"Personal investments are private matters. Yingke belongs to all Yingke members, and we are operating normally." "Stay strong, Yingke team." "Our team is still hiring." On March 12, a global partner of Yingke Law Firm posted multiple updates on social media within a single day, responding to escalating rumors. As the firm found itself at the center of a storm, its lawyers stepped forward one after another, attempting to alleviate public concerns and doubts. "As a member of Yingke Law Firm, my WeChat was flooded on March 11 with private messages from clients, friends, and peers asking questions, even inquiring whether 'Old Mei turned himself in,'" shared one legal team via a public statement, affirming their steadfastness and expressing confidence in weathering the turbulence: isolated incidents, individual remarks, and scattered rumors cannot shake the firm's solid foundation of stable development.
Beneath the surface, however, the situation appears less tranquil. Reports have gradually emerged alleging that Yingke’s leader, Mei Xiangrong, misappropriated legal fees for financing guarantees, creating an estimated funding shortfall of around 1 billion yuan. Some partners at Yingke branches have urgently applied for settlement and withdrawals, while competitors have seized the opportunity to actively recruit its talent. The global partner who earlier issued reassurances later deleted their social media clarifications, and public content about Mei Xiangrong on Yingke’s official website has gradually been removed.
On the evening of March 13, a visit to the Yingke International Lawyer Building in Shanghai revealed that the core company linked to the financing guarantee incident, Shanghai Yingke Enterprise Management Co., Ltd., located on the 8th floor of the west wing, was unoccupied. The office was dark, the entrance chained shut, with desks and chairs in disarray and papers scattered on the floor. A night-shift property management staff member disclosed that the office areas related to Mei Xiangrong’s companies had been sealed. The same day, an informed source indicated that Mei Xiangrong had surrendered himself to Shanghai police, though the amount of funds involved remains uncertain. Police officials declined to provide further details.
Questions linger over the veracity of the 1 billion yuan funding gap, the possibility of misusing legal fees for financing guarantees, and whether the "mega firm" Yingke will be dragged deeper into the turmoil. Interviews with more than ten experienced industry lawyers and sources close to Yingke’s core leadership have begun to uncover the hidden facets of this storm shaking the legal profession.
On March 8, Mei Xiangrong, in his capacity as Party Committee Secretary, Director, and Global Board Chairman of Yingke Law Firm, attended and delivered a speech at a International Women’s Day event hosted by Yingke’s Beijing office. Official social media accounts featured images from the event.
As news of Mei Xiangrong’s financing guarantee issues spread, a series of actions by Yingke Law Firm came to light. Late on March 11, Yingke issued an announcement stating that Mei Xiangrong had resigned from all positions at the firm, clarifying that the incident stemmed from problems related to a company established by his family and was unrelated to the firm’s professional practice. The previous day, Yingke completed a global board election, appointing Li Jingwu, born in the 1980s, as the new Global Board Chairman.
Meanwhile, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau had approved Yingke’s application to change its organizational form from a general partnership to a special general partnership as early as March 2. A visit to Yingke’s headquarters in Beijing’s China World Center on the afternoon of March 12 showed normal operations, with multiple clients entering and exiting the premises. Staff in the client reception area were observed engaged in discussions with lawyers. A reception staff member stated that current business remained unaffected by online rumors and declined to comment on questions regarding Mei Xiangrong or the sale of financial products, emphasizing that the firm was operating normally and that official statements would serve as the sole source of information.
Visits to Yingke’s Shanghai branch and the Yingke International Lawyer Building in Shanghai on the same day were met with refusal for interviews. Internally, however, the impact was palpable. An insider from a Yingke branch revealed that upon initial reports of the incident, concerns about potential asset freezes led them to hastily withdraw outstanding legal fees, though normal settlement processes have since continued. Representatives from Yingke’s Foshan and Chongqing branches also confirmed that operations were proceeding normally.
Efforts to reassure and stabilize personnel are underway. An internal source mentioned that many competitors are actively recruiting Yingke lawyers, suggesting that online speculation aims to undermine morale. "If a large number of lawyers leave, Yingke would suffer significant damage. Currently, internally, the situation has stabilized, and a mass exodus is unlikely," the source commented, adding that business continues as usual and withdrawals are being processed normally.
Regarding the shift to a special general partnership structure, an internal representative explained that this change "provides additional protection for other partners" and is a forward-looking risk mitigation measure, though it cannot absolve past liabilities. The move is primarily intended to prevent situations where an individual partner, like "Old Mei," creates a major liability affecting the entire firm.
Under China’s Partnership Enterprise Law, the key distinction between a general partnership and a special general partnership lies in partners’ liability for the firm’s debts. In a special general partnership, partners responsible for debts arising from intentional or grossly negligent acts in professional practice bear unlimited liability, while other partners are liable only up to their capital contributions in the firm. Debts not resulting from such faults are jointly and severally borne by all partners.
Legal expert Fu Jian explained that while both forms involve collaborative business, the liability rules differ crucially. In a general partnership, creditors can seek full repayment from any partner, who may then claim reimbursement from the responsible partner. In a special general partnership, the liable partner bears unlimited responsibility for their own serious faults, though non-fault partners’ capital contributions within the firm remain exposed. Internal recourse among partners is typically governed by partnership agreements or statutory contribution ratios, without affecting external creditor claims.
A central question remains: Could an individual, even a firm leader, misappropriate substantial legal fees forming a "capital pool"? One anonymous Yingke partner responded to queries by stating, "He cannot, and in fact, did not use firm assets as collateral." From an operational standpoint, the partner explained that branches operate independently with separate accounts, making misappropriation difficult. "We receive fixed monthly distributions without any delays, and there have been no abnormal fluctuations in client refunds or lawyer departures—operations are normal," the partner added.
Concerns about misappropriation reflect evolving attorney-firm relationships. Multiple lawyers interviewed noted that cooperation models in domestic law firms have diverged into two distinct paths, often involving looser ties than commonly perceived—a factor underlying the "Yingke model’s" rapid scaling.
"The relationship between a law firm and its lawyers fundamentally falls into two types," one anonymous partner lawyer stated. "One is salaried lawyers, similar to regular employees, who follow firm and team management, receive fixed salaries plus bonuses—common among newly qualified lawyers without their own cases or non-litigation teams handling matters like IPOs and compliance. The other is commission-based lawyers, who practice under the firm’s umbrella, utilizing its credentials, office space, and invoicing services while sourcing and handling their own cases, sharing fees with the firm proportionally."
Another lawyer corroborated this, likening large-scale firm models to a "farmers' market": "The firm leases entire floors or buildings, partitioning them into offices or workstations like market stalls. Lawyers using these spaces and the firm’s brand pay a 'stall fee,' known in the industry as a management fee." Management fees typically hover around 20%, with even smaller firms charging approximately 10%. "Taxes are fixed by the state; the variable is the management fee, which constitutes the firm’s stable revenue stream," a partner lawyer illustrated. "For example, on 1 million yuan in legal fees received, about 21% is deducted for management fees and taxes, leaving the lawyer with 790,000 yuan, which is subject to multi-level approval before withdrawal."
This industry-standard settlement model inherently creates a substantial "capital pool." "All legal fees must be deposited into the firm’s public account—private collection by lawyers is strictly prohibited. However, the lag between receipt and full withdrawal allows significant operational leeway," a lawyer explained. "First, the firm typically withholds a 10%-20% deposit, refundable only after case completion and absence of client complaints. The remaining withdrawable portion requires tax payment or legal tax offset measures." Withdrawals are processed in batches, taking anywhere from one week to a month or longer. "When multiplied across hundreds or thousands of lawyers, the idle cash in accounts becomes enormous," the lawyer noted.
According to the latest data from the firm’s website, Yingke has 127 branches in mainland China plus one Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao joint operation, with over 25,200 staff, including more than 19,400 lawyers. Multiple lawyers indicated that even a moderately sized firm with a hundred lawyers can generate annual revenues exceeding hundreds of millions of yuan.
Prior to the Yingke incident, another law firm faced allegations of its director absconding with billions, highlighting investment risks associated with firms operating beyond their core practice. An industry insider pointed out that law firms possess inherent advantages for capital maneuvering—holding funds, social credibility, and access to capital-seeking clients. In recent years, some firm controllers have been motivated to invest externally, diverting from traditional practice. However, inadequate risk management by legally trained but financially less specialized professionals can lead to issues like capital chain fractures. "Similar incidents have occurred before with law firm principals, though not widely publicized," one lawyer remarked, noting that sizable firms with stable cash flow inevitably attract capital operation ambitions.
Mei Xiangrong has been described by industry observers as "a law firm operator with grand ambitions, whose focus in recent years appears to have shifted from legal practice to capital operations." Over the years, he has built a family "Yingke系" (Yingke Group), with Beijing Yingke Global Holding Co., Ltd., established in 2015, serving as the core investment platform. Initially, Mei Xiangrong held a 95% stake with a capital contribution of 95 million yuan. In December 2021, he transferred ownership to Mei Yaping and Mei Chunhua, with Mei Yaping becoming the majority shareholder holding 95%. Reports indicate Mei Chunhua is Mei Xiangrong’s elder brother, and they have a younger sister, Mei Yaping.
Spanning sectors from scenic area management and cultural tourism to health management, film and television, catering, and international trade, the "Yingke系" has directly invested in 36 companies through Yingke Global. Including entities controlled via direct or indirect shareholding, the group influences at least 67 companies. Twenty-two currently active companies include Yingke Meichen International Travel Agency Co., Ltd., Yingke Scenic Area Management Co., Ltd., Yingke Lexiang Hotel Management Co., Ltd., Shanghai Yingke Banma Culture Media Co., Ltd., and Beijing Jushengju Catering Management Co., Ltd., among others.
Several "Mei" family members hold positions such as chairman and director at the listed company Lyyun Co., Ltd. Public filings show Mei Chunhua became the actual controller of Lyyun in July 2020, with Wu Weiping added as a concerted party based on family relations. Mei Chunhua, born in June 1970, previously served as production section chief at Taizhou Machine Tool Hydraulic Parts Factory from 1993 to 2002. In January 2018, Lyyun appointed Mei Pei as chairman. Born in 1991, Mei Pei, with a college diploma, served as logistics supervisor at Beijing Jushengju Catering Management Co., Ltd. from ages 22 to 24. Mei Yaping also held a directorship at Lyyun; a June 2018 announcement noted her election as director, following her tenure as a practicing lawyer at Yingke’s Shanghai office from May 2014 to April 2017.
Lyyun has reported consecutive annual losses. As of the end of 2023, its consolidated financial statements showed an accumulated loss of 32.653 million yuan, exceeding its paid-in capital. Additionally, Beijing Jushengju Catering Management Co., Ltd. faces high-consumption restrictions, and Yingke Meichen International Travel Agency Co., Ltd. has been listed as a被执行人 (subject to enforcement).
Visits revealed that companies under the "Yingke系" umbrella are located in close proximity to Yingke Law Firm offices, amid controversies over their association. On the evening of March 12, several Mei Xiangrong-related companies, including Shanghai Yingke Enterprise Management, Shanghai Yingce Investment Management Center (Limited Partnership), and Shanghai Qianhong Culture Communication Co., Ltd., were found to have offices within the Shanghai Yingke International Lawyer Building. A property management staff member confirmed that these offices had been sealed. Observations from outside the building showed lights on in floors occupied by Yingke Law Firm’s operational areas, where working lawyers claimed unawareness of the situation within the building.
Corporate records indicate Mei Xiangrong currently holds direct stakes in five active companies, including a 24.24% share in Shanghai Yingce Investment Management Center and a 43.74% share in Beijing Heying Technology Development Center. Nearly 30 companies linked to him that have been deregistered were mostly established between 2012 and 2015, coinciding with Yingke’s rapid expansion period. One, Beijing Shuimu Huaqing Investment Center, registered with the Asset Management Association of China in 2015, was deregistered just a year later.
"His investments primarily targeted real estate, new energy vehicles, and tourism sectors. People naturally assumed these were official Yingke Law Firm projects—who would have thought they were personal capital ventures?" one lawyer questioned. Industry assessments of Mei Xiangrong are mixed. "He is capable and foresighted; the sectors he bet on might not be wrong, but perhaps the timing was," a veteran lawyer commented. "A good lawyer is inherently pessimistic and conservative, prioritizing risks and working within rules, whereas a successful entrepreneur is optimistic and risk-taking, often pushing boundaries for profit."
Another lawyer noted, "Law firms are light-asset industries; their core assets are lawyers' expertise and brand credibility, lacking the buffer of heavy assets like factories or equipment. Once the capital chain breaks, the impact is devastating." During economic upswings, successful investments and filled gaps mask underlying issues beneath impressive scales, but when the tide recedes, exposed vulnerabilities become evident.
As the fog surrounding Mei Xiangrong’s financing guarantee incident lingers, the trust crisis engulfing Yingke Law Firm serves as a cautionary tale for the legal profession.