On April 17th, MANYCORE TECH, a leading tech firm from Hangzhou, debuted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange under the ticker "00068". The stock was priced at HK$7.62 per share and surged over 170% on its first trading day, pushing its market capitalization past HK$35.1 billion at its peak. The company was crowned the "world's first spatial intelligence stock," generating widespread social media buzz and positive media coverage.

However, it is important to look beyond the celebratory confetti. The company's journey to this listing is more complex than it appears. This includes a previously stalled plan for a U.S. listing, repeated inquiries from regulators, and a history of significant losses before a recent, narrow turnaround. Let's examine some of the less-publicized aspects of MANYCORE TECH's Hong Kong IPO.

First, the path to listing was not straightforward. MANYCORE TECH submitted its application to the Hong Kong exchange in February 2025. The process, however, was far from smooth. Just three months later, in April 2025, the China Securities Regulatory Commission's international department requested additional materials from nine companies planning overseas listings, including MANYCORE TECH. The regulators sought clarification on the establishment of its corporate structure, specifically its VIE arrangement, and compliance with foreign exchange, overseas investment, and foreign investment regulations. They also questioned the pricing, payment methods, and compliance of its 2022 acquisition of its main domestic operating entity, Hangzhou MANYCORE. This was not a one-off event; in February 2026, when issuing the filing notice, the CSRC again mandated that the company strictly implement rectification requirements from other government bodies. Repeated regulatory scrutiny raises questions about the company's claims of a "standardized listing."

Second, a look at the company's financials reveals a challenging picture. MANYCORE TECH's revenue grew from RMB 664 million in 2023 to RMB 755 million in 2024 and RMB 820 million in 2025. However, it reported net losses of RMB 646 million, RMB 513 million, and RMB 428 million for those respective years, accumulating a total loss of RMB 1.587 billion over three years. While the company claimed profitability in 2025, this was an "adjusted net profit" of RMB 57.13 million. The term "adjusted" is crucial. More concerning is the decline in its net dollar retention rate from 106.1% in 2023 to 98.6% in 2025, falling below 100% for the first time. This indicates that revenue growth from existing customers is no longer sufficient, forcing the company to rely heavily on acquiring new customers. Concurrently, the customer retention rate dropped from 61.2% in 2023 to 59.3% in 2024 and 58.4% in 2025. For a design software company, losing the loyalty of existing clients poses a significant threat to its future.

Third, the 2025 turnaround appears to be driven more by cost-cutting than operational improvement. The proportion of R&D spending to revenue was slashed from 58.9% in 2023 to 35.5% in 2025. For a self-proclaimed technology company, halving its R&D intensity during a critical pre-IPO period is notable. Furthermore, the sales team was reduced from 615 employees at the end of 2023 to 540 by the end of 2024, and further to 501 by mid-2025, with corresponding cuts in sales and marketing expenses. This raises the question: was the profitability achieved through genuine business growth or simply aggressive austerity measures? If core investments in technology are being scaled back, what does that imply for the company's long-term competitiveness?

Fourth, the IPO may serve as an exit strategy for early investors. MANYCORE TECH's last funding round was an E+ round concluded on December 28, 2021. For over five years leading up to the IPO, the company secured no new external financing. By February 22, 2026, approximately 80.1% of the previously raised funds had been utilized. The inability to attract new investment for five years suggests waning investor confidence. The pre-IPO shareholder list was impressive, including firms like IDG Capital, GGV Capital, Shunwei Capital, Hillhouse Capital, Matrix Partners, and Coatue. GGV Capital, for instance, first invested in the Series B round in 2014 and held a 12.54% stake pre-IPO. Based on the opening price of HK$20.70, their earliest investment yielded a return of over 70 times. For many of these venture capital firms, the IPO represents a prime opportunity to realize substantial gains, shifting future performance risks to public market investors.

Fifth, the company has a confirmed history of intellectual property infringement. In January 2020, a competitor, Sanweijia, sued MANYCORE TECH, alleging that its Kujiale platform had directly copied and used Sanweijia's proprietary code. After a nearly three-year legal battle, a first-instance ruling in 2022 found MANYCORE TECH guilty of infringement. This verdict was upheld in a second-instance ruling in July 2023, which ordered the company to cease the infringement, publish an apology on the Kujiale website for 15 consecutive days, and pay RMB 270,000 in compensation. For a company built on claims of proprietary technology, a court-confirmed case of copying a competitor's code is a significant blemish.

Finally, the company's ambitious "spatial intelligence" narrative contrasts sharply with its current revenue streams. In 2024, it launched the SpatialVerse platform, promoting a vision of "spatial editing tools - spatial data - spatial large models" aimed at becoming AI infrastructure for the physical world. However, in 2025, the SpatialVerse platform attracted only 16 customers, generating revenue of just RMB 5.2 million. Revenue from "professional services," which includes SpatialVerse, totaled only RMB 25.207 million, accounting for a mere 3.1% of total revenue. The vast majority—96.9%—of revenue still comes from subscription services, primarily supported by the core Kujiale home design software launched a decade ago. The futuristic "spatial intelligence" story remains largely conceptual, while the business still relies on its established product.

In conclusion, while MANYCORE TECH has successfully listed in Hong Kong, providing a lucrative exit for early backers, the fundamental challenges remain. The company has a history of losses, declining customer loyalty, heavy cost-cutting, a confirmed IP infringement case, and a new business narrative that contributes negligibly to revenue. The high retail oversubscription rate of 1,590.56 times for the public offering indicates significant enthusiasm from individual investors, who may now bear the risks. With the Hong Kong listing addressing immediate funding needs, speculation arises about a potential future listing on the A-share market, where valuations can be higher. Investors would be wise to thoroughly review the company's prospectus, regulatory inquiries, court rulings, and retention metrics before committing capital. A compelling story is one thing; a sustainable business model is another.