During a recent international energy forum roundtable in Geneva organized by the World Economic Forum, a Swedish energy company CEO sitting beside me remarked, "Thank goodness for China, otherwise international oil prices would have skyrocketed to $200 per barrel during this Middle East crisis and the Hormuz Strait closure! Just the other day, analysts from bp, Shell, Goldman Sachs and other institutions were all telling me this."

Coincidentally, during another roundtable discussion the following morning, an energy professor from Rice University in the United States told me, "China has saved the world this time, especially Asia. As you just mentioned, the supply and transportation disruptions caused by this strait blockade are unprecedented in history, yet international oil prices (referring to Brent futures) are only the third highest ever. The main reason is that China reduced its imports. Otherwise, look at the Philippines, Singapore, India, Vietnam, Thailand and other countries - they would face major problems and extreme difficulties."

Many people might wonder what exactly happened. Since the US-Israel-Iran war broke out on February 28 and Iran and the United States successively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, global daily average crude oil supply has lost 12 million barrels over the past six months compared to pre-war levels, representing approximately 13% of total supply. Despite the IEA coordinating OECD countries to release strategic petroleum reserves and stockpiles, adding 2.5 million barrels per day of supply, and mobilizing non-Middle Eastern producers such as Brazil, Russia, Venezuela and African nations to boost output by 1.5 million barrels per day, the global daily supply-demand gap still stands at 8 million barrels per day (12 - 2.5 - 1.5).

Had such a massive shortfall persisted, based on historical experience, global oil market turbulence would have intensified dramatically, with international prices surging well beyond the 2008 peak of $147.6 per barrel and likely reaching or exceeding the "astronomical" $200 per barrel level. However, this scenario never materialized, and prices actually retreated after hitting a high of $119 per barrel on March 31.

What explains this outcome? The answer lies in China - the world's largest oil importer (importing over 11 million barrels per day on average in 2025) - which was forced to cut imports to around 7 million barrels per day due to the Hormuz Strait blockade. In other words, on the demand side, China's reduction of approximately 4 million barrels per day in imports brought the global daily net shortfall of 8 million barrels down to around 4 million barrels. As data from the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute showed in May and September, global market shortages during those two months were 3.7 million and 3.9 million barrels per day respectively.

Therefore, because China, as a responsible stakeholder, proactively curbed demand and reduced imports, the global oil market avoided the "absurd moment" and "darkest hour" of prices above $200 per barrel. China saved the world.

At this point, more people might ask: How did China accomplish this? China has been the world's largest oil importer for the past eight years. Does its economy, maintaining around 5% growth, no longer need oil support? Let's examine what the renowned Economist magazine analyzed on this matter!

On August 8, The Economist published an article titled "How China Became a World Oil Power." Its core argument: China has replaced OPEC as the key force capable of influencing global oil prices. The article demonstrated this transformation by analyzing China's intervention in the oil market during the 2026 Iran war. It pointed out that China relies on three major levers to regulate the market: first, inventory management - before the war, during 2025 and earlier, China imported large volumes of crude at low prices and released stockpiles during wartime to stabilize prices. Second, strengthened export controls - reducing refined product exports, retaining resources domestically, and adjusting refining capacity. Third, suppressed refined product demand - guiding the public toward electric vehicles and other alternatives through price mechanisms, proactively reducing domestic oil consumption. The article concluded that China's active demand-side management to influence oil prices now rivals OPEC's traditional supply-side power.

It is clear that the remarks from Western colleagues about "without China, international oil prices would exceed $200 per barrel" are not alarmist, and The Economist's analysis holds considerable merit. What exactly would $200 oil mean? How did China manage to "reduce oil imports by 4 million barrels per day (equivalent to 200 million tons annually, matching China's domestic annual production) without panic"?

In fact, the assessments of the two Western experts align closely with recent analyses from international authorities and mainstream media. Taken together, China's role in this crisis has genuinely altered the traditional logic of global energy markets. After the Hormuz Strait blockade, multiple institutions predicted prices could surge to $150-200 per barrel. Macquarie analysts warned that if oil reached $200, global economic growth would decline by about one percentage point, and central banks, particularly in developed and major developing economies, would face "stagflation" difficulties similar to the 1970s. Goldman Sachs also noted that China's proactive contraction was "the key force preventing oil prices from spiraling out of control to $200 per barrel."

China's response this time has been phenomenal - truly achieving "braking without chaos." During the crisis, as the world's largest crude importer, China bucked the trend by cutting imports by approximately 40%, reducing daily volumes by around 4 million barrels - a scale exceeding OPEC's routine production cuts, which over the past decade have typically ranged from 500,000 to 1 million barrels per day under OPEC+. China successfully managed this crisis through a "dual approach" of demand-side and supply-side management.

On the demand side: First, electric transportation played a "super substitute" role. On one front, new energy vehicles are replacing conventional cars - China's NEV substitution rate surged from around 30% in March to over 65% by August. At this pace, it is expected to bring about a decline of roughly 20 million tons in gasoline consumption for the year. On another front, electric heavy trucks and LNG heavy trucks are rapidly replacing traditional diesel trucks, while new electric-powered high-speed rail locomotives are fast replacing diesel locomotives - together expected to reduce diesel consumption by another 20 million tons annually. Behind this lies China's new energy development scale and speed continuing to lead the world. Notably, in August this year, China's total installed solar photovoltaic capacity exceeded coal-fired power for the first time, reaching 1,288 GW (1.288 billion kilowatts). China is entering a "super-electrification" era.

Second, shifts in ordinary citizens' transportation choices. The high oil and gas prices from the crisis passed through to fuel vehicle owners. It is reported that when 92-octane gasoline prices exceeded 8 yuan per liter, some fuel vehicle owners stopped refueling and switched to public transport or even bicycles, contributing to reduced gasoline consumption.

Third, controlling refined product exports. Over the past few years, China's annual refined product exports averaged around 50 million tons. To prioritize domestic supply, China restricted refined product exports early in the conflict (which have since gradually resumed). While this temporarily deprived some Asian buyers of supply, it objectively suppressed upward pressure on global crude prices.

On the supply side: First, China relied on its already established diversified oil and gas import channels, increasing imports from Russia. Second, by boosting investment in domestic exploration and development, China made every effort to stabilize domestic oil and gas production levels, achieving slight growth. Third, China went all out in crude inventory management. According to Western expert data, China's massive crude stockpile of 1.4 billion barrels (approximately 200 million tons) served as the "reassurance pill" for successfully weathering this strait blockade.

China's一系列 measures have won broad recognition from the international community. Jason Bordoff, founding director of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, noted: "China's reduction in oil imports is one of the most important reasons why current oil prices have not spiraled out of control." CNBC also reported that China's import cuts accounted for approximately 70% of the global decline in crude imports. (Interestingly, at one time China's oil import growth accounted for about 70% of global import growth - now the situation has completely reversed.)

Thus, China's actions not only prevented a global economic "disaster" but also marked a shift in the logic of pricing power in global energy markets - leveraging its enormous demand scale, China has become the world's "swing importer" (akin to OPEC's long-standing role as swing exporter) and a "demand-side stabilizer."

At this point, I want to emphasize that China's role as a "demand-side stabilizer" during the Hormuz crisis demonstrates the image of a responsible major country and is definitely a boost to China's global soft power. From an international communication perspective, this is indeed a positive narrative with tremendous dissemination value. Through China's performance this time, we should highlight our role as a provider of "global public goods" - not just saying China "reduced imports," but emphasizing that China provided a "shock absorber" for global markets by releasing strategic stockpiles and cutting imports. An analogy can be drawn: when the global energy supply chain fractured, China did not join the panic buying but proactively applied the brakes. This is essentially providing a global public good - stable oil price expectations.

Of course, the crisis has not yet ended. Recently, international oil prices have once again crossed $100 per barrel due to intensified US-Iran conflict and attacks by Yemen's Houthi forces on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Countries are all seeking energy security and transition pathways amid the crisis. China is not some "savior" - its role has been a natural, inevitable result. China's contribution is not about demanding gratitude from the world, but about enabling the world to recognize: a stable, predictable, and responsible China serves everyone's interests. When such recognition becomes international consensus, the elevation of China's image will likewise be a natural and inevitable outcome.