On the final day of July 2026, the US Department of Homeland Security abruptly announced it was adding 43 Chinese companies to the so-called "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act" entity list under the pretext of "forced labor," reigniting US sanctions related to Xinjiang that had been dormant for 18 months. They boasted in the sanctions statement that the "list grew by 30 percent, the largest expansion in the history of this list," claiming it would "protect our citizens from unfair competition that harms both American interests and human dignity." This sparked widespread mockery online, with many asking how sanctioned brands like Qiaqia sunflower seeds, Synear dumplings, and Septwolves clothing could possibly threaten US national security or harm the interests of the American people. In reality, the security and interests truly being damaged are those of China's Xinjiang region. So, what is the US really up to? And how will these Xinjiang-related sanctions evolve?

Section 1: The Nature of These Sanctions: Grandiose Yet Flawed

I have been tracking Xinjiang-related sanctions for years, conducting on-site interviews and visits to several sanctioned enterprises. Earlier this year, I published an analysis of their diminishing effectiveness in an opinion piece. This latest round of sanctions essentially provides a shot in the arm to a flagging policy, displaying several key characteristics. First, the most prominent feature is the sheer number of sanctioned entities. The US sanctioned 43 Chinese companies in one go, setting a new record for the number of entities sanctioned since the policy's inception. This also marks the first such sanctions under the Trump administration, making its significance clear. Second, in terms of corporate composition, this round involves the most well-known brands. Major enterprise groups like SDIC, Tianshan Aluminum, Tefeng Pharmaceutical, Shandong Gold, Baiyin Nonferrous, TBEA, and Shandong Weiqiao have all faced "group sanctions," with parent companies, subsidiaries, and even sub-subsidiaries collectively blacklisted. Additionally, household names across China, such as Synear Dumplings, Chacha Foods, and Septwolves Clothing, have also been hit. Third, from an industrial structure perspective, the US has essentially drawn up a comprehensive blacklist targeting Xinjiang's pillar industries. This round targets companies in pharmaceuticals, mining, agricultural and sideline food products, energy, textiles, electronics, and transportation. Some companies have overlapping operations, such as SDIC Xinjiang Lithium's salt lake lithium extraction, which belongs to mining but directly serves the new energy sector, or Chenguang Biotech's plant extracts and cottonseed protein, spanning from pharmaceuticals to animal feed. The businesses of these sanctioned companies overlap with nine of the ten "major industrial clusters" outlined in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Government Work Report for 2025, highlighting the severity of the US attack. Fourth, geographically, the sanctions extend far beyond Xinjiang. Over 40% of the sanctioned companies are not located in Xinjiang, spanning provinces including Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Guangxi, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, covering every major geographical region of China except the Northeast. It feels as if the Americans took a map of China and randomly selected companies from each area for sanctions. Some companies without factories in Xinjiang were sanctioned merely for purchasing Xinjiang goods. This leads to the fifth point: the justifications for sanctions involve a wide range of Xinjiang specialties, hiding ulterior motives. Apart from a few, like Xinjiang Communications Construction and Synear Food, sanctioned for "transferring minority workers," the vast majority were sanctioned for "procuring raw materials from Xinjiang," mainly minerals, agricultural products, and medicinal herbs, listing four or five dozen items. As is well known, US sanctions on Xinjiang began with cotton. In August 2025, the DHS added caustic soda, copper, red dates, lithium, and steel to its "high-priority enforcement sectors" alongside aluminum, clothing, cotton and cotton products, PVC, seafood, and silicon-based products. The sheer volume and breadth of goods involved in this round of sanctions break previous records and likely serve as a candidate pool for future "high-priority enforcement sectors." Sixth, the timing of the sanctions suggests the US may be timing them to "sabotage" these companies. During previous visits to sanctioned companies, multiple firms reported facing such fabricated accusations precisely when they achieved breakthroughs in R&D or overseas market expansion. The same pattern appears now. Tianshan Aluminum was sanctioned just after announcing the completion of its closed-loop supply chain from bauxite mining to aluminum foil manufacturing, with its Jiangyin battery aluminum foil project ramping up and the first electrolytic cells of its 1.4 million-ton green, low-carbon efficiency upgrade project just reaching production. Aihua Group had just announced in late May that its products had entered the supply chains of 14 communication companies, stably used in 5G base stations and data centers. Xinjiang-based agricultural firms like Jiangguoguo, Aodu Sugar, and Tianyun Organic had also recently promoted their industrial layout progress in July. For instance, Aodu Sugar, previously touted as "China's largest single-site beet sugar producer," included images of "Party Building" in the background during a media tour, easily targeted by the US's web of fabricators. I suspect this round of Xinjiang sanctions was hastily assembled. The US seems to have combined a map of China, Xinjiang's characteristic industries, and sectors the US wants to target, then selected leading companies in each field to create the sanctioned list. This aligns with the DHS's "high-risk industry identification criteria" from August 2025, targeting industries with "credible evidence of forced labor," those China aims to "expand" in Xinjiang, and those where Xinjiang accounts for over 15% of national output. The first criterion is a facade; the latter two are the real basis for targeting. This feeling leads to the seventh point: the crude nature of this round. Previous US sanctions on Xinjiang, though baseless, at least feigned evidence of "forced transfer of laborers" or "goods from forced labor." This time, the statement omitted any evidence, resulting in comically formatted justifications like: "The US government has reasonable grounds to believe that Xinjiang Company X procures raw materials from Xinjiang. Information reviewed by the FLETF also shows that Xinjiang Company X procures raw materials from Xinjiang." This raises serious questions about the US government's state of mind, which I recently mocked. The legal leap is telling: related goods haven't been listed as "high-priority enforcement sectors," and there are no even superficial allegations of "forced labor" or "forced transfer," yet sanctions have begun. This reveals the hasty execution, likely driven by internal US dynamics. In a previous article, I joked that the US government couldn't even fabricate a decent story. Now, they've given up fabrication entirely and directly resorted to strong-arm tactics. Some might argue that "if you want to convict someone, you can always find a pretext," and question the significance of such details. But that's not correct. This reveals a significant flaw in the Trump administration's execution, a flaw that has already sparked internal US conflict, providing us with leverage for countermeasures. Details to follow. Additionally, I noticed the US sanctions list used outdated names for some companies. Anyone capable of logging into China's business registration system would not make such a basic error. As for which specific companies, I have no obligation to point out the Americans' stupidity. Finally, the eighth point: the impact of this round is dual-natured. Superficially, the sanctioned companies have limited overseas sales. For example, listed companies disclosed that their export shares are generally below 10%. Septwolves even directly retorted, "Sanctions have no impact!" A superpower's serious sanctions being directly dismissed by a Chinese garment factory is a significant blow to its image. However, we must also recognize that some companies will still be affected. Some companies' downstream sales go through trading companies that eventually export. Others, as well-known brands, are preparing to go global. Some companies, while domestic-focused, have higher demand for external raw materials or even have large overseas investments. Xinjiang companies naturally develop outward through the Belt and Road Initiative. Tianshan Aluminum is expanding high-quality bauxite resources in Guinea, Indonesia, and elsewhere. TBEA exports single-machine products to over 90 countries and regions, including Germany, Spain, and Brazil. Tefeng Pharmaceutical is actively exploring markets in Central Asian countries. Jiangguoguo hosted 24 foreign guests in July during the "Entering the Core Area of the Silk Road Economic Belt" event to promote its products. Tianyun Organic, which exports to 23 countries, appointed Rick Stephen, Vice President of the World Chefs Association, as its global brand ambassador in June, clearly aiming to promote its products to global markets, including the West. These companies are like adolescents. Being held down might not be immediately life-threatening, but over time, it can severely hinder their growth. This is the insidious nature of US sanctions. The key to success or failure lies in whether supply chains, both within the US and globally, comply with US sanctions. Countermeasures and establishing rules can provide confidence to our cooperative supply chains.

Section 2: This Wave of Sanctions is More Like Reconnaissance; We Must Not Allow It to Escalate

First, let's examine the characteristics of the sanctions themselves. While cruder and more brutal, they follow the US's previous pattern: targeting representative companies to block supply chains and targeting specific goods to create a chilling effect. This round of Xinjiang sanctions is like an "onion," reflecting the US's attitude towards China. It appears loud and grand, but its direct impact is limited since most sanctioned companies are domestic-focused. The main perpetrator of these baseless sanctions, US Secretary of State Rubio, recently stated that "US-China conflict would be a disaster." This round of sanctions echoes this sentiment, reflecting the US government's desire to stir up trouble while fearing actual confrontation, resulting in this "two-faced" approach that prioritizes form over substance, hoping to appear tough on China while receiving "understanding" from Beijing. Therefore, I believe this round of Xinjiang sanctions is a probe of China's reaction. While seemingly having limited direct impact, it has already chipped away at two layers of defense. As analyzed earlier, this round has named Xinjiang's pillar industries one by one, abandoned any pretense of evidence, and disregarded past legal frameworks. The logic has shifted from "cannot buy goods produced by forced labor" to "buying Xinjiang goods or employing Xinjiang people equals forced labor." Beneath the surface of "limited impact," the last shred of legal cover-up has vanished. The US government is testing us with this. If we let it slide, precedent will be set, allowing subsequent sanctions to become even more reckless and aggressive. This round is also a test of US allies' compliance. While these companies have low overseas sales, a significant number are expanding in overseas raw material procurement, outbound investment, and export channel development. The sanctions' disruption of supply chains could create waves for these companies' global ambitions. As I previously noted, the EU, Japan, Canada, and Australia have performed on the "forced labor" issue, with the EU passing legislation to follow up by the end of 2027. US sanctions on Xinjiang serve as a statement and call to its allies, likely intensifying their subsequent hype around "forced labor." Furthermore, since the US Supreme Court rejected Trump's tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, "forced labor" and "overcapacity" have become Trump's two main tools for imposing tariffs, with "forced labor" being fast-tracked to the Section 301 tariff stage. On July 23, the USTR cited this to announce tariffs on 60 economies, including China. On July 31, the DHS used the same reason to sanction a large number of Xinjiang companies. The crude execution of the DHS sanctions, as analyzed above, clearly shows signs of being "rushed as a tribute." On one hand, the US is trying to impose broad tariffs through creative pretexts. On the other hand, it's directly sanctioning companies without even fabricating charges. This is the situation facing Xinjiang, and indeed all of China, following the "forced labor" Section 301 tariffs. The political impact of these sanctions is also extremely harmful. Just one day before the sanctions were announced, the US and China held a "candid, in-depth, and constructive" video call between their economic and trade leads. The very next day, the US delivered this blow. China's Ministry of Commerce issued a stern statement, pointing out that the US sanctions "seriously deviate from the consensus of the two heads of state." Yet, the DHS statement mentioned Trump's name four times, indicating that this is not just a DHS action but a Trump administration sanction. Coupled with the act of sanctioning 60 countries based on the invented "forced labor" pretext, it is Trump himself who is first undermining the US-China consensus. As early as Trump's first round of tariffs, I analyzed why tariffs were the central pillar of his administration. Once "forced labor" becomes a tool for tariff imposition, his attitude towards Xinjiang sanctions will shift from extreme indifference to intense enthusiasm, as long as there is no external interference. He went from not touching Xinjiang for 18 months in office to now causing the biggest trouble related to it, without even bothering to provide evidence. This 180-degree turn is telling enough. During the Spring Festival, I analyzed that US sanctions on Xinjiang are the weakest link in the US's sanctions chain against China, presenting the best opportunity to break the deadlock. Now, the US government, driven by internal strife, is using this as a tool to defend its core political agenda. Meanwhile, US financial sanctions, military sanctions, and technology sanctions are being strengthened, creating a delicate balance with reduced direct geopolitical conflict. This will become the norm of a "constructive and stable strategic relationship," but it also reminds us that if we don't occupy key positions, the enemy will, and the window of opportunity is fleeting.

Section 3: Understanding the Path Forward from US Internal Strife

Nevertheless, I still believe that Xinjiang-related sanctions are the weakest link in the US's sanctions chain against China, and the window for countermeasures while the enemy is still unstable remains open. This is not only because the US has been stirring up trouble for four or five years without hindering Xinjiang's development or creating another Xinjiang cotton-like product to be suppressed in the supply chain. But also because, as mentioned above, the "forced labor" accusation used to frame Xinjiang has itself sparked intense internal conflict within the US. On August 3, 25 states governed by the Democratic Party, including New York, Oregon, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Connecticut, jointly filed a lawsuit in the US Court of International Trade. They sought to declare the US government's use of "forced labor" to impose tariffs illegal, to have it struck down, and to suspend the tariff measures during the judicial review. The cover of the 25-state lawsuit, with its impressive list of signatories, clearly demonstrates the scale of the opposition. I have read the original lawsuit. If the reasoning behind the Xinjiang sanctions severely tested my belief in the US government's sanity, the lost logic and intelligence can be found in this lawsuit. The lawsuit closely follows the US government's statements around the time the IEEPA-based tariffs were blocked, arguing that these statements only concerned tariffs, not "forced labor" as a reason. It shows that the US government could pre-announce tariff rates and push through this round of Section 301 tariffs at a speed that breaks normal investigation timelines. The 25 states therefore conclude that "forced labor" is merely a pretext for imposing tariffs. The lawsuit details the numerous deficiencies in the current US administration's evidence, such as using only three cases to assert that 60 countries and regions are failing to curb "forced labor." It criticizes the extremely sloppy investigation and consultation process, which fails to meet the basic requirements of a Section 301 investigation. It also cross-validates tariff exemptions and rates to demonstrate that the US government's tariff imposition is highly unserious and violates the constitutional provision that "the power to tax belongs to Congress." The lawsuit directly questions: "How can the laws of over 60 countries be so different, yet the tariff rates are only divided into two levels?" "With over 1,600 public comments on record, why has the government provided zero response?" "A two-and-a-half-month hasty process shows legislation from thin air." "Over a hundred people attended hearings, but all were ignored." The lawsuit concludes that the tariffs are "ultra vires," lacking "historical precedent," and that "no President has ever found such power," while the USTR, which spearheaded the effort, has acted "arbitrarily and capriciously." Given the efficiency and rigor of the 25-state legal challenge, combined with the current domestic and international situation in the US, Trump's "forced labor" tariff is likely to collapse under legal scrutiny. Therefore, our window for countering the Xinjiang sanctions remains open. However, the internal dynamics within the US are complex. The 25 states are not suing out of a sense of justice or legality; otherwise, they would have spoken out when the US fabricated the century-old lie of "genocide" in Xinjiang. The Democratic Party itself has been actively pushing for Xinjiang sanctions. They are making this move because their own interests are being damaged. In the current phase where Trump is aggressively wielding the "forced labor" tariff stick and other control measures, we have a temporary alignment of interests. But once the "forced labor" Section 301 tariffs are gone, these states' hype about "forced labor" in Xinjiang will likely intensify. The lawsuit itself, citing a witness, states that "forced labor mostly occurs in the manufacturing of finished goods, while raw materials, which are 'critical to domestic production, are a different matter,'" revealing their true stance. Therefore, the window for countermeasures may exist only while the Section 301 tariffs are in place, during the most chaotic period between the US courts and the government, and between the federal and state levels, just before the midterm elections. After that, the positions of various US factions will likely be consolidated. The effectiveness of our countermeasures depends on our understanding of Trump's role in the US. His political foundation rests on jobs, income, and prices. The experience of the trade war last year has shown that China has a rich toolbox to influence these three elements.

Section 4: The Weakest Link in the US Sanctions Chain Must Not Become Our Bleeding Point

The lawsuit from the 25 US states contains extensive legal arguments we can reference and also reveals a key clue: what the US fears. The lawsuit details the harms of the tariffs, including rising production and living costs, the US effectively bearing the cost of the tariffs, additional fiscal pressure, and the risk of retaliation. These are precisely the levers for our countermeasures. Just one day before the latest Xinjiang sanctions were announced, during the US-China economic and trade lead meeting, Bessent expressed hope that China would "fully fulfill its commitments on rare earths and US agricultural products." So, how can the US sanction so many of China's Xinjiang minerals while expecting China to honor its commitments on critical minerals? How can it sanction so many of China's Xinjiang agricultural products while expecting China to fulfill its promises to purchase US farm goods? Some things China does are not publicly announced, or they simply follow economic laws and social norms, leaving little to be said. In just five years, without uttering a single harsh word, we made the US federal treasury pay an additional $57 billion to American soybean farmers. While confident in the state's subsequent countermeasures, I also hope we can strengthen the implementation of the Blocking Statute and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. We should retaliate tit for tat against the US's global forced labor and its forced unemployment of our compatriots, including the Uyghur, Kazakh, Tajik, Kirgiz, and Tibetan ethnic groups. I believe that alongside defending our rights, launching a counter-offensive is imperative. The US's genocide and forced labor are not just historical; they are a present reality. This extends beyond the widespread slave labor and child prostitution within the US today to the whips tacitly permitted in US mines in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the confiscated local labor documents at US military bases in the Middle East, and the military-first economy in the Ryukyu Islands that stifles the region's future, leaving it with an economic growth rate slower than North Korea's. Since the Americans are so fond of stories, we have countless stories to tell them. Each story is not just a few tears but also a matter of cosmic justice. As I write this, my heart is heavy. Recently, I visited Fujian and passed by the historic sites of Zuo Zongtang. I was reminded of the wonderful portrayal of him by the late actor Wei Qiming. The scene where Zuo Zongtang recalls his nocturnal conversation with Lin Zexu embodies the charm of China's historical heritage. Many of the Xinjiang companies sanctioned this time are located in areas where Zuo Zongtang once fought. The smoke of the past has long dissipated, and the land being cultivated is vibrant and full of life. They grow vegetables and harvest fruits, attract investment and establish industries, promote technology, and build the region to be as developed as the inland areas. I have repeatedly witnessed with my own eyes that beneath the majestic mountains lies an even more magnificent grand enterprise. Remote and impoverished areas have been transformed because of these companies, with national-level leading enterprises, deeply cultivated specialty industries, supply chains connecting the whole country and the world, employee training, welfare housing, and new models of joint management and shared prosperity. The company I mentioned earlier, Tianyun Organic, which raises salmon, hired Rick Stephen, Vice President of the World Chefs Association, as its brand ambassador. He said something very moving: "I saw a herder become a skilled worker, saw him get a house and live a happy life. That is more convincing than any advertisement." The US's relentless efforts to smear and sanction result from its habitual reliance on a path of impoverishing, destabilizing, and ultimately eliminating us. Xinjiang, China, is not only beautiful in its people and scenery but also in its development. The Tianshan Mountains merge with the Qilian Mountains, deserts turn into oases. Behind this 1.6 million square kilometers is a powerful nation of 9.6 million square kilometers, coordinating its efforts nationwide to make Xinjiang, like its other provinces, an even more beautiful place on earth. Xinjiang's present is not just the result of the hard work of its people but also the fruit of the concerted efforts of the entire nation. If a link that is the weakest in the enemy's chain becomes a persistent bleeding point, we would all be deeply saddened. The devil's hand must be not only resolutely severed but also made to pay extra, as a fine. This is fairness to Xinjiang and fairness to the great family of the Chinese nation.