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當前，環境權益證書正成為衆多企業青睞的減排工具。但這種交易模式，究竟能否真正推動行業實現實質性減排？圍繞這一核心問題，綠色金融60人論壇（GF60）聯合新浪財經，與哥倫比亞大學可持續投資中心主任Lisa Sachs教授發起1.5℃ Talk對話。在Sachs教授看來，環境權益證書恰恰折射出當前全球推動難減排行業轉型時一個普遍存在的深層誤區：我們正在用方法論層面的精巧設計，替代對物理世界真實改變的追求。
Lisa Sachs 教授是哥倫比亞大學氣候學院可持續投資中心主任，哥倫比亞大學氣候金融碩士項目主任。自2008年加入哥大可持續投資中心以來，Lisa Sachs教授創建並領導了該中心的跨學科研究和諮詢工作，致力於推動投資法律、政策和實踐與可持續發展目標的一致性。她在全球範圍內享有盛譽，專注於研究法律、政策和商業實踐如何影響國際投資流動，並促進可持續發展。她與各國政府、地區和國際發展機構、金融機構、企業、民間組織以及學術機構密切合作，力求深入理解投資流動與可持續發展的關係，並推動投資政策和實踐的改善，以實現SDGs和應對氣候變化的巴黎協定目標。
Lisa Sachs 教授以下為Sachs教授的觀點全文：
今年早些時候，微軟宣佈達成一項交易：購買瑞典生產商Stegra所生產綠鋼對應的環境屬性。此舉被廣泛稱讚為「有創新性」，「能夠塑造市場」。但實際情況是，這筆交易轉移的是「宣稱權（claims）」，並沒有改變生產本身；它恰恰折射出當下推動綠鋼市場規模化時一個更普遍的問題。
微軟並沒有採購綠鋼用於在生產地市場中實際使用。它購買的是一類環境屬性，從而使其能夠將自己在其他地區採購或使用的鋼材宣稱為「綠鋼」，尤其是在那些綠鋼生產尚不具備可行性的市場，比如中國（全球很大部分鋼鐵產量都來自這裏）。亞洲鋼鐵市場的實體系統並沒有因此發生變化。沒有新增綠鋼產能，沒有降低電價風險，也沒有緩解孖展約束。這一採購行為或許讓資產負債表變得好看，但並沒有改變其映射的底層工業現實。
這種情形其實並不陌生。從結構上看，它和碳抵消是同一種邏輯：用一種方法論層面的安排，讓企業可以宣稱取得進展，卻無需改變其所處系統的排放軌跡。就像碳抵消一樣，人們對這類做法的讚譽暴露出一個更深的問題：我們已經習慣於獎勵那些在方法論上「說得通、算得清」的進展，而不是那些真正改變物理世界的變化。
過去幾年，圍繞綠鋼的討論越來越集中在標準、信息披露、薄記申明（book-and-claim）體系以及買方承諾上。這些工具之所以受歡迎，是因為它們容易辨識，能夠整齊地嵌入企業淨零目標與可持續發展框架敘事，在單個企業層面覈算，也便於企業對外宣佈「取得進展」。但問題在於：它們繞開了更艱難、也更關鍵的問題，即在鋼鐵生產活動發生的地方，鋼鐵生產本身有沒有變得更清潔、更便宜、更容易孖展。
簡而言之，這些工具並沒有觸及真正的約束。
如果綠鋼之所以難以規模化，原因只是買方缺乏傳遞需求信號的渠道，或者市場對綠鋼的定義不夠清晰，那麼市場本應早已形成。事實並非如此。我們看到的是，尤其在亞洲，綠鋼仍主要停留在試點階段，幾乎完全依賴企業資產負債表孖展，而項目孖展基本缺席。
這一區別非常關鍵。工業市場的擴張，本質上是通過孖展實現的。一個項目如果無法以獨立項目的方式獲得孖展，並不意味着行業缺乏雄心，而是因為項目風險和現金流達不到金融機構的承保/授信門檻。
薄記申明（book-and-claim）體系對這一點沒有任何實質改變。它確實把環境屬性與實體供給分離開來，但它並不會降低綠鋼生產成本，不會穩定電價，也不會降低氫能投資風險。它做的只是事後重新分配屬性，而不是讓下一個項目更容易孖展、或更低成本建設。
鋼鐵生產並不像太陽能光伏那樣，能夠沿着成本遞減的S曲線快速下行。儘管人們常常用光伏來類比綠鋼。太陽能之所以能夠規模化，是因為每新增一塊組件的安裝，都會直接擴大製造規模、觸發學習效應、降低單位成本，並在部署發生的同一市場提升競爭力。購買太陽能板，會改變未來生產太陽能板的經濟性。
綠鋼不是這樣運作的。它的成本主要受電力市場（價格及其波動性）、資本密集度以及工藝路線配置所主導。從瑞典某項目購買環境屬性，並不會降低中國氫基鍊鐵面臨的電價波動風險，也不會改變電網接入規則、調度約束或孖展條件。這裏不存在一種能夠跨市場傳播的「靠宣稱產生學習效應」。
買方承諾也存在類似的誤判。人們常把它描述成「缺失的需求信號」，但在實踐中，它的作用比這有限得多。在供給側（生產端）風險基本解決之後，買方承諾可以幫助穩定項目利用率；但它無法讓成本結構本身不可行的項目變得可行，也無法說服貸款人去為那些暴露在電價波動和運營不確定性之下的資產提供孖展。
這並不是紙上談兵的批評。無論是綠鋼還是其他難減排行業，短期限、附條件、與投產時間表脫節的承諾，已經一再被證明無法撬動孖展。買方承諾這類工具真正發揮作用的，是在項目經濟性已經接近市場出清時，而不是更早之前。
那麼，為什麼我們總是反覆將希望寄託到這些工具上來？
部分原因在於，我們深陷於「企業個體視角」的思維框架裏。標準、目標、披露、轉型計劃和承諾，問的都是「單個企業靠自己能做什麼」。它們與企業問責體系天然契合，卻把電力市場、基礎設施和產業政策中的政治與制度複雜性，當作外生條件來看待。於是，人們便可以在缺乏系統性變革的情況下，仍然宣稱「取得了進展」。
但綠鋼不是一個企業層面的挑戰，而是一個系統性挑戰。系統性問題，不會被個體行動者設計的工具所解決。
正是受到微軟這筆交易的觸發，我和同事們決心去識別中國綠鋼規模化面臨的真正約束。我們梳理了諸多相互交織的風險、約束與激勵因素，最終發現其中有一個問題最為關鍵：氫基鍊鐵在20至30年的資產壽命周期內，需要巨大且持續的電力投入。即便可再生能源平均電價已經很低，中國工業用戶仍然面臨價格波動、限電（棄電/限供）風險、擁塞和接入不確定性。真正具有決定性的風險，不是電價「高不高」，而是電價「穩不穩」。
當然，波動性風險雖然最關鍵，卻並非唯一風險。它還與技術風險、資本密集度、政策風險等疊加，而這些風險目前大多都要由鋼鐵企業自己吸收。風險過度集中，最終使綠色鍊鐵只能停留在謹慎試點階段。
儘管我們完全可以把這些真實的項目風險分離，但現實中我們很少這麼做。我們常常籠統地把無法孖展的項目稱為「高風險」，卻不進一步說明：究竟是哪些風險阻斷了孖展、哪些風險可以通過設定邊界或風險共擔池來處理、哪些風險則即便獲得支持也依然不可行。結果就是，各類粗放式干預不斷出現，如泛化的混合孖展、普遍性補貼、象徵性的需求聚合，它們改善了「觀感」，卻沒有改變孖展現實，也沒有改變生產結果。
這些問題正是我們最近在上海與恒隆地產和GF60共同召集的一場研討會所聚焦的主題。會議的目標非常明確：推動亞洲綠鋼市場發展。討論的重點並不是標準或承諾，而是經濟性。
我們討論了一系列具體方案，核心是如何為綠色鍊鐵的風險設定邊界、通過共擔池集中降低風險，從而壓降綠鋼生產成本。當成本下降、經濟性改善、與傳統鋼材的成本差距逐步收窄之後，可信買方的承購承諾才能真正發揮作用，去解決剩餘的利用率風險，進而形成真實的市場需求。
同樣的問題也出現在其他難減排行業，以及那些尚未真正啓動轉型的行業中。迄今為止，產業界及其合作方投入了大量精力設計「可以宣稱進展」的方法論工具，卻沒有把重點放在改變物理現實的系統性約束上。
這些轉型，即便困難重重，並非不可實現。前提是，我們不要再把「可以宣稱」誤當成「已經改變」。真正的起點應當是經濟性、風險與孖展。我們手裏並不缺處理這些問題的工具，而且仍有很大的創新空間。只要這些核心問題沒有被解決，我們就會繼續獎勵那些看起來很創新的交易，而底層系統本身卻幾乎原封未動。
英文原文如下：
Lisa Sachs, Feb 5, 2026
Earlier this year, Microsoft announced a deal to purchase the environmental attributes associated with green steel produced by Stegra in Sweden. The transaction was widely praised as innovative and market-shaping. In reality, it shifted claims without changing production, and was emblematic of a broader failure in how we are trying to scale green steel.
Microsoft did not buy green steel for use in the market where it was produced. It bought attributes that allowed it to claim "green steel" for steel procured or used elsewhere, specifically in markets where green steel production is not yet viable, like in China, where most of the world's steel is produced. The physical system in Asian steel markets did not change. No new green steel capacity was built. No power price risks were reduced. No financing constraints were eased. The claim improved a balance sheet narrative, not the underlying industrial reality.
This should feel familiar. It is structurally the same as offsets: a methodological solution that allows a company to claim progress without changing the emissions trajectory of the system in which it operates. And like offsets, the celebration reveals a deeper problem. We have become accustomed to rewarding what can be claimed methodologically rather than what changes in the physical world.
Over the past several years, the green steel conversation has increasingly focused on standards, disclosure, book-and-claim systems, and buyer commitments. These tools are legible. They fit neatly into corporate net zero and sustainability frameworks. They operate at the level of individual firms. And they allow progress to be announced without confronting the harder question of whether steel production itself is becoming cleaner, cheaper, and more financeable in the places where it actually occurs.
But these tools are not addressing the binding constraint.
If green steel were failing to scale because buyers lacked a way to signal demand, or because definitions were unclear, markets would already be forming. They are not. What we see instead, across Asia in particular, is that green steel remains limited to pilots, almost entirely financed on corporate balance sheets, with project finance largely absent.
That distinction matters. Industrial markets scale through finance. When projects cannot be financed on a standalone basis, it is not because ambition is missing. It is because risks and cash flows do not clear underwriting thresholds.
Book-and-claim does nothing to change that. It decouples environmental attributes from physical supply, but it does not reduce the cost of producing green steel. It does not stabilize electricity prices. It does not reduce hydrogen exposure. It reallocates attributes after production has occurred. It does not make the next project easier to finance or cheaper to build.
Steel production does not resemble the cost-declining S-curve of solar photovoltaics, which is often invoked by analogy. Solar scaled because each incremental panel installed directly expanded manufacturing volume, drove learning effects, lowered unit costs, and improved competitiveness in the same markets where deployment occurred. Purchasing solar panels changed the economics of future panels.
Green steel does not work that way. Its costs are dominated by power markets (prices and volatility), capital intensity, and process configuration. Buying environmental attributes from a project in Sweden does not reduce electricity price volatility for hydrogen-based ironmaking in China. It does not change grid access rules, dispatch constraints, or financing conditions. There is no learning-by-claiming effect that propagates across markets.
Buyer commitments suffer from a similar miscasting. They are often described as the missing demand signal, but in practice their role is far more limited. Commitments can help stabilize utilization once supply-side risks are largely resolved. They cannot rescue projects with unviable cost structures. They cannot persuade lenders to finance assets exposed to volatile power prices and uncertain operating conditions.
This is not a theoretical critique. Across green steel and other hard-to-abate sectors, commitments that are short-tenor, conditional, or disconnected from commissioning timelines have repeatedly failed to unlock finance. Where commitments have mattered, it has been after the economics were already close to market-clearing, not before.
So why do we keep returning to these tools?
Part of the answer is that we are deeply embedded in entity-level thinking. Standards, targets, disclosure, transition plans, and commitments all ask what an individual company can do on its own. They align with corporate accountability frameworks. They treat the political and institutional complexity of power markets, infrastructure, and industrial policy as exogenous dependencies. They allow progress to be claimed without systems change.
But green steel is not an entity-level challenge. It is a systems challenge. And systems challenges do not yield to tools designed for individual actors.
Prompted by the Microsoft deal, my colleagues and I were determined to identify the real constraints to scaling green steel in China. We sorted through the many interrelated risks, constraints, and incentives – but one emerged as paramount: hydrogen-based ironmaking requires enormous, continuous electricity inputs over asset lives of 20 to 30 years. Even where renewable generation is cheap on average, industrial users in China face volatile prices, curtailment risk, congestion, and uncertain access. It is the volatility - not the price of electricity- that is the decisive risk.
But while the volatility risk is the decisive risk, it is not the only one. It combines with technological risks, capital intensity, policy risks, and others that steel companies must currently absorb. That risk concentration limits green iron production to cautious pilots.
Although we can disaggregate the real risks, we rarely do. We often describe unfinanceable projects as "high risk," without specifying which risks block financing, which could be bounded or pooled, and which make a project infeasible regardless of support. The result is a proliferation of blunt interventions (generic blended finance, broad subsidies, symbolic demand aggregation) that improve optics without changing the financing realities or production outcomes.
These issues were the focus of a recent workshop we co-convened in Shanghai with Hang Lung and GF60, aimed explicitly at advancing the green steel market in Asia. The discussion did not center on standards or pledges. It centered on economics.
We discussed concrete proposals to bound, pool and reduce risks for green ironmaking in order to bring down the costs of green steel production. When the costs come down, the economics improve, closing the cost differential with conventional steel; at that point, credible buyers' offtake commitments can address remaining utilization risk, creating market demand.
The same challenge shows up across other hard-to-abate sectors and sectors yet to transition. So far, industry and its partners have focused on designing methodologies that allow progress to be claimed rather than addressing system constraints that change physical reality.
These transitions - even the hard ones - are feasible, if we stop confusing claims with change. The starting point has to be economics, risk, and finance. We have many tools to address those and room for further innovation. Until those are addressed, we will continue to reward transactions that look innovative while leaving the underlying system exactly as it was.
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責任編輯：李欣然