A special report on 2026 fund second-quarter results: heavy bets on "chip and optical" sectors yield strong performance (source: Jian Ying Cai Guan). This is an original report by Jian Ying Cai Guan, authored by Qi Si and edited by Feng Ling.

In 2026, Hong Kong stocks witnessed a textbook case of industrial capital retreat. The Kingboard Group's two companies—KB LAMINATES (01888.HK) and KINGBOARD HLDG (00148.HK)—saw their share prices surge amid the AI wave. For KB LAMINATES, the stock rose approximately nine-fold from the start of 2026 to its peak in June. As the share price hit its zenith, major shareholders of the Kingboard Group engaged in intensive cash-outs. On June 17, during a second placement, KINGBOARD HLDG sold 155 million shares at HKD 76 each, cashing out HKD 11.78 billion. In late June, major shareholders of KINGBOARD HLDG cumulatively reduced their holdings by over HKD 10 billion. Combined with reductions by directors and senior management, conservative estimates indicate that Kingboard Group shareholders have cashed out over HKD 20 billion since the start of 2026.

Who has been buying these shares? Mutual funds. At the end of the first quarter, all mutual funds held only about 16.27 million shares of KB LAMINATES. By the end of the second quarter, this figure had surged to 178.6 million shares, representing a net increase of over 162 million shares. This number aligns almost perfectly with the 155 million shares placed by the major shareholder.

Where to Begin

Guo Weiling’s 3.9 billion yuan bet on the Kingboard Group may have already incurred a floating loss of 2.7 billion yuan. Among the many fund "bag holders," the Penghua Gangmei Internet LOF was the first to ignite public attention. Despite its name including "Internet," the fund had allocated 19.32% of its net asset value to a company producing circuit board materials by the end of the second quarter. KB LAMINATES accounted for 10.40% of the net value, while KINGBOARD HLDG accounted for 8.92%. These two companies are parent and subsidiary, with highly intertwined fundamentals and closely correlated share prices, yet their connection to the internet is quite distant. Beyond buying high and facing subsequent declines, there are more subtle concerns about regulatory compliance. The Penghua Gangmei Internet LOF’s 19.32% position in targets under the same actual controller raises questions about potentially splitting holdings to circumvent the 10% single-security cap? However, Penghua was not the largest buyer of the Kingboard Group. The Penghua fund’s total holdings in the Kingboard Group were only 453 million yuan, representing 19.32% of its net value. The true "big player" was Dacheng Fund. Guo Weiling, a rising star in technology at Dacheng Fund, was the major buyer of Kingboard Group stocks. By the end of the second quarter, her fund held 2.089 billion yuan in KB LAMINATES (8.36% of net value), effectively consuming one-fifth of the June secondary placement. At the end of the second quarter, Dacheng Technology Innovation held 2.089 billion yuan in KB LAMINATES (8.36% of net value) and 1.625 billion yuan in KINGBOARD HLDG (6.51% of net value), with total Kingboard Group holdings accounting for 14.87% of net value, amounting to 3.714 billion yuan in market value. Besides Dacheng Technology Innovation, Guo Weiling also managed Dacheng Jingxian Chengzhang and Dacheng Lingxian Dongli, with three funds collectively holding 2.2 billion yuan in KB LAMINATES and 1.714 billion yuan in KINGBOARD HLDG. This represented the market value of Guo Weiling’s Kingboard Group holdings at the end of the second quarter (June 30), totaling 3.914 billion yuan across both companies. Since late June, both Kingboard Group stocks have collapsed, with a decline exceeding 70% in one month. If these investments have not been sold, they may have already lost 2.7 billion yuan. The Kingboard Group’s massive cash-out may ultimately make fund investors the final losers.

Why Just 10 ASX 200 Shares?

Technology star Guo Weiling saw her fund scale surge by 20 billion yuan in the second quarter. Xu Yan, Liu Xu, and Han Chuang, known as the "Three Musketeers" of Dacheng Fund, have traditionally represented value investing and were once criticized for "missing" the technology rally. In January, Wang Shuai, the former head of Dacheng Fund’s technology team, left. Subsequently, Guo Weiling rose to prominence. Joining Dacheng Fund in 2015, she progressed from a researcher to a core fund manager in the technology sector, delivering strong performance in the recent technology bull market. She has managed Dacheng Technology Innovation for five years, with a surge of nearly 80% in the third quarter of 2025 and an annualized return of 17%. In the first quarter of this year, it rose 7.82%, and in the second quarter, the fund’s net value doubled, surging 112.89%. Attracted by the stellar performance, fund investors chased the rally, pouring in substantial capital. Dacheng Technology Innovation had a scale of only 1.7 billion yuan at the end of 2025, growing to 4 billion yuan by the end of the first quarter. By the end of the second quarter, its scale had surged by over 20 billion yuan, with A and C shares combined approaching 25 billion yuan. By the end of the second quarter, Guo Weiling’s total management scale had rapidly expanded to nearly 30 billion yuan, making her the most prominent "technology face" of Dacheng Fund. During the same period, Han Chuang, one of the "Three Musketeers" and a well-known cycle-sector manager, was experiencing a downturn. He was "buying high and selling low" in the gold sector, with his management scale halving from 20.8 billion yuan to 10.9 billion yuan, leading to rumors of his departure this month.

Initial Steps and Insights

Self-reflection on the Kingboard Group investment and compliance concerns. KB LAMINATES is the global leader in copper-clad laminates, and KINGBOARD HLDG is its controlling parent company, holding over 60% of its shares. As industrial capital, the Kingboard Group’s major shareholders are most familiar with industry cycles. They significantly reduced their holdings when share prices were high, and mutual funds stepped in to buy. Guo Weiling’s investment in the Kingboard Group was not a blind chase of hot trends. The core logic was likely based on the "inflation and price increases" narrative in the upstream AI computing sector. In her second-quarter report, Guo explained her buying rationale: price-rising products like electronic yarn, CCL, and memory chips had generated good returns, and she invested in industry chain leaders. Based on the "bottleneck links and technological changes in AI computing" (first-quarter report view), Guo judged that the cyclical prosperity in the upstream of computing would continue, believing that strong earnings growth could support valuations. She may have viewed the Kingboard Group as part of a "structural adjustment" within AI computing, allocating to the price-rising segment of the "PCB upstream," rather than blindly chasing outside her framework. The problem lay in her overly heavy bet. A 14.87% position, nearly 4 billion yuan, was placed in two stocks within the same corporate group. These two companies are highly interconnected—the parent holds over 60% of the subsidiary, and their share prices are closely correlated. The market capitalization of KINGBOARD HLDG is even lower than the market value of its stake in KB LAMINATES. One’s rise benefits the other; one’s fall hurts the other. As Guo Weiling’s management scale expanded from several billion to nearly 30 billion yuan, the larger the scale, the harder it became to adjust positions, increasing liquidity risk. Cyclical price-rising stocks, after rapid price increases, become extremely sensitive to price changes and very fragile. Guo acknowledged this in her second-quarter report, but it was too late. Whether it was Penghua Fund’s Penghua Gangmei Internet LOF or Guo Weiling’s three funds at Dacheng Fund, both exposed a sharper compliance issue. Within the same corporate system, with the parent and subsidiary as two listed companies, does separate counting avoid exceeding limits? The common mutual fund investment limit is that a single fund’s holdings in securities issued by one company must not exceed 10% of the fund’s net asset value. For Dacheng Technology Innovation, KB LAMINATES accounted for 8.36% and KINGBOARD HLDG for 6.51% of net value, each under the 10% threshold. The issue is that these two companies are parent and subsidiary, with the same actual controller, core management, consolidated financials, and highly correlated share prices. Separately, they do not exceed the limit; combined, 14.87% of the position is bet on the same system. The Penghua Gangmei Internet LOF was more extreme: 10.40% in KB LAMINATES plus 8.92% in KINGBOARD HLDG equals 19.32%. Jian Ying Cai Guan reviewed Dacheng Technology Innovation’s prospectus, which states: "This fund holds securities issued by one company (A+H shares of the same company listed in mainland China and Hong Kong are calculated together), with a market value not exceeding 10% of the fund’s net asset value." Are KB LAMINATES and KINGBOARD HLDG considered the same company? Does this high-risk correlation situation violate regulations? Even setting that aside, Dacheng Fund cannot avoid questioning the prudence of Dacheng Technology Innovation’s decision to invest in the Kingboard Group. Was concentrating nearly 15% of the position in the same corporate system, after a tenfold stock price surge, based on adequate risk assessment? In the second quarter, a large number of fund investors made net subscriptions of over 2.4 billion units. Newly entering capital did not benefit from the technology rally but instead plunged into the stock collapse. In her second-quarter report, the fund manager reflected: "These price-rising stocks have recently experienced significant pullbacks, warranting reflection. From a drawdown control perspective, the risk exposure of the positions should have been promptly reduced." We hope that during the Kingboard Group’s sharp decline in July, Guo Weiling cut losses in time. This information is republished from a Sina cooperative media outlet. Sina’s publication of this article is for information dissemination purposes only and does not imply endorsement of its views or verification of its content. The article is for reference only and does not constitute investment advice. Investors assume their own risks.