The Strait of Hormuz has become the singular variable capturing investor focus, with current market pricing already factoring in a disruption exceeding one month. According to Zhui Feng Trading Desk, Michael Hsueh, a Commodity Research Analyst at Deutsche Bank, released a new research report on March 9, 2026. The core conclusion is straightforward and unambiguous: the timing for the safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is the only decisive variable for current oil price trends. Policy tools such as Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) releases, exemptions for Russian crude oil, or oil price caps are fundamentally unable to alter the trajectory of oil prices until the situation regarding the Strait's reopening becomes clear. Current market oil prices have surpassed $100 per barrel. According to Deutsche Bank's model, this implies the market is pricing in a Strait disruption lasting more than one month. If prices rise to the $105-$115 per barrel range, it would correspond to the market pricing in approximately two months of disruption. A further increase to $130-$150 per barrel would signal market expectations of a closure lasting three months. The most critical operational logic currently is singular: closely monitor the timing and safety conditions for the Strait's reopening.
Oil prices have exceeded one-month disruption pricing, with further upside potential remaining.
The report notes that oil prices breaking above $100 per barrel have exceeded the previous pricing range of $80-$100 under a "vague closure" scenario, indicating the market has extended its expected disruption timeline beyond one month. The $105-$115 range corresponds to about two months of disruption, while $130-$150 aligns with a three-month closure scenario. Looking at a downside scenario, if military escorts for commercial convoys can commence around March 18, allowing commercial traffic to initially resume at 50% capacity and reach 100% by early April, the actual disruption duration would be closer to one month. Under this assumption, Brent crude prices could retreat to around $90 per barrel, depending on the market's assessment of the ongoing risk of attacks on tankers.
Trump's clear stance that oil prices won't constrain military decisions; Russian oil exemption for India offers minimal relief.
A key observation in the report is that there appears to be no threshold for U.S. policymakers to constrain military actions due to excessively high oil prices. In response to rising international oil prices, former U.S. President Trump stated on social media on the 8th that it is only a "very small price to pay" for the "safety and peace of the United States and the world." Furthermore, while U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent claimed to be studying policy measures to curb oil prices, the only substantive action implemented so far is granting an exemption permit to Indian refiners, allowing them to receive Russian oil cargoes already en route. Estimates suggest this exemption will increase India's imports from Russia to 33 million barrels in March, equivalent to approximately 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd), up from an estimated 600,000 bpd in January—an increase of about 500,000 bpd. However, the report clearly states that this increment "would be meaningful in any other period," but its impact is almost negligible against the backdrop of the Strait of Hormuz disruption causing a global supply loss of 17-20 million bpd. Notably, March's import rate may still be lower than the level recorded in December last year, according to data from India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
SPR Release: A Sedative for Sentiment, Not a Fundamental Solution.
The report offers a relatively cautious assessment of the effectiveness of SPR releases. Treasury Secretary Bessent stated that measures to calm the market would be announced continuously, and the G7 is reportedly discussing a coordinated release of emergency petroleum reserves. However, Deutsche Bank's analysis points to three fundamental limitations of SPR releases:
First, reserves are finite. A large-scale release could instead trigger greater market panic about the depletion of supply buffers. Second, there is a supply time lag. The Japanese government disclosed that SPR releases typically require about one month (including the auction process); the U.S. Department of Energy stated that delivery could begin as soon as 13 days after announcement, but this depends on logistics arrangements. Third, the release rate is severely insufficient. The peak U.S. SPR release rate in 2022 was about 1 million bpd. Even assuming the U.S. could increase this to 1.5 million bpd, with other IEA members contributing another combined 1.5 million bpd, the total would only be 3 million bpd—far below the daily shortfall of 17-20 million bpd caused by the Strait of Hormuz disruption.
Therefore, the report concludes that without a clear prospect for the Strait's reopening, an SPR release is, at best, a short-term sentiment安抚剂 and not a substantive solution to supply and demand fundamentals. Additionally, the report specifically emphasizes the technical difficulty of reopening the Strait. Military naval analysts previously judged that U.S. forces might not provide military escorts for commercial convoys until 10-14 days after the middle of last week at the earliest. This suggests the most optimistic time window for the Strait's reopening could be from mid to late March. Finally, the report identifies a potential accelerator for supply recovery: if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, OPEC members with spare capacity, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, could temporarily increase production to make up for the previous supply shortfall. Deutsche Bank believes this aligns with these countries' interests—preventing lasting damage to demand from high prices while gaining short-term revenue boosts—but there have been no related statements or signals from any OPEC countries so far.