The year 2025 witnessed an unprecedented full-scale war in the food delivery industry. One year later, what legacy has this conflict left behind?

Discussions about the "aftermath of the food delivery war" are flooding social media this year, with topics shifting from earlier focuses on price cuts and anti-dumping to more pressing concerns: "Is food delivery still a reliable fallback job?", "More riders, fewer orders", and "Too many riders for too few orders—is the industry really changing?". As platform subsidies recede, the "side effects" of the war—rider oversupply, declining order volumes, and diluted rider earnings—are becoming increasingly apparent.

The battle ignited in February 2025 when JD.com entered the arena, followed swiftly by Taobao Quick Deals launching a 50-billion-yuan subsidy campaign, forcing Meituan into a defensive posture. The three platforms have collectively burned through hundreds of billions in subsidies. Financial reports show Meituan recorded a net loss of 23.4 billion yuan for 2025, while JD.com saw its annual net profit halved, with new business losses reaching 46.6 billion yuan.

According to a HSBC research report, Alibaba incurred losses of 87 billion yuan in instant retail from Q2 2025 to Q1 2026. HSBC also estimates that Meituan and JD.com lost approximately 44 billion yuan and 42 billion yuan, respectively, due to the delivery war over the past year, bringing the three-platform total to 173 billion yuan.

However, the war's "aftermath" extends beyond financial statements. Media reports indicate the number of instant delivery riders nationwide has surged to nearly 20 million, with over 8 million new riders joining during last year's battle alone. As subsidies fade and orders contract, this surplus of riders is trapped in an industry experiencing systemic income decline, effectively "paying the bill" for the chaotic competition.

**Order Peaks Recede, Exposing a Delivery Capacity Bubble**

New players seeking to capture orders first needed to capture riders, a logic that inflated a "delivery capacity bubble" during the war.

In February 2025, JD.com entered the fray with high-profile subsidies worth tens of billions, which Taobao Quick Deals promptly matched. The subsidy battle, ignited on the consumer side, quickly spread to rider recruitment.

Since JD.com's grand announcement, the competition between it and Meituan has involved several rounds of direct confrontation, with one core focus being the "battle for riders."

JD.com announced that starting March 1, 2025, it would gradually provide full social security and housing fund contributions for its full-time delivery riders and offer accident and health insurance for part-timers. On the same day, Meituan stated it was building a social security information system and planned to start contributing to social insurance for full-time and stable part-time riders from Q2 2025. Following suit, Ele.me announced on February 20th it would also provide social security for riders.

Platforms rolled out various tactics to attract riders. Some significantly increased delivery fees and offered attractive compensation packages, including hefty cash incentives. Others optimized delivery systems to reduce wait times and improve efficiency, acting like an "acceleration engine" for riders.

On July 14, 2025, Taobao Quick Deals and Ele.me jointly announced growth in both rider order volumes and income. Data showed that since Taobao Quick Deals launched, the overall number of riders increased by 78% year-on-year, with crowdsourced riders surging by 120%. Rider income saw significant growth, with active, stable crowdsourced riders earning a monthly average exceeding 12,500 yuan. By August 7th, the total number of Ele.me riders had reached 3.5 times the previous year's figure.

QuestMobile data indicated that in July, the daily average number of Fengniao (Ele.me's crowdsourcing platform) riders increased by approximately one million, many of whom were new to the industry. On August 19th, the "JD Blackboard" reported that JD.com's full-time delivery riders had surpassed 150,000.

The speed of rider workforce expansion during this war far exceeded expectations. Recruitment ads promising "monthly income over 10,000 yuan" and "zero entry barriers" were ubiquitous, attracting a massive influx of workers. The total number of registered riders was pushed to over 20 million within a single year, even as daily industry order volumes continued to decline after the peak of the battle.

According to a UBS Group AG research report released on March 12, 2026, the combined daily average food delivery order volume for platforms including JD.com, Taobao Quick Deals, and Meituan stood at only about 110 million orders as of February 2026. Post-war, the rider workforce grew rapidly, but order numbers did not keep pace after subsidies receded. One rider told media, "In March this year, order recovery fell short of expectations. The average daily orders per rider dropped from nearly 40 to about 30. With fewer orders, to maintain income, riders have no choice but to stay online for longer hours."

**The Spreading Dilemma of Riders "Running More, Earning Less": Experts Call it an Inevitable Outcome of Disorderly Competition**

The extent of rider oversupply can be illustrated with a simple calculation.

Assuming a skilled rider handles 30-40 orders per day, supporting the current 110 million daily orders would require only about 4 million riders. With nearly 20 million registered riders, even after accounting for multi-platform registrations, short-term tryouts, or inactive accounts, the market still faces immense delivery capacity overpressure. This is the heaviest "bubble legacy" left by the food delivery war a year ago.

Professor Zhan Jing from the School of Labor Economics at Capital University of Economics and Business defines this phenomenon as "stock competition superimposed with low-level repetitive competition": the total user base of the food delivery market is nearing its ceiling. New entrants are not expanding the market pie but are fighting over the existing share. The three platforms are competing in a finite pool, creating delivery capacity far faster than the market can generate orders.

Meng Quan, Director of the Labor Relations Department at China University of Labor Relations, who maintains deep focus and research on rider working hours, income, and protections, believes the direct consequence of delivery capacity过剩 is reduced order volume and被动 compression of delivery fees. During the war, base delivery fees reached as high as 6 to 9 yuan; post-subsidy, they were halved to 3-4 yuan, with some short-distance orders falling below 2 yuan. Platforms no longer need high fees to compete for riders, and riders' bargaining power has shrunk alongside the increase in supply. This is the inevitable result of disorderly competition and supply-demand imbalance.

Meng Quan noted, "In the past, society widely viewed the food delivery industry as an 'employment reservoir.' But after the food delivery war, the industry's own elasticity is slowly becoming saturated. For instance, when over five people are competing for one order, the inevitable outcome is that many riders cannot get orders, the number of orders per rider gets diluted, and the fee per order is bound to be driven down."

The more people join, the fewer orders per person, worsening the situation of "too many monks for too little gruel," and further diluting the fee per delivery. Riders have only one way to cope—exchanging more time to regain their previous income, giving rise to the "work hour inflation" dilemma.

Media reports indicate a Shanghai rider's monthly income dropped from a peak of around 15,000 yuan to about 12,000 yuan, with nearly 20 fewer daily orders than during the busiest period. A Jiangsu rider saw monthly income fall from 13,000 yuan to 9,000 yuan, with 400-500 fewer monthly orders. A Guangzhou survey showed 76% of riders work 9 to 12 hours daily, with some exceeding 14 hours. In Beijing, the average daily orders per rider fell from 35 in 2020 to 20 in 2025, while working hours extended from 8 to 12 hours. "I used to earn 300 yuan in 8 hours; now I have to work 12 hours to barely make that," said Lao Zhou, a Beijing rider.

Anxiety over declining income is erupting on social platforms. On Douyin and Xiaohongshu, many riders post complaints: "Too many people, too few orders," "The more I run, the harder it gets," "The fee per order is too low," "Everyone jumped into delivery after the war, and now it's cutthroat, can't make money," "Working myself to death for 10 hours to earn half of what I used to."

Chen Liteng, a digital life analyst at the E-Commerce Research Center of Wangjing Group, stated that riders are not just service executors but also direct shapers of the user experience. "As the food delivery industry transitions from subsidy competition to a new stage of service quality competition, the ability to build a stable, efficient rider ecosystem will become a key factor for platform differentiation and a crucial element determining the long-term market structure."