Recent attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran have sparked fears of war, leading to exaggerated market worries about the strategic "chokepoint effect" of the Strait of Hormuz. Some narratives have amplified panic about potential severe shortages in China's oil supply. However, an analysis based on official public data and the objective situation shows that such anxiety lacks factual foundation. The attacks are unlikely to cause any substantial impact on China's petroleum supply in the short term.

Ample import reserves serve as a robust "firewall" for short-term supply security. Recent import data indicates that China's oil imports have been steadily increasing, having established a sufficient safety buffer in advance. According to figures released by the General Administration of Customs, China's crude oil imports totaled 50.89 million tons, 55.97 million tons, and 118.83 million tons for November and December 2025, and January-February 2026, respectively. This represents year-on-year increases of 14.95%, 17.0%, and 16.0%. The cumulative imports over these four months reached 226 million tons, approximately 31.14 million tons more than the same period a year earlier, equivalent to about 18.3 days of China's total oil consumption. Based on current domestic consumption levels, existing commercial reserves combined with strategic petroleum reserves can meet the nation's demand for over 90 days. Even if short-term imports experience fluctuations, domestic production and living needs can be fully safeguarded without disruption. The recent stability in domestic refined oil prices and ample market supply further attest to the resilience on the supply side.

Diversified import sources significantly reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. In terms of import structure, the proportion of oil China imports from countries along the Strait of Hormuz has been continuously decreasing, substantially weakening the practical impact of the so-called "chokepoint effect." Data from the National Energy Administration shows that oil imported via the Strait of Hormuz accounts for about 33% of China's total imports, representing approximately 22% of the nation's total consumption. Even in an extreme scenario where transit through the strait is completely halted, increasing imports from non-Gulf countries such as Russia, nations in the Americas, and Africa, coupled with adjustments to domestic reserves, would fully compensate for the supply gap, preventing any widespread shortage. Regarding import substitution capacity, China has established a diversified and stable crude oil supply system, fully capable of mitigating the risk of a Hormuz supply disruption. According to the National Energy Administration's "2025 Report on Domestic and International Oil and Gas Industry Development," Russia, as China's largest crude oil supplier (accounting for 26% of imports), could increase annual supply by 50 million tons via the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline and maritime routes, covering 27% of a potential gap. Countries in the Americas, including Brazil, Canada, and Colombia, could contribute an additional 25 million tons per year, covering 14% of the gap. African nations such as Angola, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo could supply an extra 35 million tons annually, covering 19%. Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, along with Southeast Asia and Australia, could provide a further 20 million tons per year, covering 11%. These alternative channels collectively offer an additional 130 million tons per year. Combined with a potential domestic production increase of 20 million tons per year and the ability to release strategic reserves, the total substitution capacity reaches 180 million tons annually. This nearly covers the yearly import volume of 185 million tons that transits the Strait of Hormuz, with any minor remaining gap manageable through demand-side adjustments. From a global supply perspective, the crude oil market is currently in a state of overall surplus, lacking a fundamental basis for a real physical shortage. OPEC+ data indicates the organization holds spare capacity exceeding 3 million barrels per day (approximately 150 million tons per year), primarily concentrated in producers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are not subject to US restrictions. Non-OPEC countries, including the United States and Canada, have potential production increases of over 2 million barrels per day (about 100 million tons per year). Global idle capacity totals more than 250 million tons per year, fully capable of filling any gap created by a reduction in Iranian oil exports. China's strategy of diversifying crude oil import sources has been implemented for over a decade, with imports now coming from more than 40 countries. Dependence on any single region or transit route has consistently decreased, indicating that the "Hormuz chokepoint theory" significantly overestimates the actual impact of related risks.

The US strategic predicament dictates that the conflict is unlikely to escalate into a prolonged quagmire akin to the war in Ukraine. Firstly, the US economy would struggle to withstand the impact of sustained high oil prices. Current US core inflation (Core PCE) has risen to 3.0% (from a previous 2.8%), and domestic gasoline prices have surged by 20% since the attacks on Iran. A prolonged conflict would likely keep oil prices above $100 per barrel, driving US inflation higher and potentially forcing the Federal Reserve to reduce the number of expected interest rate cuts in 2026 (perhaps to just one cut) or even resume hiking rates. This would severely impact the US housing market, stock market, and debt sustainability, running counter to US economic interests. US Department of Commerce estimates suggest that every $10 per barrel increase in oil prices could reduce US GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points and raise the inflation rate by 0.4 percentage points. Secondly, 2026 is a US Congressional election year. The core objective of the Trump administration is to maintain control of both houses of Congress. A protracted war would be detrimental to this electoral strategy. If the conflict reaches a stalemate with significant US military casualties, voter support would be severely affected. Consequently, the US is more inclined towards a strategy of "limited strikes and rapid conclusion" to avoid a long-term war. Thirdly, there is widespread international opposition to escalation. Major economies, including China, Russia, and the European Union, have called for an immediate ceasefire and the restoration of safe shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The UN Security Council is already consulting on a ceasefire resolution. Global energy market stability aligns with the common interests of all nations, making a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz highly improbable.

In conclusion, the current market "Hormuz anxiety" is essentially an overreaction driven by short-term sentiment. It aligns neither with the actual security of China's oil supply nor with the objective trends of the conflict's development. Strategic patience should be maintained, continuing the established pace of energy transition and import diversification. There is no need to be swayed by one-sided "chokepoint theories." Ultimately, China's energy security has never relied solely on the unimpeded flow through any single strait. It is built upon a diversified supply system, ample strategic reserves, and robust domestic production capacity.