A new report jointly released by the Bitcoin Security Consortium and Presidio Bitcoin reveals that although a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) has not yet been publicly demonstrated, incremental advances in quantum computing already pose a substantive threat to Bitcoin.
A series of recent breakthroughs in the quantum computing field has drawn intense attention from the community. In December 2024, Google's Willow chip demonstrated for the first time that adding physical qubits can improve the reliability of logical qubits. Entering 2026, Google Quantum AI, together with the Ethereum Foundation and Stanford, optimized Shor's algorithm, shrinking the circuit scale needed to break Bitcoin's elliptic curve by roughly 20 times; research from Oratomic and Caltech showed that their optimized approach could crack a single private key within days; and the ECDSA.fail project launched by Eigen Labs further reduced the circuit size by nearly 70%. In September 2026, IonQ released an end-to-end Shor algorithm compilation blueprint, theoretically requiring 26 days per attempt with a 63.3% success rate. In October of the same year, Google achieved a 40-fold reduction in magic state errors on Willow, reaching a logical fidelity of 99.99%; Quantinuum's Helios achieved 99.9995% logical fidelity, with an error rate 100 times lower than Google's, and errors decreasing 12-fold as encoding scale expanded.
The core of quantum computing lies in the qubit, which possesses superposition and entanglement properties, enabling computers to simultaneously explore multiple candidate answers. However, physical qubits are susceptible to decoherence, leading to loss of quantum information. Therefore, current research focuses on building logical qubits composed of multiple redundant physical qubits to achieve error correction. Major hardware architectures include: superconducting circuits adopted by Google and IBM, which offer fast computation but slow scaling; neutral atoms used by Oratomic, which scale rapidly but compute slowly; trapped ions employed by Quantinuum and IonQ, which offer moderate computation speed; and photonics pursued by PsiQuantum and Xanadu, which compute quickly but have longer development timelines.
Quantum attacks against Bitcoin are mainly divided into static attacks and in-transit attacks. Static attacks target addresses whose public keys have already been exposed, such as reused addresses or P2PK addresses. Project Eleven estimates that approximately 7.1 million BTC (35% of the total supply) is vulnerable to such attacks, with three-quarters of that held in reused addresses at large exchanges, and another roughly 1.7 million BTC in P2PK addresses, most of which are already lost. In-transit attacks target the roughly 10-minute window between transaction submission and block inclusion. Google estimates that a warmed-up fast-clock quantum device could complete private key acquisition within 9 minutes, exposing otherwise secure addresses to theft risk during transactions.
Data compiled by Woofun AI shows that current quantum threats suffer from two misconceptions: exaggeration and underestimation. On the exaggeration side, Quantinuum has so far demonstrated only 48 error-corrected logical qubits, while breaking ECDSA requires at least 1,200; what Willow proved was error-corrected memory rather than large-scale computation; and most Bitcoin public keys remain hidden before spending, making them difficult to attack in a static state. On the underestimation side, Shor's algorithm has enormous room for optimization, and ECDSA receives far less attention than RSA; experts predict a 50% probability of a capable machine emerging between 2030 and 2035, governments aim to complete post-quantum migration in the early-to-mid 2030s, and Google and Cloudflare have internal deadlines of 2029 to guard against "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks; moreover, breakthroughs may be kept secret, making early theft difficult to detect.
Response strategies focus first on address migration and post-quantum signatures. Holders should move funds from reused addresses to unused addresses, adopting best practices such as change output rotation. On the post-quantum signature front, the SHRINCS (Shrunken SPHINCS) scheme proposed by Blockstream is based on SHA-256 and can process 3 transactions per second, far exceeding the NIST standard SPHINCS+ at 0.36 transactions per second. The scheme was tested on the Liquid Network in March 2026, and a BIP was published in August, with full-network deployment requiring a soft fork. Another key challenge is the consensus treatment of P2PK coins. Approximately 1.7 million BTC is held in 20,000 P2PK addresses, including an estimated 1.1 million BTC attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto. Presidio Bitcoin notes that options currently under discussion include: keeping legacy spending valid, allowing quantum attackers to steal; rate-limiting, restricting the speed at which vulnerable coins can move; and soft freezing, disabling legacy spending but allowing owners to reclaim coins through zero-knowledge proofs of their seed phrases. Although the quantum threat has not fully arrived, its countdown is clearly visible. From hardware error-correction progress to algorithm optimization, every breakthrough shortens the attack window. The Bitcoin community needs to accelerate address migration and post-quantum signature deployment while reaching consensus on P2PK coin handling, in order to fortify its defenses before the critical time window of the early-to-mid 2030s. This is not merely a technical challenge but the ultimate test of network resilience.