On the evening of April 28, 2026, Jiuding Investment disclosed financial results that shocked the capital markets: annual operating revenue was only 2.81 billion yuan, shrinking 16.65% year-on-year, while net profit attributable to shareholders plummeted 164.14% to a massive loss of 3.58 billion yuan.
More critically, the company's post-deduction operating revenue has fallen to between 2.699 billion and 2.899 billion yuan, breaching the Shanghai Stock Exchange's delisting risk warning threshold. Following the resumption of trading on April 30, Jiuding Investment was swiftly designated with a delisting risk warning, its stock abbreviation changed to "*ST Jiuding." The share price has more than halved from its February high of 26.25 yuan, with its total market capitalization shrinking to less than 5 billion yuan.
This marks the second consecutive year of substantial losses for Jiuding Investment—the 2.68 billion yuan loss in 2024 was merely a prelude to the ongoing decline. Faced with an increasingly severe fundamental predicament, the company urgently issued an earnings revision announcement just two days before the annual report deadline, raising the estimated loss ceiling from 3.5 billion yuan to 3.7 billion yuan. This last-minute change has nearly shattered market confidence in Jiuding Investment's internal governance.
Once a legendary institution crowned as the "first PE stock," it was once the brightest star in the capital market. Today, it teeters on the edge of a dual precipice: delisting and a crisis of confidence.
From Surging Capital to Consecutive Massive Losses: What's Dragging Jiuding Down? Jiuding Investment's rise was a capital market miracle. Its parent company, Jiuding Group, listed on the New Third Board in 2014, becoming the first PE institution to do so, with its market capitalization once exceeding 100 billion yuan. In 2015, Jiuding Investment successfully listed on the A-share main board through a reverse merger with Zhongjiang Real Estate, writing a new chapter for PE institutions accessing China's A-share market. At its peak, Jiuding Investment managed assets exceeding 60 billion yuan, had nearly 100 IPO pipeline projects, and held stakes in over 300 companies.
However, since 2018, the Jiuding group has faced investigations by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for suspected violations of securities laws and regulations. Founder Wu Gang was subjected to significant administrative penalties, culminating in a hefty fine in 2022 of 501 million yuan in confiscated gains and a 100 million yuan penalty. Wu Gang, the actual controller, was also banned from the securities market for five years. This regulatory storm struck like a hammer, plunging the former PE powerhouse into years of governance turbulence. The current financial crisis is merely another concentrated outbreak of legacy regulatory issues combined with a deteriorating business model.
A breakdown of the 2025 annual report loss structure reveals that Jiuding Investment's three main business segments—private equity investment management, real estate, and construction—are all deeply mired in losses. The private equity investment management business generated operating revenue of only 1.16 billion yuan, down 27.28% year-on-year, with a net loss attributable to shareholders of 520 million yuan. The real estate business reported a loss of 2.88 billion yuan, a staggering increase of 320.59% year-on-year, accounting for 80% of the total loss. The construction business also recorded a net loss of 170 million yuan, up 687.82% year-on-year. The simultaneous collapse of all three core businesses exposes a comprehensive failure of Jiuding Investment's fundamentals.
The real estate segment has become the most fatal loss black hole, rooted in the long-standing failure to digest and mitigate the inventory projects inherited from Zhongjiang Real Estate.
Although the company shifted its business focus from real estate development to private equity investment management in 2015, it did not engage in large-scale leveraged expansion. Instead, it adopted a gradual digestion strategy for the "Purple Gold City" project. However, a decade later, this inventory has not only persisted but has continued to hemorrhage due to the deep adjustment in the real estate market. In 2025, the company's salable housing inventory decreased, with both sales area and selling prices declining, leading to a rapid contraction in real estate business revenue. Concurrently, due to the continued market price downturn, the company had to make provisions for inventory depreciation of approximately 1.36 billion yuan, recognized a fair value loss on investment properties of 400 million yuan, and, based on the principle of prudence, derecognized deferred tax assets of about 800 million yuan.
The private equity investment management business, once Jiuding Investment's core competency, has also entered a contraction cycle. In 2025, the company's managed equity funds saw no new capital contributions, with new investment scale amounting to only 120 million yuan, indicating a near-total investment standstill. The predicament of nearing delisting suggests that even long-term fund investors deeply tied to Jiuding Investment have lost confidence in reallocating capital to the firm.
Jiuding Investment's persistent losses reflect far more than mere financial deterioration—it appears to be the result of a triple assault: pressure from the macro environment leading to a large number of legacy funds entering their final exit phases, causing sustained reductions in management fee income; the historical legacy of the regulatory storm creating a trust deficit for the company in capital market financing and project exits; and the cyclical deep adjustment in the real estate market turning the legacy real estate business inherited from Zhongjiang Real Estate into a persistent drain on performance.
The Path of Transformation and Self-Rescue: Racing for a Breakthrough on the Cliff's Edge What further unnerves investors is the "sudden reversal" in the earnings forecast just before the annual report disclosure. On the evening of April 26, a critical moment with only two days left before the formal annual report release, the company suddenly announced a correction to its 2025 performance forecast, raising the loss ceiling from 3.5 billion yuan to 3.7 billion yuan and, for the first time, disclosing that post-deduction revenue fell below 3 billion yuan, triggering the delisting red line. Following this news, Jiuding Investment's stock price hit the daily limit down for two consecutive trading days on April 27 and 28.
While earnings revisions by listed companies are not uncommon, the timing and magnitude of Jiuding Investment's correction directly touched a sensitive nerve in the market. The announcement explained that the audit work was not fully underway during the initial earnings forecast disclosure, and the revision was made after thorough communication with the audit firm as the annual report preparation and audit progressed. This explanation has sparked strong skepticism in the capital markets and legal circles. Lawyer Wang Zhibin of Shanghai Minglun Law Firm pointed out that the timeliness of an earnings forecast correction hinges on when the listed company actually became aware of audit opinions or financial information significantly different from the preliminary forecast. If the company knew for a considerable time before the correction, it could suggest delayed disclosure.
In fact, deeper governance concerns lurk beneath the surface. Just before the earnings revision announcement in March, the core executive long responsible for the company's finance and information disclosure—CFO and Board Secretary Yi Lingjie—suddenly resigned from the positions of Vice President, CFO, and Board Secretary citing "job change reasons." Shortly after, on April 3, company director Zhao Gen also submitted his resignation, citing "personal reasons," stepping down from his director and committee member roles. The密集变动 of core personnel in disclosure and finance at a critical financial reporting juncture has further heightened investor doubts about the resilience of Jiuding Investment's internal control system.
In response to the market panic and stock price plunge triggered by the delisting risk warning, Jiuding Investment Chairman Wang Liang convened a special investor briefing on April 29. He stated directly that the management's response was not a conventional "shell preservation first-aid kit" approach but a concerted effort to advance a transformative shift towards industrial operations. In this two-hour online communication with the market, the company presented an action roadmap with several core initiatives aligned with its strategic direction towards hard-tech industrial transformation. For the private equity investment management business, the focus will be on accelerating the exit of legacy projects through M&A, buybacks, transfers, S-funds, and other means to release capital tied up in traditional PE projects, providing ample ammunition for the new tech transformation. Regarding real estate, while ensuring the construction and pre-sales of the Phase V residential project of "Purple Gold City," efforts will intensify to sell off completed inventory tail units to increase revenue. For the construction business, the strategy involves dual-track efforts: upgrading qualifications and expanding into large-scale projects to secure substantial contracts and significantly boost business income.
However, what has captured the market's attention most is not the cleanup of these traditional legacy businesses but Jiuding Investment's core move in its hard-tech transformation: entering the humanoid robotics sector. In August 2025, the company acquired a 53.29% stake in Nanjing Shenyuansheng Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. for approximately 210 million yuan, representing a 2,936% premium, completing the industrial and commercial registration change in February 2026. The founder of Nanjing Shenyuansheng is a professor at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and its core products are six-dimensional force sensors and key components for humanoid robots. Whether this represents a prescient and precise bargain-hunting move or another high-stakes gamble by Jiuding Investment on the brink of delisting remains highly divisive in the market. After all, prior to the acquisition, Nanjing Shenyuansheng reported revenues of only 2.088 million yuan in 2024 and 163.8 thousand yuan in the first four months of 2025, with net losses of 5.7349 million yuan and 2.7954 million yuan, respectively. The Shanghai Stock Exchange issued an inquiry letter demanding the company explain the commercial rationale for cross-border acquisition of an unprofitable target amid operational losses.
In response to regulatory scrutiny, Jiuding Investment explicitly included "transformation and upgrading towards robotics and other technology fields" in its core strategic positioning for the first time in the newly disclosed 2025 annual report. According to the company's top-level design logic, this transformation should not be simplistically interpreted as a hasty asset acquisition under market pressure but rather as a profound endogenous重塑: Jiuding Investment is undergoing a qualitative transformation from a fund management institution centered on financial investment to a technology manufacturing platform driven by dual engines of "industrial holding + strategic investment." The management outlined a clear business advancement path during the investor briefing—using Nanjing Shenyuansheng's six-dimensional force sensors as a core pivot to enter essential value chain segments of the humanoid robotics industry, then gradually expanding the product line and适时切入 the joint module field, ultimately achieving extension across the entire industry chain from sensors to joint components. Simultaneously, the company will leverage the PE investment experience, industrial resources, and professional capabilities accumulated over more than a decade to continuously seek high-quality investment and M&A targets in areas like humanoid robotics, semiconductors, and AI.
Some supporters believe the depth of this industrial transformation reflects Jiuding Investment's accurate judgment of industry trends—2026 is widely regarded as the inaugural year for humanoid robot commercialization. At the national level, humanoid robotics has been explicitly elevated to a national strategy. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, in coordination with relevant ministries, is establishing a national standard system covering the entire industry chain. Cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou have密集出台 specific support policies for embodied intelligence, accelerating the industry's shift from technological breakthroughs to mass production. However, opposing voices are equally prominent: transitioning from PE investment to实体制造 means Jiuding Investment must confront a series of high-barrier实战 challenges, including order牵引 for precision manufacturing, technological iteration, capacity ramp-up, and channel expansion. For a traditional PE institution lacking实体制造基因, the difficulty of this transformation cannot be underestimated.
In responding to the delisting crisis, a Jiuding Investment representative stated that the company is "confident in achieving the relevant financial indicators in 2026 and争取 applying for the撤销 of the delisting risk warning in 2027." While some investors offer applause, an increasing number of voices caution that for a company with nearly 4 billion yuan in losses, less than 3 billion yuan in revenue, and叠加 internal control concerns, safely removing the "*ST" designation will not be solved by mere optimistic statements.
From the former "first PE stock" with a market cap of hundreds of billions to today's *ST company teetering on the edge of delisting, the rise and fall of Jiuding Investment is a microcosm of the peaks and troughs of China's domestic private equity investment industry. It once relied on aggressive capital-driven models and全牌照布局 to create the myth of a私募机构攀上巅峰 in A-share history. Now, under the交织 of multiple factors—worsening overall exit environments, deteriorating legacy businesses, lingering regulatory concerns, and cross-border transformation pressures—it faces an unprecedented dark hour. The most significant test Jiuding Investment must inevitably confront lies between two截然不同的 value propositions: whether, in the process of deepening its industrial transformation, it can simultaneously resolve the structural矛盾 between short-term delisting risks and long-term profitability. The answer will determine whether this former market benchmark stages a comeback or is forever inscribed in the annals of the rise and fall of China's PE industry.