A commentary piece from a state-affiliated media outlet has triggered a collective surge in Hong Kong's technology sector, with the market interpreting it as a clear signal from regulators to halt the subsidy war in food delivery services. This price war, ignited by JD.com's high-profile entry in February last year, has seen three major platforms collectively invest over 80 billion yuan over nearly a year and now faces intervention from regulatory authorities.
On the morning of the 25th, the State Administration for Market Regulation republished a commentary article from the Economic Daily titled "The Food Delivery War Should End." The article stated that healthy competition should involve benign rivalry through technological innovation, efficiency improvements, and service optimization, rather than a capital-intensive battle of burning money, or a zero-sum game using monopolistic positions to control traffic and force alliances. Allowing food delivery prices to return to reasonable levels, enabling the餐饮 industry to escape the dilemma of dying without subsidies and becoming chaotic with subsidies, and shifting market competition from spending money to competing on service—this is what truly benefits businesses and the public. Price wars are unsustainable; involution-style competition has no winners. The food delivery war should end.
This statement immediately drove up Hong Kong's technology sector. Meituan's intraday gains exceeded 10%, while Alibaba and JD.com both rose over 5%. The Hang Seng Tech Index surged 2% in the afternoon, with the overall Hang Seng Index rising nearly 1%. Investors widely interpreted this regulatory signal as a precursor to a potential phased reduction in high-intensity subsidy battles, boosting expectations for profit recovery across platforms.
In fact, as early as February this year, the State Administration for Market Regulation had already summoned platform companies including Alibaba, Douyin, Baidu, Tencent, JD.com, Meituan, and Taobao Quick Purchase, requiring them to strictly comply with laws and regulations such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, proactively implement their primary responsibilities, and further standardize promotional practices. The three major platforms had also simultaneously signaled strategic contraction in the fourth quarter of 2025.
The 80 Billion Yuan Bill: Divergent Strategies and Pressure Tolerance According to the "2025 China餐饮 Brand Power White Paper" released by the Hongcan Industry Research Institute at the end of September 2025, based on daily order volume, Meituan's market share in the third quarter of 2025 was 46.9%, the Alibaba ecosystem (Ele.me + Taobao Quick Purchase) accounted for 42.8%, and JD.com's food delivery held about 10%. J.P. Morgan's November survey data showed shares of 50%, 42%, and 8% for the three, respectively. Although the two sets of data slightly differ, they both point to the same conclusion: the food delivery market has evolved from Meituan's dominance to a tripartite balance of power.
The three major platforms accumulated investments exceeding 80 billion yuan in the second and third quarters of 2025. Meituan bore the most direct cost. Data shows that in Q3 2025, Meituan's core local commerce segment (including food delivery and quick commerce) reported an operating loss of 14.1 billion yuan, with sales and marketing expenses soaring to 34.3 billion yuan. However, Meituan CEO Wang Xing clearly stated during the earnings call that he "firmly opposes low-quality, low-price involution-style competition," emphasizing that the related investments aimed to "defend core market position" rather than participate in comprehensive price competition. He explicitly stated they were actively abandoning the pursuit of "coupon chasers" to focus on high-value, high-loyalty users. CITIC Securities commented that Meituan's losses were a result of "active choice," "trading short-term profits for a time window to secure high-value territories while accelerating the shift towards instant retail and globalization as a second growth curve."
Alibaba made the largest investment, but the pressure was relatively dispersed. Financial reports for the second fiscal quarter of FY2026 (ending September 30, 2025) showed Alibaba's instant retail revenue at 22.906 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 60%, with sales expenses increasing by 34 billion yuan year-on-year. Due to the traffic spillover effect of instant retail driving simultaneous growth in commission and advertising revenue, this expenditure was somewhat diluted within Alibaba's overall revenue scale of 247.8 billion yuan. Approximately 3,500 Tmall brands integrated their offline stores into instant retail, with ecosystem synergy being the core logic behind Alibaba's insistence on high investment.
JD.com found itself in a relatively passive position, with new business losses of 15.7 billion yuan. The persistently low penetration rate of its food delivery service made it difficult to achieve economies of scale, making a strategic contraction a practical choice.
Strategic Pivot: From Burning Money for Volume to Ecosystem Competition In fact, back in February, regulators had already reminded relevant platform enterprises to eliminate various forms of "involution-style" competition, jointly maintain a fair market competition environment, and promote innovation and healthy development of the platform economy.
Even before the regulatory statement, the three major platforms had begun adjusting their directions in Q4 2025. Meituan comprehensively strengthened its instant retail layout, betting heavily on "Brand Official Flash Warehouses" in October and shutting down inefficient businesses like Meituan优选. Wang Xing's statement about "not participating in price wars" was interpreted by the market as a fundamental shift in positioning—from a餐饮 delivery gateway to an "everything instant delivery" infrastructure.
Alibaba deeply integrated Taobao Quick Purchase with Ele.me, forming a hybrid consumption network of online ordering and 30-minute offline delivery, and expanded its full-category supply by leveraging offline retail assets like Hema, RT-Mart, and Tmall Supermarket. JD.com focused on high-average-order-value, high-trust niche scenarios like 7Fresh Kitchen and JD.com Medicine Instant Delivery, building barriers based on its self-built logistics and pharmaceutical supply chain, actively abandoning scale competition in favor of deepening "quality instant services."
With the clear signal from official media, this nearly year-long food delivery war may be entering its final stage. For the three platforms, the next phase of competition will be decided by higher-dimensional ecosystem integration and fulfillment efficiency, rather than reliance on capital consumption.
The impact of the food delivery war extends beyond the balance sheets of餐饮 business owners to the livelihoods of ordinary people. When餐饮 consumption, acting as a "ballast stone," slows down due to price wars, the chill felt by the broader economy ultimately transmits to every micro-level individual. Healthy competition should be a良性 contest of technological innovation, efficiency improvement, and service optimization.
Have you received any free delivery vouchers from food delivery platforms recently? At a recent press conference, the State Administration for Market Regulation disclosed the latest progress in anti-monopoly investigations into food delivery platforms, stating that regulatory personnel had been stationed at relevant platforms for on-site investigations. The next steps involve further conveying regulatory pressure through questionnaires and verifications, and studying disposal measures. This sends a clear market message: the疯狂的 food delivery war must cease!
The food delivery war appears to benefit consumers but is实质上 involution. For consumers, the food delivery war is indeed attractive—who doesn't like 1-cent milk tea or 3-yuan coffee? However, free things often come at the highest cost. When we shift our perspective from the free vouchers on our phones to the entire economic picture, we find that the ultimate price of this war is borne by us, the ordinary people, and it far exceeds expectations.
The most direct impact is reflected in macroeconomic data. From the end of Q2 to Q3 2025, China's CPI continued to decline, with a noticeable chill in the consumer market. Strangely, if food and energy are excluded, the core CPI was actually rising. This indicates that consumption was supposed to recover but was being "pulled down" by something.
What was pulling it down was the餐饮 sector. In China's CPI basket, the weight of food, tobacco, alcohol, and dining out is close to 30%, the highest among all categories. This means that when餐饮 prices rise, CPI may follow; when餐饮 prices fall, CPI may dip significantly.
Against this backdrop, examining the data reveals that from the end of Q2 to Q3 2025, the growth rate of China's餐饮 revenue slowed, and the timing and trend of its decline highly overlapped with the下滑 curve of the overall CPI. During the same period, other categories with high weights, like housing and transportation/communication, did not show similar declines.
This period coincided precisely with the most intense phase of the food delivery war and the most疯狂的 period of platform subsidies. Financial reports indicate that during the war, Alibaba, JD.com, and Meituan accumulated subsidies ranging from 80 to 100 billion yuan. The China饭店 Association pointed out that the price decline caused by large subsidies among platforms became a significant factor constraining the growth of the餐饮 industry since June 2025. According to Meituan's observations, this war directly pushed the average ticket size for dine-in customers back to levels seen a decade ago.
Superficially, the food delivery war involves platforms offering discounts, but from a macro perspective, it represents a severe冲击 on the price system of the餐饮 industry.餐饮 enterprises, to survive the subsidy war, had to sacrifice quality and compress profits, plunging the entire industry into a vicious cycle of losing money to attract customers, ultimately hindering the broader trend of consumption recovery—which runs counter to the central government's efforts to stimulate consumption and adds unnecessary阻力 to macroeconomic regulation.
The food delivery war affects not just the account books of餐饮 owners but the livelihoods of ordinary people. Consumption is the main engine driving economic growth. When餐饮 consumption, the "ballast stone," slows due to恶性 price wars, the chill felt by the economic system ultimately transmits to every individual. When corporate profits are paper-thin or even negative upon opening, where will jobs come from? How can salary growth be discussed?
Therefore, the timely regulatory intervention to stop the food delivery war is actually safeguarding the normal operation of the economy, avoiding the disruption of the economic recovery rhythm by恶性 competition, and allowing businesses and workers to have normal lives and incomes.
Healthy competition should be a良性 contest of technological innovation, efficiency improvement, and service optimization, not a capital-intensive money-burning game, nor a zero-sum博弈 utilizing垄断 positions to control traffic and force alliances. Allowing food delivery prices to return to reasonable intervals, enabling the餐饮 industry to escape the subsidy dilemma, and shifting market competition from burning money to competing on service—this is what truly benefits enterprises and the public.
Price wars are unsustainable; involution competition has no winners. The food delivery war should end.