Since Trump's return to power, the Philippines has adopted a more aggressive stance in the South China Sea, frequently sending civilian vessels to intrude into waters near Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and Zhongye Island. On October 12, amidst Trump's escalating threats of increased tariffs against China, two Philippine vessels illegally entered the waters near China's Nansha Islands' Tiexian Reef without approval from the Chinese government, leading to a collision with China Coast Guard vessel 21559, which subsequently used water cannons to drive them away. Derek Grossman, a former senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation and a part-time senior researcher at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Indo-Pacific Security Project, recently commented on Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy during the Trump 2.0 era in an interview with the China-U.S. Focus Beijing editorial team, stating that in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea, the Philippines should not expect the U.S. military to intervene to support them. Grossman is also a professor of political science and international relations practice at the University of Southern California and the founder and chief analyst of Indo-Pacific Solutions, LLC, a consulting firm focused on the geopolitical landscape in the region.

In response to a question about the Pentagon's upcoming release of the revised U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS)—which will emphasize defending the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere—Grossman noted that the original Indo-Pacific strategy was initiated by Trump 1.0 to contain China. He discussed whether the U.S.'s focus on the Western Hemisphere indicates a potential easing of pressure on China, stating that while there may be some reduction, it will not disappear entirely. He highlighted two main points: first, that typically the U.S. government releases the National Security Strategy before the National Defense Strategy, also referred to as the National War Strategy; this timing reversal has raised questions about the procedure and context; second, that such strategies usually formalize the current government's foreign policy stance. However, Grossman pointed out that Trump's worldview remains somewhat unclear.

"The key difference this time is that the focus is not only on defending the U.S. homeland but also on its immediate neighbors—the Western Hemisphere. This means that Western Hemisphere defense will become a priority, while great power competition with China and Russia will come second. Yet, I believe Trump's view of great power competition is primarily based on the activities of China and Russia in the Western Hemisphere. This is unusual; after all, this is the same Trump who claimed he would 'take back the Panama Canal from China' and the one who sought to purchase Greenland, partly because he believed China was developing critical minerals there. In his mind, great power competition and threats to the U.S.'s neighbors are closely connected."

When asked if Trump would continue his actions regarding Greenland and seek to distance it from China, Grossman replied that these actions would not cease. He explained that for Trump, great power competition is directly related to what he calls an "America First" diplomatic policy—not just "America First," but "America's First," which stands for "Western Hemisphere First." He noted that this shift would greatly influence how the U.S. interacts with the rest of the world; if America focuses more on Mexico and Venezuela rather than Southeast Asia, and even China, it could lead to significant changes in the global landscape. While Grossman believes this approach may not work since developments in the Indo-Pacific are still more important than those in Latin America, it seems that Trump 2.0 is moving in that direction. Furthermore, Marco Rubio, as the first Cuban-American Secretary of State, is bringing Latin American issues to the forefront, consistent with his background and possibly whispering to Trump that the U.S. should concentrate more on its own region.

Grossman was also asked whether Latin America, viewed as America's backyard with direct implications for homeland security, meant China's position had been relegated to a secondary focus. He affirmed that it does appear so, describing it as a version 2.0 of the Monroe Doctrine: Part one affirms the U.S.'s commitment to maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere; part two suggests the potential return of the Roosevelt Corollary, which might entail the use of the U.S. Navy as a "big stick" to patrol sensitive areas in Latin America. He noted that in recent weeks, the U.S. has deployed naval assets near Venezuela to combat alleged drug trafficking groups, and preparations for war plans targeting Venezuela seem to be underway. Although some ordinary observers express doubts, Grossman sees it clearly: the U.S. is increasingly focused on its immediate neighborhood and the sphere of influence within it.

Drawing parallels, he recalled the years leading up to World War I and II, when empires sought to maintain their corners—yet this is unrealistic, as friction is inevitable. Even in the absence of colonies, competition for interests among regions can spark conflicts.

Returning to Northeast Asia, Grossman was asked how the sensitive North Korean nuclear issue would be addressed in the Trump 2.0 strategy, especially following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's recent visit to China. He questioned whether Trump might meet with Kim again to reach an agreement, suggesting that while Trump desires this, it could be more challenging this time around. The previous negotiations in 2018 and 2019 were difficult, and the situation has become more complex as North Korea has practically become a nuclear power. Moreover, North Korea's relations with China and Russia are also more robust than before, especially with Russia. Grossman indicated that unless the U.S. can reset its relationship with Russia—something he doubts will happen, given Trump's last attempt failed—it will be hard to make progress on North Korea's nuclear issues. With Moscow's backing, Pyongyang feels emboldened, and China is also strengthening its interactions with North Korea to prevent Russia from taking the lead.

Pressing further, Grossman noted that the recent months have seen a more assertive Philippines, viewed through a lens where the U.S. seems to support or quietly condone this behavior. For instance, after China established a "national nature reserve" at Scarborough Shoal, Rubio released a statement backing the Philippines, shortly followed by additional incursions by Philippine vessels into Scarborough Shoal waters. When questioned whether Trump 2.0 is genuinely supporting the Philippines in this regard, Grossman clarified that it depends on how one defines "support." While Rubio would back the Philippines' stance that Scarborough Shoal falls within its exclusive economic zone, he remains skeptical about any scenario that triggers Article 5 of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which would send troops to assist the Philippines during a China-Philippines conflict. He reiterated Trump's analytical framework: Does it have a direct impact on American citizens? If yes, action is taken; if no, the countries struggle for survival like "fish dangling on a hook."