The dispute over "ByteDance Time" does not gain much from arguing about "who is right or wrong" or "who is the monopolist." What truly matters is that all the giants standing at the forefront of the industry should think more about what their products bring to users, what they leave behind for the industry, and what they create for society.

On October 26, former media professional Qin Shuo published an article titled "The Frightening Hongguo and the ByteDance Time of China's Internet," pushing the concept of "ByteDance Time" to the center of public discussion. The article cited QuestMobile data from a Nomura Securities report and raised a question: is China's internet shifting from "Tencent Time" to "ByteDance Time"?

On October 27, Douyin Group Vice President Li Liang responded that this characterization was "extremely imprecise and pure nonsense." According to media reports, Qin Shuo, founder of "Qin Shuo's Circle of Friends," said in a social media post on November 2 that "regarding recent remarks published by 'Douyin Group's Li Liang' that infringe on my reputation rights, I have entrusted a lawyer to file a lawsuit with a people's court and take measures in accordance with the law to protect my lawful rights and interests and hold the infringing party legally accountable." The case has been accepted by Grandall Law Firm, and filing materials have been submitted to a Shanghai court.

On November 4, Li Liang responded again, saying that eight years ago, WeChat relied on its monopoly position to prohibit Douyin sharing, and litigation between the two sides remains unresolved. In his view, the "ByteDance Time" proposed by Qin Shuo would release TENCENT from the narrative of "monopoly," while instead placing ByteDance into a narrative of "possible monopoly," and would even make Qin Shuo TENCENT's "benefactor."

This debate has moved beyond a simple judgment of right and wrong and become a public topic of shared concern across the entire internet industry. A platform that wins users and achieves commercial success certainly has things worthy of praise. But as its influence gradually expands, a company should also answer how it will use that influence, and how it will reconcile business growth with user interests, content quality, and social value.

Behind "ByteDance Time": Hongguo Surpasses Doubao

QuestMobile's "2026 China Mobile Internet Autumn Report," released on November 3, shows that by its de-duplicated total user volume measure, in September 2026, Hongguo Free Short Dramas and Doubao reached 430 million and 419 million users, respectively. Hongguo has surpassed Doubao to become the application in Douyin Group with the second-largest user scale after Douyin, which has 1.029 billion users.

From Toutiao, Xigua Video, and Douyin to Hongguo Short Dramas, Fanqie Novels, and Soda Music, ByteDance's content products already cover multiple scenarios including information, video, short dramas, reading, and music. Jianying and Jimeng AI serve content creation, while Doubao has expanded its application scenarios to AI question-and-answer services and daily assistance.

Platform growth is essentially a contest for users' time. Hongguo's rise has occurred against the backdrop of an overall slowdown in industry growth. As of September 2026, China's mobile internet monthly active user scale rose slightly by 0.9% year on year, already entering a stage of stock competition. Under this logic, short dramas have become direct beneficiaries of traffic spillover from the short-video ecosystem. Douyin and Kuaishou have accumulated strong content distribution capabilities and a massive entertainment user base, providing a continuous source of customer acquisition for independent short-drama apps.

Hongguo Short Dramas' ability to rapidly accumulate a user scale surpassing Doubao also lies in changes in the age structure and regional distribution of users. QuestMobile data shows that users aged 46 and above exceeded 40%, up 2.6% year on year, among whom users aged 51 and above approached 30%. By contrast, users aged 25 to 45 accounted for 39%, already falling below 40%. This reversal shows that the "aging" trend of mobile internet users is still continuing.

The characteristics of short dramas, being "click-to-watch, no learning required, and tightly paced," fit the needs of diverse user groups for low-threshold, lightweight, and fast-paced entertainment content. After internet dividends peaked, content products aimed at specific groups instead became more likely to explode. Kuaishou Lite previously used user incentives to tap the lower-tier video market and achieve rapid expansion. The Hongguo short-drama model is similar. Relying on ByteDance's algorithmic distribution capability, it can more accurately match user interests and thereby improve conversion efficiency.

But the hidden concerns behind this growth are equally obvious. Some short dramas have melodramatic plots and rough production, and using algorithmic recommendations to make users "stop" has become difficult. Time is continually taken away, but what is often exchanged for it is fragments forgotten immediately after watching, stirred-up emotions, and a kind of inexplicable self-depletion. This "hollowed-out" experience is precisely the main reason the public has concerns about "ByteDance Time."

Users' worry about "ByteDance Time" is in fact asking: how exactly do algorithms control our attention? Algorithms favor dwell time, which makes strongly conflicting, highly stimulating, and low-threshold content easier to push. What people truly fear is that after being fed this way for a long time, they will slowly lose the ability for deep reading, sustained thinking, and self-control.

The official WeChat account of the Publicity Department of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, "Zhejiang Propaganda," pointed out that content products are different from ordinary goods. A bottle of water or a bag of rice is finished once used, but content products are different: they enter people's spiritual world and shape people's cognition, emotions, and value judgments. A video, a short drama, or a tweet may seem light, but over time it can affect how a person views themselves, others, and society.

Public concern has already appeared, and the focus of debate should no longer stop at "right or wrong," but should instead focus on the unavoidable public responsibilities hidden behind it.

Beyond Right and Wrong, There Is Also Responsibility and Accountability

At a time when "ByteDance Time" has become a nationwide felt experience, ByteDance is no longer an ordinary internet company, but infrastructure for the spiritual lives of hundreds of millions of people. Every day it determines what people see, what they believe, and where they spend their time. Precisely because of this, the National Radio and Television Administration has reiterated that all platforms must tighten their primary responsibilities, resolutely implement "all broadcasts must be reviewed, full-volume human review," guard the launch threshold, effectively optimize algorithms, and resolutely correct mechanism designs that induce addiction.

If it chooses to do good, ByteDance can make users' time truly worthwhile. When algorithms begin to respect users' time and actively recommend nutritious and warm content, users will not return to life with emptiness and self-blame after scrolling, but with a little gain. When platforms are willing to put public interest into algorithms, public identification with mainstream values will strengthen, and the public opinion field will have less confrontation and more rationality.

If it chooses to do evil, aiming only at making money and lacking any positive values, the cost will be borne by society as a whole. If algorithms continue to extract attention without limit, users will feel emptier the more they scroll, spiritual depletion will worsen day by day, and concentration and thinking ability will be dissolved imperceptibly. High-quality content will be crowded out by vicious and inferior content, cyberspace will be filled with confrontation and hostility, and rumors and extreme emotions will also easily grow larger and larger. Companies may preserve daily active users and revenue, but what they lose is public trust in the platform and society's patience with the internet.

Over the past two years, Douyin has launched a safety center, disclosed algorithm principles, governed rumors, and supported knowledge content, proving that "doing good" adjustments to parameters are entirely technically feasible. But the current inertia of traffic distribution still centers on completion rate, dwell time, and interaction, so the system naturally rewards content that "keeps people" through strong conflict and high reversals. To correct it, platforms must proactively reconstruct their metrics.

Social responsibility is not a moral requirement imposed on companies; it is an inherent requirement of business sustainability itself. Technology may have no values, but the organization behind it cannot lack values. How should giants "do no evil"?

Looking back, China's internet industry has experienced similar moments. In the 2010 "3Q War," TENCENT was pushed into the position of "public enemy" because of "choose one of two" behavior and an expansion strategy of "doing everything," facing overwhelming questions about monopoly. But it was precisely that crisis that led Ma Huateng and the TENCENT team to reflect deeply and realize that the "closed empire model" no longer worked and that openness was a mission the company had to undertake. After that, through strategic transformation, TENCENT moved toward openness, empowered partners, and ultimately enlarged the industry pie and achieved self-transcendence.

The book "Looking at Tencent Under X-Ray" points out that Ma Huateng showed great breadth of mind during TENCENT's strategic transformation. This breadth involved three levels: self-innovation from closure to openness, responsibility for the industry ecosystem, and an inclusive attitude toward innovation and talent.

When a company grows into an industry leader or even holds a dominant position, its greatest challenge is how to restrain its own power, how to "do no evil," and how to avoid falling into vicious competition aimed at killing opponents. Users choose a platform out of trust. If a platform treats that trust as a bargaining chip for harvesting traffic, it will ultimately lose users.

Today's internet industry is no longer a landscape dominated by one company. TENCENT has its base in social networking and digital content, ByteDance leads in short videos and short dramas, Xiaohongshu occupies the mindshare of lifestyle content, Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo each have advantages in e-commerce, and Meituan and Alipay firmly grasp local life and service scenarios... These giants together form China's internet ecosystem. Each controls the attention of hundreds of millions of users, and each should bear corresponding responsibilities.

Conclusion

We should not casually label any successful company as a "monopoly," but greater capability brings greater responsibility. When a company's influence has penetrated every aspect of social life, it must move beyond pure business logic and think about its public value. Returning to the debate over "ByteDance Time," arguing about "who is right or wrong" and "who is the monopolist" is actually not very meaningful. What truly matters is that all giants standing at the forefront of the industry should think more about what their products bring to users, what they leave behind for the industry, and what they create for society.