Recently, Beijing Zhitai Biopharmaceutical Technology Co., Ltd. (referred to as "Zhitai Biotech") formally submitted its listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, planning to list on the Main Board under Chapter 18A rules, becoming another innovative pharmaceutical company in the GLP-1 field seeking capital market access.

Founded by a former core executive team from Novo Nordisk and holding a globally advanced pipeline of once-monthly GLP-1 receptor agonists, Zhitai Biotech has been highly sought after by capital since its establishment. It has raised a cumulative total of 1.11 billion yuan over 7 funding rounds, with its post-investment valuation climbing to 2.881 billion yuan. Prominent institutions such as Sequoia Capital China, OrbiMed, and Imeik Technology have all invested. With GLP-1 remaining the hottest trend in the global pharmaceutical industry, Zhitai Biotech's IPO narrative appears full of potential.

However, beneath the glossy exterior of the world's first monthly GLP-1 formulation, the financial data, R&D progress, commercialization plans, and industry landscape disclosed in the prospectus reveal risks at every turn. The company currently faces numerous concerns, including continuously expanding losses, tight cash flow, significant pipeline uncertainties, intense market competition, and potentially weak future market competitiveness.

**Sustained Losses, Cash Flow Strain, Lack of Profitability: Core Product's Commercial Prospects Questionable**

Prospectus data shows that in 2024 and 2025, Zhitai Biotech achieved operating revenues of 4.006 million yuan and 3.132 million yuan, respectively. Revenue in 2025 declined by 21.8% year-on-year, showing a clear contraction trend. This meager revenue does not come from drug sales but entirely from a small amount of R&D services and pharmaceutical intermediate sales. The company has yet to generate genuine commercial revenue, and its main business lacks profitability. During the same period, the company's net losses were 164 million yuan and 191 million yuan, respectively, with the 2025 loss expanding by 16.9% year-on-year. As of the end of 2025, the company's accumulated losses had reached 658 million yuan.

Regarding cash flow, net cash outflow from operating activities was 45.04 million yuan and 112 million yuan in 2024 and 2025, respectively, with the cash burn rate increasing by 148.7% year-on-year. As of December 31, 2025, the company's cash and cash equivalents on hand amounted to only 31.195 million yuan. Even including liquid financial products, at the 2025 cash burn rate, the company's funds would only support less than three months of operations, already breaching the red line for liquidity safety.

In January 2026, the company completed a Series C financing round of 531 million yuan, temporarily alleviating the urgent need. However, against the backdrop of the company's lack of profitability and increasing expenses required for clinical pipeline advancement, this capital injection still fails to fundamentally address the company's long-term funding requirements.

**Business Focus and Pipeline Uncertainties**

The core of Zhitai Biotech's IPO narrative is its flagship product, Zotaglutide (ZT002), touted as "potentially the world's first approved once-monthly GLP-1 peptide therapy." The company views this product as a game-changer to disrupt the GLP-1 competitive landscape and the core asset supporting its 2.881 billion yuan valuation. However, judging from clinical progress, data performance, and commercialization plans, Zotaglutide's future may be fraught with uncertainty.

Based on disclosed Phase II clinical data, ZT002's differentiating advantage primarily lies in its dosing frequency. However, its weight-loss efficacy still shows a significant gap compared to leading competitors. Data indicates that the ZT002 160mg once-every-4-weeks group achieved a maximum weight reduction of 13.8% at 24 weeks. While this data is competitive among once-monthly GLP-1 products, its advantage is not significant compared to already marketed leading products.

Eli Lilly's tirzepatide achieved up to 22.5% weight reduction at 72 weeks in its highest dose group. Novo Nordisk's semaglutide achieved up to 17% weight reduction at 68 weeks in its highest dose group. Innovent Biologics' mazdutide also achieved up to 19.4% weight reduction at 48 weeks. All exceed ZT002's Phase II data.

As competition in the GLP-1 field has evolved into a comprehensive contest involving weight loss efficacy, side effect control, dosing frequency, and price accessibility, the compliance advantage from dosing frequency alone may not fully compensate for the gap in weight loss effect. Data from CIC Consulting shows that besides dosing frequency, the primary reasons for obesity patients discontinuing medication are unmet weight loss expectations and intolerable side effects. If ZT002 cannot further improve its weight loss efficacy in Phase III trials, even with the convenience of once-monthly dosing, it may struggle to gain an advantage against leading products, and its so-called differentiation barrier could be significantly weakened.

Besides the core product ZT002, the company's second-most advanced pipeline, ZT001 (a biosimilar of semaglutide), also faces significant commercialization uncertainty. The prospectus shows that ZT001 has completed clinical trials and is about to submit a Biologics License Application (BLA). The company has reached cooperation agreements with Tonghua Dongbao and Imeik Technology, granting them commercialization rights for the diabetes and weight loss indications in Greater China, respectively. However, the core issue with this product is that its market entry progress is severely lagging behind the industry, facing the awkward situation of entering a "red ocean" market upon launch.

The core compound patent for semaglutide officially expired in March 2026. To date, over 30 domestic companies have developed semaglutide biosimilars. Among them, companies like Huadong Medicine, Livzon Pharmaceutical Group, and Genor Biopharma have seen their marketing applications enter the final review stages. It is expected that a large number of domestic semaglutide generic drugs will be launched intensively in 2026-2027, rapidly plunging the sector into fierce price wars. Currently, marketed GLP-1 products in China have already seen significant price cuts. The e-commerce price for tirzepatide 10mg has dropped to 450 yuan per pen, and the minimum monthly cost for semaglutide has fallen to just over 200 yuan. Prices are expected to drop further after the concentrated launch of generics.

Even if ZT001 is approved smoothly, it will likely not reach the market until 2027. By then, the market will have been divided up by earlier entrants, and prices will have fallen to low levels, making it difficult for the company to secure a substantial market share. More importantly, the company has fully licensed ZT001's commercialization rights to partners, retaining only milestone payments and sales royalties. Even if the product sells well post-launch, the company's potential earnings may be limited and cannot become its core revenue source.

**Price Wars Coupled with Technological Evolution: Breaking Through Red Sea Competition Proves Difficult**

Looking ahead, Zhitai Biotech defines its core competitiveness as its first-mover advantage in the ultra-long-acting GLP-1 field. However, viewed globally, this first-mover advantage is rapidly diluting. The company faces a dual squeeze from established leaders ahead and fast followers behind, making its path to breakthrough potentially more difficult than imagined.

Examining the global GLP-1 competitive landscape, Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly have established absolute dominance. Leveraging their blockbuster marketed products, they control over 90% of the global GLP-1 market share while building comprehensive barriers across the R&D, production, and commercialization chain. More importantly, these two giants have not halted R&D efforts and have long completed their layouts in the ultra-long-acting GLP-1 field, potentially becoming formidable competitors for Zhitai Biotech.

Currently, Novo Nordisk is developing new formulations of semaglutide for once-every-two-weeks and once-monthly dosing. Eli Lilly is also advancing the development of long-acting formulations of tirzepatide. Besides the two giants, several multinational and domestic pharmaceutical companies are competing directly with Zhitai Biotech in the once-monthly GLP-1 space. The prospectus discloses that products like Amgen's MariTide and Pfizer's PF-07943944 have already entered late-stage clinical trials, with progress nearly matching ZT002. Among them, Amgen's MariTide also targets once-monthly dosing, and disclosed clinical data shows its weight loss efficacy is significantly superior to ZT002.

In the domestic market, leading pharmaceutical companies like Jiangsu Hengrui Pharmaceuticals, Innovent Biologics, and Huadong Medicine have also laid out ultra-long-acting GLP-1 pipelines. With their more substantial financial reserves, more robust clinical development capabilities, and more mature commercialization systems, Zhitai Biotech can hardly claim an advantage in competing with these domestic leaders.

Furthermore, in recent years, competition in GLP-1 products has focused on "creating something from nothing." As long as a product could be launched with clear weight-loss effects, it could gain a share of the market. However, with numerous products now launched, the field has entered a stage of "optimizing from existing options" in a saturated market. Patient and market selection criteria have evolved from focusing solely on weight loss efficacy to a comprehensive evaluation of weight loss effect, safety, dosing convenience, and price accessibility.

In this context, Zhitai Biotech's reliance on the single advantage of once-monthly dosing is unlikely to build a sufficiently deep moat. On one hand, oral GLP-1 products are rapidly emerging. Novo Nordisk's oral semaglutide is already marketed in China. Eli Lilly's oral tirzepatide has entered late-stage clinical trials. Oral GLP-1 products from several domestic companies have also entered clinical stages. Compared to once-monthly injectable formulations, oral formulations offer a more significant compliance advantage. Once oral products achieve efficacy breakthroughs, they could directly replace all injectable formulations, including ZT002.

On the other hand, dual-target and triple-target GLP-1 products have become the new mainstream direction in the industry. Currently marketed products like tirzepatide (GIP/GLP-1 dual-target) and mazdutide (GIP/GLP-1 dual-target) have shown significantly superior weight loss effects compared to single-target GLP-1 products. Companies like Eli Lilly and Innovent Biologics are also advancing the development of triple-target products.

In contrast, Zhitai Biotech's core product ZT002 remains a single-target GLP-1 product, inherently limited in its efficacy ceiling from a pharmacological mechanism perspective. Even if it achieves long-acting properties, it may struggle to compete with dual-target and triple-target products. The company's dual-target pipeline, ZT003, is currently only in Phase I clinical trials in Australia, lagging far behind industry leaders.

Regarding drug accessibility, after the core patent for semaglutide expired in 2026, a large number of domestic generic drugs will be launched intensively. It is estimated that within the next 1-2 years, the monthly treatment cost for semaglutide generics will drop below 100 yuan. As an innovative drug, Zhitai Biotech's ZT002 has much higher R&D and production costs than generics, necessitating a price significantly higher than semaglutide generics. However, as a single-target product, its weight loss efficacy is inferior to already marketed dual-target innovative drugs, making it difficult to justify a high price. Its market space may thus be compressed.