As the disclosure period for the 2025 annual performance forecasts of *ST companies concludes, a group of firms that will trigger financial delisting indicators has emerged.
According to data statistics, as of the end of January this year, all 93 *ST companies had disclosed their 2025 annual performance forecasts. Among them, four companies—*ST Jinglun, *ST Yanshi, *ST Wanfang, and *ST Guohua—disclosed in their announcements that they expect their post-deduction revenue to be less than 3 billion yuan and their post-deduction net profit to be negative, thereby triggering the composite financial delisting indicator. They anticipate their stocks will be terminated from listing following the annual report disclosure.
Furthermore, some other *ST companies disclosed that they might receive non-standard audit opinions from their auditing firms, which could also lead to triggering financial delisting indicators.
"This is an intuitive reflection of the effective implementation of the market-oriented and rule-of-law reform of the delisting system, and it also highlights the regulatory direction of 'delisting as appropriate'," stated Zhou Li, President of Shenzhen Daxiang Investment Holding Group, in an interview. He added that the current composite financial delisting indicators accurately target "shell companies" with萎缩的主营业务, compressing the space for preserving listing status and channeling more market resources towards high-quality enterprises. The proactive disclosure of delisting risks by the aforementioned four companies also reflects a growing reverence for delisting rules among market participants.
Four companies have triggered financial delisting indicators.
Financial delisting primarily involves a linked assessment using core financial metrics such as the "net profit + revenue" composite, net assets, and audit opinions, and is a major type of delisting for listed companies. The four aforementioned *ST companies that have announced triggering financial delisting indicators are all listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main boards, and all have triggered the composite delisting indicator of "negative net profit + revenue below 3 billion yuan."
Specifically, *ST Jinglun expects its 2025 net profit to be between -39.5 million yuan and -45.5 million yuan, and its post-deduction net profit to be between -40 million yuan and -46 million yuan. It anticipates 2025 revenue of 338 million yuan, but expects post-deduction revenue to be only around 86 million yuan. The company attributed this to its newly added computing power server business, which relies heavily on a single customer and involves a simple assembly process with minimal added commercial value, leading to the decision that revenue from this business should be deducted.
*ST Guohua expects its 2025 post-deduction net profit to be between -40 million yuan and -20 million yuan, with post-deduction revenue between 197 million yuan and 296 million yuan. The company stated it made preliminary judgments on revenue recognition methods (gross vs. net) and the need for revenue deductions based on its role and the substance of transactions in projects related to computing power, emergency safety, and software development, combined with factors like the business's relation to core operations and its occasional nature, which significantly impact the final post-deduction revenue and profit figures.
*ST Wanfang and *ST Yanshi potentially face dual delisting triggers: the "negative net profit + revenue below 3 billion yuan" composite indicator and the risk of non-standard audit opinions. Both companies expect their 2025 total profit, net profit, and post-deduction net profit to be negative, with both revenue and post-deduction revenue below 3 billion yuan, indicating their stocks will be terminated due to meeting financial delisting criteria. Additionally, both companies received non-standard audit opinions for their 2024 financial statements, and the issues leading to those opinions remain unresolved, posing a continued risk of non-standard opinions for their 2025 statements.
"The potential delisting of these four companies reflects the new delisting regulations' precise targeting of 'shell companies.' All four have萎缩的主营业务, report losses after deductions, and have questionable ongoing operational capabilities," said Zheng Dengjin, Associate Professor at the Central University of Finance and Economics and Deputy Director of the Capital Market Regulation and Reform Research Center. He added that delisting pressure will force listed companies to focus on their core businesses and improve quality, while guiding capital towards better enterprises and optimizing the capital market ecosystem.
Some companies still face high delisting risks.
Beyond the companies clearly triggering financial delisting indicators, some *ST companies, while barely meeting the financial thresholds, face uncertainty regarding whether they will pass their audits, leaving them at high risk of delisting.
For example, *ST Chuntian expects its 2025 total profit, net profit, and post-deduction net profit to be negative, with anticipated revenue between 343 million yuan and 371 million yuan and post-deduction revenue between 338 million yuan and 367 million yuan. However, a special note from its annual auditor stated that it cannot yet confirm that *ST Chuntian's post-deduction revenue for 2025 will exceed 3 billion yuan as forecasted.
Furthermore, non-standard audit opinions have become a significant delisting "red line." This indicator uses independent third-party audit opinions as a benchmark to forcibly remove companies with financial inaccuracies, internal control failures, or questionable going-concern status, significantly reducing the room for preserving listing status.
For instance, the annual auditors for companies like *ST Guandian and *ST Panda issued special notes indicating that the issues leading to prior non-standard opinions have not been resolved. If sufficient audit evidence cannot be obtained later to prove these issues are eliminated, non-standard opinions are expected for their 2025 financial statements, triggering deliction.
Zheng Dengjin stated that companies barely meeting financial thresholds often rely on non-recurring gains or related-party transactions to embellish their performance, which is unsustainable, leaving delisting risk high. Non-standard audit opinions often expose internal control weaknesses, financial fraud, or going-concern issues that are difficult to rectify, with most such companies ultimately facing deliction. These firms often engage in last-minute operations to "preserve their shell," and investors need to be wary and avoid speculative trading centered on "betting on shell preservation."
Zhou Li added that, according to listing rules, if a financial report receives a disclaimer of opinion or an adverse opinion, it triggers a delisting risk warning or even direct强制退市. This is often accompanied by deeper issues like internal control failures or doubts about sustainable operations. The "destructive power" of non-standard audit opinions should not be underestimated, and investors should closely monitor the audit progress of relevant companies.
Investors need to avoid irrational speculation.
Notably, recently, some stocks with clearly identified delisting risks have been subject to market speculation, experiencing abnormal price volatility.
For example, *ST Yanshi, which has already forecasted it will trigger financial delisting indicators, saw its stock price hit the daily upside limit for two consecutive trading days on January 29th and 30th. *ST Changyao, which previously received a pre-notice of administrative penalty from the CSRC for financial fraud and涉嫌触及重大违法强制退市, saw its price hit the limit up for four consecutive trading days from January 20th to 23rd. It wasn't until the evening of January 23rd that *ST Changyao simultaneously received the formal administrative penalty decision and a pre-notice of termination of listing, entering the delisting process.
Market participants believe that the aforementioned companies have clearly disclosed their delisting risks through announcements, and the price movements completely diverge from their fundamentals, representing typical irrational speculation. Ordinary investors should resolutely avoid such speculation to prevent unnecessary losses.
Since the implementation of the new delisting rules in 2024, the signal for "delisting as appropriate" has been clear, with the intensity of capital market clean-up continuously increasing. Zheng Dengjin stated that speculation on stocks with delisting risk often stems from some investors' "expectations of shell preservation," but under the new rules, preserving a listing has become significantly more difficult, making such speculation mostly short-term投机行为. In reality, these stocks have weak fundamentals, and price increases lack earnings support, often representing a "last frenzy" where investors can easily become trapped at high prices. Currently, regulators are continuously strengthening delisting supervision and cracking down severely on abnormal trading and insider trading. Investors should rationally assess delisting risks, adopt a value investment philosophy, and consciously steer clear of delisting speculation traps.