On Friday, Bloomberg energy and commodities columnist Javier Blas noted in an article that the Trump administration has nearly exhausted its available tools to suppress oil prices. Blas has extensive expertise in the energy and commodities sector.

Blas argued that the oil market possesses a force comparable to the bond market, capable of cornering politicians. If the conflict persists, elevated energy costs could compel Trump to end the war swiftly—not by choice, but under pressure from the market.

Currently, oil prices have not yet breached the $100 per barrel threshold but are hovering close to that level. Blas estimates that each additional day of conflict adds $3 to $6 to the benchmark price. Over a week, that amounts to $15 to $30; while two weeks may still be manageable, any longer would begin to inflict real damage on the global economy.

A more critical question remains: What options does the White House still have? Blas examined existing policy choices and concluded that the outlook is not optimistic. Short-term measures might buy a few days of breathing room, but none offer a fundamental solution. The only real path forward, he suggests, is reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

What remains in the White House's toolkit? Since the conflict began, the administration has already deployed its most readily available tools. Releasing strategic petroleum reserves and activating alternative pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz have provided some market relief, but Blas believes this extra time is measured in days, not weeks.

What other options exist? Blas lists several: Congress could repeal the federal fuel tax (as the Biden administration did in 2022), but legislation takes time and may not secure enough votes; states, particularly those under Republican control, could declare fuel tax holidays; Trump could also waive certain environmental standards for gasoline and diesel. While these measures might ease domestic pressure temporarily, they would have no effect on rising international oil prices. A more extreme option—an export ban on U.S. crude and refined products—would lower domestic prices but drive global prices even higher. Blas bluntly assesses this as "a huge mistake."

Blas also highlights a more sensitive option: direct intervention in oil futures markets. He stated, "I believe the Trump administration has seriously considered this." In fact, the Biden administration evaluated this approach after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict but ultimately abandoned it due to high risks and low chances of success. Such a move would be not only operationally perilous but also legally contentious.

Oil price impact not yet fully felt Blas offers a relatively calm perspective: so far, the conflict's actual impact on the global economy remains limited. WTI crude has not closed above $100 per barrel this year. By comparison, after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict began, WTI traded above triple digits for nearly 83 consecutive days. For oil prices to truly harm the economy, they must remain elevated for an extended period—a scenario that has not yet materialized.

Looking closer, electricity markets—the epicenter of Europe’s 2022 energy crisis—have shown little reaction this time. German wholesale power prices are even lower than a few weeks ago. Inflation expectations have not shifted significantly, and growth forecasts in wealthy nations remain largely stable. Blas concludes that if the conflict ends within the coming days, the global economy may scarcely remember it by mid-year.

However, the market has sent a clear signal of its sensitivity. When U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright mistakenly posted on social media that an oil tanker had passed through the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices plunged over 10%. Though the report was false, the reaction demonstrated how quickly prices could fall if the situation improves. The problem is, the tanker never actually passed.

Time is running out Blas mentioned that Trump initially expected the conflict to last four to five weeks. As the third week approaches, energy-related costs continue to mount, though they remain within manageable levels. The real risk, he warns, lies in the conflict dragging into April and May.

If that occurs, oil prices could reach "stratospheric levels," triggering widespread inflationary pressure. But Blas believes the greater threat is not inflation itself, but growth. If the conflict extends from days or weeks to months, economists would be forced to lower GDP forecasts, casting a real shadow of stagflation over the global economy.

From this perspective, the oil market's logic is straightforward: if prices rise high enough, demand will inevitably be destroyed—consumers and businesses will be forced to cut oil use. However, where this "demand destruction" occurs matters greatly. Blas notes that if demand shrinks in smaller nations like Bangladesh (where signs are already emerging), the global economic impact may be limited. But if major industrial economies like Germany begin slashing energy consumption, the consequences would be far more severe—as the 2022 European energy crisis demonstrated.

Ultimately, Blas's core assessment is clear: Trump must either end the conflict quickly or be forced to do so by the oil market. There is no third option. The fact that administration officials are taking turns appearing on television to "talk to" the market only underscores that the White House itself knows it lacks the tools needed to truly resolve the situation.