The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), in conjunction with multiple ministries, has intensively introduced a series of specialized policies, aiming to build a diversified, relay-style financial service system that matches the full lifecycle financing needs of technology-based enterprises. Central enterprise venture capital funds (hereinafter referred to as "central enterprise VC funds"), leveraging the industrial resources and capital advantages of central enterprises, play a critical role in sharing innovation risks, accelerating the commercialization of hard technology achievements, and cultivating strategic emerging industries. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), in conjunction with multiple ministries, has intensively introduced a series of specialized policies, aiming to build a diversified, relay-style financial service system that matches the full lifecycle financing needs of technology-based enterprises. Building on this foundation, it is necessary to further innovate institutional mechanisms, optimize policy supply, continuously enhance the precise empowerment capabilities of central enterprise VC funds, and provide long-term support for cultivating new quality productive forces and achieving high-level sci-tech self-reliance and strength. In recent years, venture capital funds, as an important capital link between technological innovation and industrial innovation, have seen their strategic value become increasingly prominent. With national policy guidance encouraging "investing early, investing small, investing long-term, and investing in hard tech," central enterprises, leveraging their unique industrial resources and state-owned capital advantages, have accelerated their deployment in the venture capital field, becoming a strategic engine driving technological breakthroughs in key areas and supporting the transformation and upgrading of the real economy. As an important part of the capital market, venture capital funds possess unique advantages in sharing innovation risks, forming innovation capital, and solving the "difficult financing" problem for early-stage technology companies. Statistics from the China Securities Regulatory Commission show that by the end of 2024, China's existing private investment funds and venture capital funds had invested in 570,200 high-tech enterprises, with an invested principal of 3.03 trillion yuan; they had invested in 36,000 early-stage technology-based enterprises, with an invested principal of 726.6 billion yuan. Among these, 64.76% of the projects were invested in strategic emerging industries such as computer applications, semiconductors, biopharmaceuticals, and medical devices and services. In terms of investment horizon, venture capital funds have a long investment cycle (typically 5-10 years or even longer), enabling them to bridge the "valley of death" from laboratory to industrialization for technological innovation, providing continuous financial support for technology companies in their start-up and growth stages. Over 90% of companies listed on the STAR Market received funding from venture capital funds before their IPO, covering critical stages such as technology verification, product R&D, and market expansion. In terms of investment mechanisms, compared to financial investors seeking short-term returns, venture capital funds, through a "risk-sharing, benefit-sharing" mechanism, deeply participate in corporate governance, assist in optimizing technology pathways and management structures, effectively reduce the trial-and-error costs for technology companies, and provide tolerance space for disruptive technological innovation. In terms of post-investment empowerment, venture capital funds build a multi-level innovation ecosystem by linking government guidance funds, industrial capital, and social capital, bridging the "last mile" of technological achievement commercialization. This multi-dimensional empowerment mechanism effectively compensates for the service gaps of traditional financial institutions in areas such as market access and scenario implementation, promoting the deep integration of the innovation chain, industrial chain, and capital chain. Currently, China's venture capital fund industry exhibits characteristics of "total contraction and structural optimization." Although fundraising and investment scales have declined somewhat, the investment logic is gradually shifting from "scale expansion" to "value deepening." Among these, state capital and government contributions have become the core funding source for the venture capital market. Statistics from the China Securities Regulatory Commission show that the cumulative committed capital from state capital and government guidance funds for PE/VC reached 1.25 trillion yuan, accounting for nearly 82% of the total committed capital. As an important part of the state capital fund system, central enterprise VC funds have accelerated their deployment in recent years. Data from SASAC shows that as of June 2024, central enterprises managed a total of 126 venture capital funds, with a committed scale of 52.9 billion yuan and an invested amount of 31.3 billion yuan, primarily directed towards advanced manufacturing, energy, electronic information, and other fields, achieving positive results in promoting technological breakthroughs and increasing R&D investment. First, the advantage of strategic orientation, focusing on breakthroughs in key areas. Unlike the pure profit-seeking nature of market-oriented institutions, central enterprise VC funds have the core mission of achieving high-level sci-tech self-reliance and strength, proactively undertaking high-risk early-stage technology project investments, and focusing on "bottleneck" technology areas with significant positive externalities, effectively correcting innovation investment deviations caused by market failures. This positioning not only helps accelerate breakthroughs in "bottleneck" technologies but also promotes the industrialization of phased achievements through a "spillover" mechanism, strengthening the national strategic scientific and technological force. Second, the advantage of industry-finance mutual promotion, building a full-cycle innovation ecosystem. As pillars of the national economy, central enterprises hold the position of "chain leader" or "chain owner" in many key industrial chains. This "industry + capital" model breaks through the singular financial attribute of traditional investment institutions, enabling full-cycle empowerment for sci-tech innovation enterprises from "technology R&D - pilot testing verification - scenario implementation." Especially in the pilot testing stage, the engineering capabilities and pilot testing resources of central enterprises bridge the "knowledge gap" between laboratory R&D and industrialization; in the scenario implementation phase, by opening up supply chains, application scenarios, and other industrial resources, they accelerate the technology commercialization process. Third, the advantage of long-term capital, overcoming capital constraints of the innovation cycle. The capital sources of central enterprise VC funds are stable. In 2024, SASAC further introduced policies extending the term of central enterprise VC funds to 15 years, to some extent alleviating the structural contradiction caused by the shorter terms of market-oriented venture capital funds (typically 5-7 years, with longer ones being 8-9 years), which can lead to funding gaps during the growth stage of portfolio companies, thereby matching capital supply with the long-cycle nature of technological innovation. Fourth, the advantage of policy synergy, creating a resource aggregation effect. Central enterprise VC funds can link resources such as government guidance funds and regional industrial policies. By functioning as a "policy interface," they can organically integrate multidimensional policy resources like R&D subsidies, tax incentives, and industrial planning, potentially breaking through the effectiveness boundaries of single policy tools and overcoming the fragmentation of policy resources. Driven by policy support and market demand, while central enterprise VC funds have made some progress, structural imbalances remain prominent: In terms of scale, venture capital funds account for only about 20% of the total number of funds managed by central enterprises, with a capital scale share of less than 5% and an investment amount share of only 3.8%; In terms of investment direction, the proportion of funds directed towards forward-looking future industries like artificial intelligence, 6G, and early-stage projects is less than 25%, indicating an underutilization of the function of "investing early, investing small, investing long-term, and investing in hard tech"; In terms of synergistic effectiveness, 95% of investment projects exit via methods like IPO or agreement transfer, with very few cases being acquired by central enterprises, failing to fully leverage the industry-finance synergy advantages of central enterprises for strengthening and supplementing industrial chains. These issues expose deep-seated contradictions in the institutional mechanisms of central enterprise VC funds, urgently requiring resolution through institutional innovation and policy coordination. First, the lack of quantitative standards for "calculating the overall account" or "the big picture." Central enterprise VC funds bear the dual tasks of "serving national strategy" and "financial return." In practice, financial returns can be directly measured by indicators such as internal rate of return (IRR) and multiple on invested capital (MOIC), but the strategic value of technological innovation and the contribution of technological innovation as functional goals are difficult to quantify, leading to a tendency to prioritize financial value over functional value. Second, "assessment flexibility" is constrained by "term rigidity." From a policy perspective, although there are currently reduced or exempted short-term investment return requirements for central enterprise VC funds, the average tenure of central enterprise managers is only 3-5 years, and their promotion is closely related to their tenure performance. Due to insufficient motivation for long-term investment, they may abandon strategic emerging industry projects with long payback periods in favor of mature projects with shorter payback periods. Third, the difficulty in implementing fault-tolerant mechanisms. Although policy standards for "exemption from liability upon fulfillment of duty" have been proposed based on the "three distinctions" principle, the specific implementation尺度 is difficult to master. There have been instances where different regulatory bodies reached inconsistent conclusions on the same issue, reflecting the complexity of implementing fault-tolerant mechanisms and the challenge of unifying standards under multiple supervision; perfecting detailed rules remains a formidable task. According to disclosures from Deloitte Venture Capital, the development of merger and acquisition funds, secondary market funds for private equity, etc., in China is relatively lagging. Domestic VC/PE rely heavily on IPO exits, accounting for over 90%. In comparison, in the US market in 2023, the proportion of venture capital fund exits through M&A and equity transfers reached 92%. With the tightening of STAR Market reviews coupled with the decline in secondary market valuations in China, the IPO exit channel has significantly narrowed. In 2024, the number of A-share IPOs was only 100, corresponding to an annual investment case number of around 10,000, resulting in an exit rate of only about 1%. According to the "VC/PE100 Exit Index" released by Zero2IPO Research, the market hit a nearly 7-year low in 2023. Although there was some recovery in 2024, it remained below the historical average. Prolonged exit cycles and decreased capital turnover efficiency directly exacerbate risk aversion among fund managers, making them more inclined to invest in mature enterprises and industries, impacting support for early-stage hard tech fields. First, insufficient participation of social capital. Affected by global economic uncertainty, the risk appetite of private capital has declined. The "2024 Profile Report of Active Institutional LPs" released by LP投顾 shows that in 2024, the proportion of capital contributions from private enterprises and listed company LPs further decreased to 8.17% from 8.95% in 2023, with small single contribution sizes and relatively low contribution to market funding. Coupled with structural contradictions like prolonged IPO exit cycles and a sluggish M&A market, the "investment-exit-reinvestment" cycle is hindered, further weakening the willingness of private capital to participate. Second, the funding potential within central enterprises is not fully unleashed. Although policies allow raising the upper limit for central enterprises' committed capital, due to risk aversion, lack of confidence in the successful commercialization of sci-tech achievements, and imperfect centralized management systems for venture capital funds, the willingness for venture investment within the central enterprise system needs improvement. Third, the structural lack of long-term capital. Long-term capital such as insurance funds has a relatively low proportion invested in venture capital funds due to reasons like risk preference mismatch, and the leveraging function of central enterprise VC funds has not been fully utilized. On one hand, there is a shortage of interdisciplinary talent reserves. The original talent structure of some central enterprises is relatively homogeneous, with a small proportion of interdisciplinary talent possessing backgrounds in finance, technology, and industry within fund management teams. Some teams, due to limited ability to assess cutting-edge technologies, over-rely on projects recommended by external institutions, leading to passive and homogeneous investment decisions. Other teams, due to insufficient industrial operation experience, provide inadequate support for process optimization during the pilot testing stage, delaying the industrialization process. On the other hand, long-term incentive mechanisms still need improvement. Although incentive policies such as binding exit proceeds, mandatory co-investment, and excess profit sharing have been introduced, constrained by total salary controls and the overall salary levels in central enterprises, incentives for core members remain relatively low compared to market levels, affecting the enthusiasm and stability of the investment research team. To promote the high-quality development of central enterprise VC funds, it is necessary to resolve structural contradictions and institutional barriers through systematic institutional innovation, promote the formation of a long-term mechanism for "investing early, investing small, investing long-term, and investing in hard tech," and strongly support high-level sci-tech self-reliance and strength and the building of a strong technological nation. As the representative of state capital contributors, SASAC needs to strengthen its role as a "strategic planner" and "institutional supplier," guiding state capital to accurately invest in key national strategic areas by optimizing the policy supply system. First, establish a dynamic赛道 management mechanism to optimize strategic resource allocation. Promote the linkage between central enterprise VC funds and major national science and technology projects, focus on national strategic needs, establish a priority list for frontier technology investment, and set minimum investment ratio requirements for key core technology areas. Set up dynamic adjustment and deviation warning mechanisms to ensure resources concentrate on areas with breakthrough potential, enhancing capital allocation efficiency. For example, implement "minimum investment ratio + dynamic correction" management for areas related to industrial chain security to avoid excessive capital concentration in mature赛道的. Second, improve the fund establishment mechanism to enhance strategic support capability. Optimize approval processes for areas involving national security and industrial chain weaknesses, explore the "fund + laboratory" model, encourage central enterprises to jointly establish concept verification funds with universities and research institutes, and promote the transformation of basic research into industrial applications. Third, strengthen inter-departmental coordination to break down policy barriers. Strengthen regular coordination between SASAC and ministries such as the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Finance, jointly formulate technology攻关 lists and investment roadmaps, unify policy implementation standards, and resolve regulatory conflicts and policy衔接 obstacles. Based on the long-cycle规律 of technological innovation, strengthen the strategic patience of state capital through institutional design, promoting central enterprise VC funds to provide long-cycle support for technology companies. First, optimize the fund term mechanism. Encourage funds to dynamically adjust investment horizons based on technology maturity, implement phased management of "investment period + exit period" for frontier areas requiring long-term incubation, and avoid the "mid-course exit" problem caused by fixed terms. Explore the "relay fund" model, forming a tiered,接力 capital supply model for different stages like laboratory verification, pilot testing, and industrialization, providing precise support for the entire technology transformation chain. Second, innovate risk-sharing and interest-binding mechanisms. Improve the "mandatory co-investment + excess profit sharing" mechanism, linking the personal收益 of the management team to the long-term value of projects, enhancing initiative and responsibility. Explore a "long-term收益 deferred distribution mechanism," implementing phased release of收益 for core teams to avoid short-term arbitrage behavior and enhance the strategic resolve of "patient capital." Third, strengthen technical research and judgment support. Integrate resources from key laboratories of central enterprises, industry associations, and university research, form跨领域 expert think tanks, establish a dynamic technology roadmap evaluation mechanism, provide professional research and judgment support for long-cycle investments, reduce non-professional decision-making risks, and strengthen the guiding role of scientific decision-making on capital allocation. Central enterprise VC funds need to broaden capital sources through institutional innovation, build a diversified funding ecosystem, and form a stable funding pool characterized by "state capital leadership + social synergy + global linkage." First, activate the funding potential within the central enterprise system. Encourage central enterprises to定向 invest a certain percentage of their sci-tech achievement transformation收益 into VC funds, establish跨企业 fund coordination mechanisms, and improve internal fund utilization efficiency. Support central enterprises in centrally managing scattered funds from subordinate units through holding platforms to achieve规模化 and专业化 operation. Second, optimize risk compensation for long-term capital. Increase the upper limit for equity investments by long-term capital such as social security and insurance funds, optimize risk control rules, and guide their倾斜 towards hard tech fields through policy tools like tax incentives and risk compensation. Promote the establishment of a national-level hard tech risk compensation fund to provide a certain比例 of guarantee for losses incurred by social security and insurance funds investing in hard tech fields. Third, deepen the synergy between central and local venture capital resources. Coordinate and integrate local industrial guidance funds with central enterprise resources, support central enterprises and local governments in jointly establishing regional hard tech special funds. Optimize分层收益 distribution mechanisms, strengthen the combined application of政策性 financing tools, and enhance attractiveness to social capital. Fourth, broaden international capital access. Pilot cross-border capital facilitation policies in non-sensitive areas, simplify foreign capital access procedures, and attract international long-term capital like sovereign wealth funds to participate in hard tech investment. Referring to the QFLP pilot experience, allow foreign capital to contribute directly in RMB and relax investment scope restrictions. By building international cooperation platforms, promote the connection between central enterprise VC funds and global innovation resources, enhancing technological source capability and global competitiveness. As important carriers of the national strategic scientific and technological force, central enterprises need to further strengthen industry-finance synergy, form a technology incubation ecosystem linked by capital and guided by demand, and bridge the "last mile" between technological innovation and industrial application. First, fully leverage the leading and driving role of central enterprises in the industrial chain. Relying on the "chain leader" status of central enterprises in key industries, jointly establish industrial synergy funds with upstream and downstream enterprises, and make定向 investments围绕 key technology攻关 and process optimization bottlenecks. By opening application scenarios and sharing R&D resources, provide market verification and iteration support for portfolio companies, shortening the technology industrialization cycle. Combined with activities like the "Hundred Venues, Ten Thousand Enterprises" connectivity events, promote deep cooperation among industrial chain enterprises, forming precise对接 between technology R&D and market demand. Second, improve the technology transformation service system. Support central enterprises in jointly building technology transformation platforms with universities and research institutes, establishing a full-process support system covering laboratory verification, pilot testing熟化, and mass production application. By linking fund investments with central enterprise laboratory resources, provide portfolio companies with technology testing platforms and engineering capability support, accelerating the transformation of technology from the laboratory to规模化 production. For high-risk环节 in the pilot testing stage, establish special compensation funds to share cost pressures from process verification, prototype testing, etc., promoting sci-tech achievements to cross the "Darwinian Sea." Third, optimize strategic M&A rules. Simplify approval processes for projects that strengthen and supplement the industrial chain, allow突破 traditional valuation limits based on technological value. Establish分层 exit channels,导入 mature technologies into the main business of central enterprises through methods like phased equity transfers and industrial chain integration and restructuring. Implement定向 acquisitions for start-ups in key industrial chain links, and achieve rapid technology application by leveraging the market channels and manufacturing capabilities of central enterprises. Build differentiated assessment and fault-tolerant exemption mechanisms adapted to the laws of technological innovation, providing institutional guarantees of "encouraging exploration and tolerating mistakes" for technological innovation, and解除 the concerns about "investing early, investing small, and investing in hard tech." First, build an assessment system that values both functional value and financial value. Coordinate the dual objectives of "serving national strategy" and "financial return" for central enterprise VC funds. For projects invested in hard tech and future industries, weaken the weight of short-term returns, and focus on assessing strategic indicators like technological breakthrough性, patent reserves, and industrial chain synergy effects; for mature projects, focus on market-oriented benefit assessment, forming a classified assessment model of "emphasizing function in early stages, emphasizing效益 in later stages." Extend the assessment cycle to the end of the fund's term, promoting the alignment of the assessment cycle with the technology transformation cycle. Second, strengthen跨部门 policy synergy. Formulate an operable fault-tolerant list, clarifying the认定 boundaries for non-subjective faults such as technology roadmap disputes and sudden market environment changes. Establish a跨部门 joint review mechanism, unify the regulatory尺度 of departments such as inspections, audits, and discipline inspection, and avoid implementation deviations caused by multiple supervision through a "negative list + dynamic evaluation" management model. Third, establish a fault-tolerant incentive linkage mechanism. Link fault-tolerant outcomes with performance distribution, allowing partial performance rewards to be retained for investment projects that meet exemption conditions. For example, for projects that incur losses due to technology path selection偏差 but comply with procedures, allow the management team to retain a certain percentage of excess profit sharing, eliminating concerns about "investing early and small." It is essential to both manage well and liberalize effectively. Through the institutional design of "market-based decision-making +穿透式 supervision," fully authorize and empower the management team,释放 professional judgment space, while firmly establishing a bottom line for risk prevention and control. First, empower the front end to stimulate vitality. For funds with mature market-oriented operations, simplify the investment decision-making approval hierarchy and explore a tiered authorization mechanism. For early-stage projects that align with national strategic directions and have clear technology roadmaps, allow the management team to make autonomous decisions within the single investment quota, pilot a "board authorization + post-facto filing" model to enhance response efficiency and professional judgment space. Second, strengthen底线 constraints at the back end. Establish a dual-threshold supervision system of "strategic target achievement rate + financial return," and implement dynamic quota management for funds that deviate from the main investment focus or exceed the capital沉淀 rate threshold. Clearly define a prohibited list to prevent capital from脱实向虚. For funds that fail to meet strategic indicators within a certain period, initiate rectification or exit procedures to strengthen result-oriented constraints. Third, improve the穿透式 supervision system. Use穿透式 supervision as a tool to完善 the regulatory system, build a fully integrated online supervision system, track fund flows and project progress in real-time, and achieve visibility of fund investment behaviors, traceability of fund flows, and measurability/controllability of major risks.