When the China Securities Regulatory Commission's fee reduction reform takes its "third cut" directly at fund sales channels, the entire public fund industry is earnestly implementing the regulatory call for "prioritizing investor interests." The "Administrative Regulations on Public Securities Investment Fund Sales Fees (Draft for Comment)" released by regulators on September 5 aims to "further reduce costs for fund investors" and promote high-quality industry development.

The public fund fee reduction reform launched in July 2023 has successively targeted management fees, custody fees, and trading commissions, and is now nearing completion. However, in this wave of inclusive finance, China Merchants Bank, bearing the title of "retail king," has wielded a counter-blade - not only maintaining fund subscription fees at the industry peak of 1.5% for multiple funds, but also locking away investors' choice through exclusive agreements. This contrarian behavior is not a remedy for market involution, but a naked display of channel hegemony.

**China Merchants Bank's High Fund Subscription Fees**

China Merchants Bank's high fund subscription fees are not isolated cases, but systematic operations. Opening the China Merchants Bank app reveals a batch of equity fund products prominently marked with 1.5% subscription fees. This rate far exceeds industry benchmarks, especially when third-party platforms like Tiantian Fund offer 10% discounts, making CM Bank's pricing appear absurd and greedy.

For example, the same equity fund requires only 0.15% on the Tiantian Fund platform, a rate difference of ten times. This means that if investors purchase 100,000 yuan of the fund through CM Bank, they must pay an additional 1,350 yuan in fees - this "hidden cost" directly erodes investor returns, violating the core principle of "reducing investor costs" repeatedly emphasized by regulators. More ironically, in the CM Bank app interface, the fee figures are prominently displayed without any explanation of additional services, as if high fees were taken for granted.

**Carefully Constructed Exclusive Barriers**

Behind the fee increases lies China Merchants Bank's carefully constructed exclusive barriers. Huatai Zijin Value Selection Hybrid A (019800) is clearly marked on the Ant Fortune platform as "At the manager's request, to ensure stable fund operation and protect holder interests, this fund has suspended subscriptions." However, turning to the CM Bank channel, the fund flows unimpeded, selling at a 1.5% rate.

This "exclusive lock-in" is not an isolated incident, but an open secret in the industry - fund companies are forced to sign "exclusive cooperation conditions" to enter CM Bank's key distribution list: promising to sell specific shares only through CM Bank and not offering discounts on other platforms. Otherwise, fund companies will lose CM Bank's channel support, including traffic portals and marketing resources. Such clauses are tantamount to financial market "forced exclusivity," using channel advantages to hijack product liquidity and trapping investors on high-priced isolated islands. Ant Fortune's suspension announcement was originally intended to protect holders, but under CM Bank's exclusive agreements, it has become an empty slogan, exposing the distortion of the distribution ecosystem.

**Wealth Anxiety Under Third-Party Platform Impact**

China Merchants Bank's contrarian behavior is rooted in its increasingly severe wealth anxiety. In 2024, CM Bank's agency fund business income plummeted, becoming the business with the largest decline in the wealth management sector. More critically, its equity fund holdings were comprehensively crushed by Ant Fortune. This share loss stems from the rise of third-party platforms: Tiantian Fund, Ant Fortune, and others attract young investors with low fees, high transparency, and convenient experiences.

Data shows that over 70% of "post-90s" investors are accustomed to comparison shopping through apps, enjoying 0.15% discount rates. CM Bank goes against this trend, using the A-share recovery momentum to "replenish blood" with exclusive resources and high fees, treating investors as traffic to be harvested. This strategy may boost income in the short term, but at the cost of sacrificing customer trust - when CM Bank's slogan "customer-centric" becomes a fig leaf for channel monopoly, its brand premium is rapidly evaporating.

**Divergence Between Regulatory Intent and CM Bank's Behavior**

The divergence between regulatory intent and China Merchants Bank's behavior is more concerning. The CSRC's fee reduction reform is a systematic project: the "first cut" in 2023 targeted fund management fees, the "second cut" aimed at trading commissions, and now the "third cut" directly targets sales channels, aiming to end the industry's chronic problem of "high fees, low service."

Historical data shows that for every 0.1% reduction in public fund rates, investors' annualized returns can improve by more than 0.5%. However, CM Bank's fee increases and exclusive operations essentially dissolve this policy goodwill. Young investors could freely compare prices on third-party platforms and enjoy the dividends of financial democratization, but are forced back to high-priced channels by CM Bank - this is not service upgrading, but hard deprivation of choice.

**Healthy Competition Should Break Channel Hegemony**

The fund distribution market is highly competitive and may need to counter involution, but definitely not by harvesting investors under the guise of anti-involution. Truly healthy competition should break channel hegemony and return to fee transparency and investor sovereignty.

Third-party platforms' low-fee models prove that costs are controllable under economies of scale, and benefiting investors can be win-win - Ant Fund's holdings surpassing CM Bank is clear evidence of market choice. If CM Bank-style "pseudo anti-involution" is allowed to continue, fee reform will become mere surface work: fund companies compromise for channels, investors pay for high fees, and regulatory efforts go to waste.

In the long run, the industry needs to strengthen the application of antitrust law in the financial sector, promote openness in sales channels, such as requiring distribution institutions to publicly disclose fee structures and prohibiting exclusive clauses. Meanwhile, investors should actively "vote with their feet" and turn to transparent platforms.

CM Bank's case serves as a warning that financial inclusion cannot rely solely on unilateral regulatory advancement, but also requires market participants' self-discipline. Since regulatory authorities are determined to reduce fund sales fees and protect investor rights, they should not ignore, be powerless against, or remain inactive regarding China Merchants Bank's deviation from original intentions.

As for China Merchants Bank, if it continues to maintain high fee practices, the halo of "retail king" will eventually fade, leaving only investors' sighs of disappointment.