Eve Energy Co.,Ltd. recently announced that it submitted a listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on January 2, 2026. This marks the company's second attempt after its previous filing, but unlike the last time, the latest prospectus shows a significant adjustment in the capital arrangement. The previously disclosed plan intended for the fundraising to cover both the construction of the Hungary production base and the third phase of the Malaysia base project. However, in the newly submitted prospectus, the Malaysia Phase 3 project has been removed. The new description focuses the fundraising primarily on the continued construction of the Hungary production base, with funds mainly allocated to factory construction and production equipment procurement. This adjustment does not occur in isolation. The financial data itself forms the core backdrop for Eve Energy's second filing. As of the end of the third quarter of 2025, the company's total liabilities reached 73.86 billion yuan, with its asset-liability ratio rising to 63.47%, nearly doubling from 35.13% in 2020. In contrast, its monetary funds at the period-end were only 9.445 billion yuan, while short-term interest-bearing debt had reached 5.355 billion yuan, and accounts payable approached 30 billion yuan. Squeezed by both rigid debt payments and operational expenditures, the company's liquidity buffer is not substantial. Greater pressure comes from the capital expenditure side. The combined planned investment for the two major overseas projects in Hungary and Malaysia is approximately 18 billion yuan. Even with the Malaysia Phase 3 project temporarily on hold, the European project itself remains a long-term, capital-intensive commitment. Simultaneously, domestic capacity expansion has not halted, with bases in Shenyang, Chengdu, and others progressing continuously, keeping the company's average annual capital expenditure above the 10-billion-yuan level. Given the current liability structure and cash flow scale, this level of investment intensity clearly exceeds what the company's own funds can independently cover. From this perspective, the second Hong Kong listing attempt is not merely a "multiple-choice question" at the capital market level, but more like a "mandatory question" under real-world constraints. By adjusting the use of proceeds and concentrating resources on supporting the core overseas project, Eve Energy is attempting to find a new balance between expansion and financial stability, yet the underlying funding gap and reliance on financing have not diminished as a result. Regarding the capital arrangements and financing pressures involved in the second filing, a request for an interview was made to the relevant person in charge at Eve Energy. The response indicated that similar questions have been raised by multiple media outlets, and related information is primarily handled uniformly by the company's securities department for external communication; however, the company ultimately declined the interview request. The capital maneuvering underlying the second filing is evident. Eve Energy recently submitted a listing application to the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange again, with China Securities Co., Ltd. continuing to act as the sole sponsor. This is already its second filing with the HKEx. Previously, Eve Energy had submitted its first listing application on June 30, 2025, but constrained by the HKEx's six-month validity period for the A1 version of the prospectus, the relevant financial data and information required updating. It ultimately failed to complete the listing process within the timeframe and had to choose to re-submit. Compared to the first filing, the most notable change in this prospectus is the adjustment in the use of proceeds. Eve Energy explicitly states that the funds raised this time will primarily be invested in the continued construction of the Hungary production base, specifically for capital expenditures directly related to the project, such as plant construction and equipment procurement. This adjustment essentially reflects a phased prioritization in the company's overseas capacity layout. In terms of project progress, the Hungary base is not merely a plan on paper. Eve Energy has already acquired the land use rights locally, and the project has officially commenced construction. It is expected to commence production in 2027, with a planned annual capacity of approximately 30GWh. The products will focus mainly on power batteries, with a strategic emphasis on the 46-series large cylindrical cells. Notably, the project's location is adjacent to a major customer's factory, clearly aiming to serve the demand for localized supply from European automakers. The strategic intent is to enhance delivery efficiency and stability for core customers. In contrast, the Malaysia base Phase 3 project, which was highlighted in the previous prospectus, has been omitted from this filing. The Malaysia base has already been completed and begun production in 2025, becoming Eve Energy's first overseas factory to achieve mass production, covering multiple product lines including consumer batteries, power batteries, and energy storage batteries. According to previously disclosed information, the total planned investment for the Malaysia Phase 2 and Phase 3 new energy storage battery projects does not exceed 8.654 billion yuan, with a combined annual capacity of 48GWh. Part of this capacity is expected to achieve mass production in early 2026, with funding sources including internal funds, raised capital, and self-raised funds. On the surface, the two major overseas bases in Hungary and Malaysia form a "dual-pivot" for Eve Energy's expansion into the European and Southeast Asian markets. This strategy can strengthen localized supply capabilities and help reduce cross-regional logistics costs and trade friction risks, which is logically sound. However, the real constraint on the smooth progression of this strategy is not the feasibility of the projects themselves, but the company's increasingly tight capital structure and persistently pressured profitability. By the end of the third quarter of 2025, Eve Energy's total liabilities had climbed to 73.86 billion yuan, with an asset-liability ratio of 63.47%, nearly double the 35.13% recorded in 2020. Concurrently, the company's monetary funds stood at only 9.445 billion yuan, while short-term interest-bearing debt was as high as 5.355 billion yuan, and accounts payable approached 30 billion yuan. Squeezed by the dual pressures of rigid debt repayments and operational cash outflows, the company's liquidity buffer remains constrained. This financial pressure is gradually manifesting in operating data. The prospectus shows that from 2022 to 2024, Eve Energy's operating revenue was 36.304 billion yuan, 48.784 billion yuan, and 48.615 billion yuan, respectively, with net profits of 3.672 billion yuan, 4.520 billion yuan, and 4.221 billion yuan, respectively. In 2024, the company's revenue saw a slight year-on-year decline of 0.35%, and net profit decreased by 6.62% year-on-year, marking the first occurrence of a "double decline" in both revenue and profit. In the first three quarters of 2025, driven by a recovery in downstream automaker sales, the company achieved revenue of 45.001 billion yuan and sales volume of 34.6GWh, but the recovery on the profitability side remains weak. The core contradiction lies in the power battery business. From a market structure perspective, Eve Energy is facing realistic pressure from market share erosion. Data from SNE Research shows that its global power battery installation volume in 2024 was 20.3GWh, with a global market share of only 2.3%, dropping to 5th place among Chinese companies. In 2023, its market share was still 4.45%, ranking 4th. The decline in share is forcing the company to stabilize shipment volumes through pricing strategies. Data indicates that from 2022 to 2024, the average selling price of Eve Energy's power batteries rapidly decreased from 1.1 billion yuan/GWh to 0.6 billion yuan/GWh, and remained at this level in the first three quarters of 2025. The price decline directly erodes profit margins. The gross profit margin for the power battery business was 15.0%, 13.6%, and 14.2% in 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively. Although it recovered to 15.3% in the first three quarters of 2025, it still remains significantly lower than the company's overall gross margin level. The strategy of "trading price for volume" has temporarily stabilized sales but exacerbated the structural dilemma of "increasing sales without increasing profits." The inability of sales growth to offset profit decline has compelled the company to look towards overseas markets as a potential solution. In this Hong Kong IPO, the use of proceeds is clearly focused on the Hungary 30GWh power battery project. Judging by the layout progress, Eve Energy's global network has begun to take shape. The prospectus shows that as of 2024, the company had established sales companies and offices in 7 countries and regions worldwide and built an after-sales service system in 18 countries and regions. Among these, the Hungary base is highly anticipated. The project is scheduled for production in 2027, primarily targeting European整车厂 customers, playing a key role in the company's strategy to penetrate the European high-end power battery supply chain. However, the narrowing focus of fundraising reflects more the capital constraints arising from continuous capacity expansion. Over the past three years, Eve Energy has rapidly rolled out capacity projects, successively advancing the Shenyang base, Malaysia Phase 1 and 2 projects, the Chengdu solid-state battery project, the Hungary project, as well as multiple heavy-asset projects like the Huizhou Sodium Energy headquarters and the Jinyuan Robot Center. The密集上马 of new projects means the company annually relies on new financing to cover the cash flow gap created by expansion, with capital expenditure intensity remaining high over the long term. This pressure is particularly pronounced in the overseas布局. The combined investment scale for just the Hungary project and the originally planned Malaysia Phase 3 project exceeds 18 billion yuan, far surpassing what the company's existing cash reserves can independently bear. Even with the Malaysia Phase 3 project temporarily delayed, the Hungary project itself remains a long-cycle, capital-intensive investment. Simultaneously, domestic expansion has not slowed down correspondingly, keeping the average annual capital expenditure above 10 billion yuan. Under the current liability structure and operational cash flow scale, such an investment pace is clearly approaching the limits of the company's financial承受能力. More complexly, overseas expansion is not merely a capacity issue but is also compounded by uncertainties in geopolitics and the trade environment. The US imposition of 25% tariffs on lithium battery products and the gradual implementation of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) are increasing short-term export costs. Eve Energy also acknowledges in its prospectus that tariffs and trade restrictions could weaken its price competitiveness in overseas markets, forcing adjustments to pricing strategies, thereby adversely affecting demand and profitability. From a structural reality perspective, Eve Energy's reliance on the domestic market remains significant. In the first three quarters of 2025, revenue from Mainland China was 34.492 billion yuan, accounting for 76.6% of total revenue; revenue from other countries and regions was 11.111 billion yuan, representing only 23.4%. Overseas business is not yet sufficient to form an effective hedge against domestic fluctuations, which also means that overseas projects, in the short term, primarily represent "future growth expectations" rather than a current source of cash flow. Commenting on this situation, Zhang Siyuan, a special researcher at Sushang Bank, pointed out that the planned 30GWh large cylindrical battery capacity at the Hungary project, located adjacent to a BMW factory, possesses clear supply chain synergy advantages. However, under the dual constraints of capital and policy, relying solely on heavy asset investment is not the optimal solution. He suggested advancing localization through a "technology licensing + joint venture operation" model: on one hand, sharing core processes with local partners via patent licensing to reduce upfront capital investment; on the other hand, establishing joint ventures with Hungarian state funds or European battery material companies to share construction and operational costs, while simultaneously meeting EU regulatory requirements for "local content." "From a cost perspective, Eve Energy's overseas revenue accounted for 23.4% in the first three quarters of 2025, with the EU market comprising 7.9%. Once localized production is achieved, it can effectively circumvent potential 25% tariff pressures. Furthermore, learning from CATL's joint venture experience in Spain, pre-positioning some precursor material capacity for cathode materials in Eastern Europe could build an integrated regional closed loop for 'battery-materials,' enhancing supply chain resilience," Zhang Siyuan stated. Eve Energy's overseas breakout is not a choice but a necessity pushed to the forefront by both profitability pressures and the inertia of expansion. How it balances global布局 with financial security will directly determine whether, following its Hong Kong financing, it enters a new cycle of growth or becomes mired in a continuous capital-consuming battle requiring ongoing输血.