Against the backdrop of a new global landscape, how are China's "hidden champions" becoming the pivotal forces that define the future? On December 19, the 7th "Chinese-Made Hidden Champions" Evergreen Symposium was grandly held in Beijing's Xicheng District, China's financial nerve center. Centered on the theme of "Building a Financial Powerhouse and Strengthening Supply Chains with Hidden Champions," the conference brought together elites from government, industry, and academia. It not only clearly outlined a symbiotic path where financial resources precisely nurture the real economy and hidden champions solidify the industrial foundation, but also heralded a more certain future: when the "hidden backbone" dedicated to innovation deeply integrates with patient and intelligent capital, and when the "individual champions" in niche sectors grow into "team champions" collaborating along the industrial chain, China's manufacturing sector's strides toward the mid-to-high end will undoubtedly become more robust. With the establishment of platforms like the "Chinese Listed Hidden Champions Club" and the continuous empowerment from financial hubs like Beijing's Xicheng District, a distinctive development path characterized by industry-finance synergy and the emergence of champions is becoming increasingly clear. It is expected that these "hidden champions" will continue to achieve excellence through focus and lead transformation through innovation, becoming not only a source of pride for China but also key forces defining the future of global industry amidst the restructuring of global supply chains. Zhu Guangyao, former Vice Minister of the Ministry of Finance, delivered a keynote speech titled "The Global Trade and Financial Landscape and Industrial Transformation Amid Fierce Great Power Competition." The following is a transcript of the speech:

The year 2025 is an extraordinarily significant year for China and a year full of challenges and transformations for the world. We need to clearly understand the basic framework of the global economy and trade—it is based on this framework that we have embarked on our development journey in 2025. Understanding China's remarkable course and achievements this year is of great importance for achieving the expected socio-economic development goals outlined in the "14th Five-Year Plan."

New changes are unfolding in the global economic landscape. Relevant data has now been fully released. According to official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the total size of the global economy in 2024 was $110 trillion. Within this, the United States, as the world's largest economy, had an economic scale of $29.17 trillion, accounting for approximately 26% of the global total. China, as the world's second-largest economy, had a total economic scale of 134.9 trillion yuan in 2024, as announced by the National Bureau of Statistics, which converts to approximately $18.27 trillion based on IMF calculations, representing about 17% of the global economy. Combined, China and the US account for over 40% of the global economic scale, which explains why the core of current major power competition is primarily manifested between these two nations. We consistently hope that this competition will be conducted with the goal of enhancing productivity, based on market principles, and that it will jointly promote the development of global productive forces on this foundation. It is noteworthy that over the past decade, China's economic growth has consistently contributed around 30% to global economic growth. This means that with an economy constituting about 17% of the global total, China has supported approximately 30% of the world's new GDP, making a significant contribution to global economic growth. A closer look at the top ten global economies, particularly the top five, reveals: Germany, as the world's third-largest economy, had an economic scale of $4.73 trillion in 2024; Japan ranked fourth with an economic scale of $4.07 trillion; India, with significant economic growth in recent years, has surpassed its former colonial ruler, the United Kingdom, to become the world's fifth-largest economy, with a scale of $3.89 trillion in 2024. Overall, countries with an economic scale below $2 trillion can no longer break into the global top ten. Within this global economic structure, China's development trajectory is particularly noteworthy. Aside from the two major economies of China and the US, no other country has yet surpassed an economic scale of $5 trillion. Looking back at the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, China's economy first surpassed the 100 trillion yuan mark in 2020, comprehensively initiating the implementation of the "14th Five-Year Plan." As mentioned, China's total economic volume reached 134.9 trillion yuan in 2024. In 2025, China's economy is expected to achieve growth of around 5%, with the total volume likely to exceed 140 trillion yuan. Converted at the current exchange rate (1 USD to 7.1 CNY), China's cumulative economic increment during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period will reach about 40 trillion yuan, equivalent to approximately $5.63 trillion—a scale comparable to the total economic size of Germany, the world's third-largest economy in 2024 ($4.73 trillion). This clearly demonstrates the significant volume of China's economic growth and the developmental momentum it contains.

Analyzing the US-China comparison through the lens of global trade volume reveals the economic contest behind surpluses and deficits. Next, we focus on the global trade situation, a topic of widespread concern. According to data from the World Trade Organization (WTO), global merchandise trade volume in 2024 was $49 trillion, while trade in services amounted to $16 trillion, totaling $65 trillion and accounting for over 50% of global GDP, highlighting the crucial role of international trade in the global economy. So, what share do China and the US each hold in this $65 trillion global trade? Overall, the two countries' total trade shares are roughly comparable, which differs from their GDP standings—the US GDP is $29.17 trillion, while China's is $18.27 trillion. Specifically: The United States' merchandise trade in 2024 was $5.4 trillion, and its trade in services was $1.9 trillion, totaling $7.3 trillion; China's merchandise trade in 2024 was $6.2 trillion (maintaining its position as the world's largest merchandise trader for the eighth consecutive year), while its trade in services surpassed $1 trillion for the first time, bringing the total for goods and services to $7.2 trillion, essentially on par with the US figure of $7.3 trillion. Notably, the trade balance structures of the two countries differ significantly: the US recorded a merchandise trade deficit of approximately $3 trillion on its $5.4 trillion in trade, whereas China achieved a merchandise trade surplus of about $980 billion. Particularly noteworthy are the trade figures for November 2025—China's merchandise trade surplus exceeded $1 trillion for the first time, reaching $1.07 trillion, setting a post-World War II historical record for a single country's merchandise trade surplus, a level even the United States has never reached. This has elicited two different international reactions: one is astonishment, acknowledging the difficulty of achieving such results amid headwinds to economic globalization, particularly targeted US tariffs; the other expresses concern over the sheer size of China's trade surplus. In response to the latter view, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive and objective analysis by combining merchandise and services trade. In the first 11 months of 2025, China's services trade deficit was $120 billion. Combining merchandise and services trade, China's overall international payments position shows a merchandise trade surplus of $1.07 trillion and a services trade deficit of $120 billion. We must view this trade structure realistically, as it forms an important backdrop for our development process in 2025, encompassing both the GDP foundation and trade dynamics. Against this backdrop, China indeed faces numerous significant challenges in its external economic relations in 2025. As is well known, Donald Trump returned to the White House on January 20, 2025, beginning his second term. The core of his administration is "Make America Great Again," with the key pathway being the reshoring of manufacturing to the United States. Over the past year, the philosophy and policies of Trump's second term have gradually become clear. From the perspective of major power competition and cooperation, we must soberly recognize that the United States, as the world's largest economy, is fully advancing its "Make America Great Again" agenda and the return of manufacturing. It is crucial to understand that the US has dominated the global trade and financial systems since World War II; therefore, we must thoroughly study the potential impact of the Trump administration's policies on these two systems. It can be said that over the past year, this impact has already become remarkably evident.

Transformation of the global trade system: US policy shocks and China's resolute response. My assessment is that the policies of the Trump administration are having a disruptive effect on the post-World War II global international trade system and the international financial system. Why is that? First, tax cuts are the primary measure of Trump's economic policy. During his first term, he already reduced the US corporate income tax rate to 21% and scheduled a review of this policy for 2024. During the campaign, candidate Trump proposed not only maintaining the 21% rate but further reducing it to 15%; whereas the Democratic candidate, Harris, advocated for reverting the rate to 23%. In practice, on July 4, 2025, the US Congress passed the "Big and Beautiful" Act, which explicitly made the 21% corporate income tax rate permanent, approved Trump administration proposals for tax exemptions on tips, overtime pay, and certain social security-related expenditures, and significantly raised the ceiling for US Treasury issuance of federal debt from $36 trillion to $41 trillion. Notably, following the passage of this act, US Treasury issuance increased substantially, currently reaching $38 trillion. This directly led to the annual federal debt interest expense exceeding $1 trillion, surpassing military spending to become the second-largest fiscal item after social security expenditures. Objectively speaking, the tax relief on income like tips and overtime has garnered significant support from the working class for the Trump administration. Therefore, tax cuts are undoubtedly the core lever of Trump's second-term economic policy. The second key area is tariff policy. Trump believes that other countries have long taken advantage of the United States, leading to the introduction of so-called "reciprocal tariffs" on April 20, 2025. Unlike the previous trade war targeting only China, this policy applies globally, including to the US's closest allies. The announcement had a massive global impact—as the largest economy and the largest single importer, US tariff adjustments inevitably trigger global chain reactions. Consequently, after April 20, most countries essentially abandoned resistance. Throughout this process, China has steadfastly safeguarded its own development rights and interests and resolutely defended the global trading system based on WTO rules. This system is an international rule framework established through member consultations to regulate all trade conduct. However, following the implementation of the reciprocal tariff policy, this landscape has undergone significant changes. Objectively speaking, aside from China, other countries largely did not offer substantial resistance. Only China adhered to principles, engaged in tit-for-tat struggle with the US, clearly articulated its own policy stance, and emphasized the critical importance of maintaining a rules-based multilateral trading system. The world today must not revert to an old order dominated by "jungle law," but in reality, only China has systematically stood up to oppose this trend. In this process, the US categorized its trading partners into tiers and engaged in separate negotiations, constructing a multi-layered, differentiated tariff policy system: First Tier: For the closest allies with trade deficits with the US, a 10% tariff increase was set through reciprocal negotiations. Second Tier: For general trading partners like China, Japan, South Korea, and the EU, a 15% tariff increase was determined after repeated consultations, accompanied by multiple conditions requiring increased investment in the US. For instance, South Korea pledged an additional $35 million, Japan pledged $55 million, and ASEAN pledged $600 billion. While the specific forms of these investments remain uncertain, the US explicitly demanded commitments during negotiations. Third Tier: Primarily targeting Southeast Asian nations, a benchmark tariff increase of around 20% was set, with distinctions based on product localization—an additional 40% tariff was imposed on non-localized products, showing clear targeting. However, defining and enforcing "non-localized products" presents practical difficulties. Fourth Tier: This tier clearly incorporates geopolitical considerations. For example, the base tariff increase for India was set at 25%, with an additional 25% imposed due to its imports of Russian oil and kerosene, bringing the total to 50%; Brazil, originally subject to a 10%–14% rate, faced an additional 40% levy due to political factors, also rising to 50%. In this context, China consistently adhered to principles, clearly articulating its legal claims and policy positions. The US had previously raised tariffs on China to 145%, prompting China to retaliate by adjusting tariffs on US goods to 120%. Given that such high tariffs severely disrupted normal bilateral trade, the two sides held five rounds of talks, starting in Geneva and proceeding through London, Stockholm, and Madrid, finally reaching partial consensus in Kuala Lumpur. According to the agreement, the US reduced the additional 20% tariff on China by 10%, citing the "fentanyl issue," and postponed the overall implementation timeline of the reciprocal tariffs by one year. By坚守原则 (holding firm to principles) and resolutely defending its interests, China ultimately helped achieve a mutually beneficial and win-win negotiation outcome. However, it must be soberly recognized that this outcome was hard-won. While mutual benefit has been achieved for now, future challenges remain severe. According to WTO forecasts, global merchandise trade growth is projected to slow to just 0.5% in 2026, down significantly from 2.4% in 2025; growth in trade in services is also expected to decelerate from 4.6% to 4.4%, indicating an overall weakening momentum. Thus, the rules-based trading system centered on the WTO is facing serious challenges. US Trade Representative Delia has publicly stated, "We are now building a rules system based on interests." It is worth pondering what the benchmark for such "interest-based" rules truly is. Therefore, facing the competition and challenges of 2026, we must unwaveringly implement the Party Central Committee's部署 (deployments)—in accordance with the requirements of the Central Economic Work Conference, we must balance domestic economic work with international economic and trade struggles, balance development and security, and promote the steady and sustained progress of China's economy on the track of high-quality development.