the backdrop of slowing growth in the domestic market, overseas expansion has become a core direction for new tea beverage brands seeking a second growth curve. NAYUKI has chosen a "premium cultural export" route, targeting developed markets in Europe and the United States, emphasizing brand tone and tea culture experience.

At the end of 2025, NAYUKI entered the US market, with its first store located in Flushing, New York, a commercial area densely populated by Chinese and Asian communities. Nearly 13,000 products were sold in the first three days, with revenue reaching $87,000 USD (approximately 620,000 yuan), setting a new record for store openings. Subsequently, Zhao Lin, founder of NAYUKI, revealed during an earnings call that four stores would open simultaneously in the US market.

The significance of going global lies not only in tapping new markets but also in testing the viability of NAYUKI's premium brand positioning in mature consumer markets. Unlike the escalating price wars domestically, overseas markets, especially developed ones in Europe and America, show higher acceptance of brand premiums and consumption experiences, which aligns naturally with NAYUKI's "premium cultural export" strategy.

Nevertheless, the path overseas is fraught with challenges. Supply chain development is the biggest pain point—seasonal supply of fresh fruits like mangoes and lychees, and finding local substitutes for ingredients like cheese foam and boba, test the brand's ability to build an efficient, flexible global supply chain. Additionally, cultural differences, reshaping consumption habits, and balancing localization with standardization are hurdles NAYUKI must overcome.

To understand the deeper meaning of NAYUKI's 2025 annual report, it must be placed in the context of the dramatic shifts in the entire new-style tea beverage industry.

In terms of market size, China's new-style tea drink industry has officially moved past the phase of consecutive years of double-digit high growth. iiMedia Research predicts the 2025 market size will be approximately 374.93 billion yuan, with year-on-year growth slowing to 5.7%, marking the end of the land-grab era. In 2024, the year-on-year growth rate of China's new-style tea drink market was only 6.4%, far below the compound annual growth rate of 24.9% between 2017 and 2022. The industry's competitive logic is shifting comprehensively from "scale first" to "efficiency first."

During this transition period, the gap between brands has widened sharply. Mixue Bingcheng reported 2025 revenue of 33.56 billion yuan, up 35.2% year-on-year, with net profit attributable to parents of 5.88 billion yuan. Guming achieved total revenue of 12.9 billion yuan, a 46.9% increase, with adjusted profit of 2.575 billion yuan. Cha Bai Dao reported revenue of 5.395 billion yuan and net profit of 820 million yuan, up 71% year-on-year. Auntie Shanghai posted revenue of 4.466 billion yuan and net profit attributable to parents of 501 million yuan, a 52.4% increase. Among the five listed Hong Kong tea beverage companies, four achieved growth in both revenue and profit; only NAYUKI remained mired in losses.

The deeper difference lies in business models and penetration capabilities in lower-tier cities. By the end of 2025, Mixue Bingcheng had increased its stores in mainland China to 55,356; Guming had 13,554 stores; Auntie Shanghai had 11,449 stores; Cha Bai Dao had 8,621 stores; while NAYUKI had only 1,646 stores. Approximately 58% of Mixue Bingcheng's stores are in third-tier cities and below; for Auntie Shanghai, the figure is 52.7%; 82% of Guming's stores are in second-tier cities and below; and Cha Bai Dao's proportion of stores in third-tier cities and below rose to 46.1%. Although NAYUKI began franchising in 2023, it has yet to effectively penetrate lower-tier markets, with franchise progress明显 lagging.

More notably, the overall health of the industry is changing. In 2025, the total number of freshly-made tea beverage stores nationwide exceeded 415,000. However, while 118,000 new stores opened in the past year, a staggering 157,000 stores closed, resulting in negative net growth. Small and medium-sized independent stores are exiting the market at an accelerating pace. Leading brands are expanding against the trend leveraging supply chain advantages, while mid-tier brands face sustained pressure—NAYUKI is a typical example within this landscape.

If operational data reflect NAYUKI's current survival state, then its performance in the capital markets reveals the level of market confidence in its future.

In March 2025, NAYUKI was removed from the list of Southbound Stock Connect securities due to factors including market capitalization size, profitability, and liquidity. On the effective date of the adjustment, NAYUKI's stock price fell over 25% at one point after opening, closing at HK$1.3 per share, a single-day drop of 20.73%, with a total market capitalization of HK$2.22 billion.

Over the following year, NAYUKI's stock price探底 further. By December 2025, the company's stock had accumulated a decline of over 90%, repeatedly falling below HK$1 to become a "penny stock," with a market cap of less than HK$2 billion. By March 30, 2026, the first trading day after the 2025 report release, NAYUKI's market cap had fallen below HK$1.5 billion. In contrast, Mixue Group's market cap was HK$108.2 billion, Guming's was HK$64.8 billion, and Cha Bai Dao's was HK$8.5 billion.

From being the "first share of new-style tea beverages" to a "penny stock," its market capitalization shrank from a peak of nearly HK$29 billion to less than HK$1.5 billion, evaporating over HK$27 billion. The capital market has delivered its verdict on NAYUKI in the most direct way.

Zhao Lin, founder of NAYUKI, stated during the 2025 interim results presentation that "performance in January-March was still not ideal, but from April-June we were almost breaking even, and the overall operating condition is gradually improving," expressing "great confidence" in achieving profitability in 2026. The full-year 2025 data confirmed the trend of narrowing losses, but issues like declining revenue, lower average spending per customer, and sluggish franchise expansion remain unresolved.

The health-oriented transformation and overseas expansion are NAYUKI's two main directions for building new growth curves. However, whether these strategic moves can truly reverse the company's long-term decline depends on the answers to two core questions: First, can health products and light food scenarios maintain profitability at scale, beyond just being short-term traffic drivers? Second, can overseas market expansion genuinely build a second growth curve, or is it merely a gamble with a potentially poor return on investment?

With its 2025 financial report showing "revenue decline, losses narrowed," NAYUKI has provided an interim report card. But the real test lies ahead—in a downcycle characterized by systematically slowing industry growth and intensifying divergence, can a brand that once led the premium tea trend complete a profound transformation from "scale first" to "efficiency first" and find its own niche amidst competition with peers?

The adjustment is not over. The answer still lies ahead.