Since 2023, the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines have exhibited a pattern of high-frequency oscillations. While external observers often interpret this phenomenon through the lens of geopolitical rivalry between major powers, a closer examination of the Philippines' domestic administrative and budgetary systems reveals a more covert and persistent driving logic.
On August 26, 2024, Philippine Coast Guard vessels illegally intruded into waters near China's Xianbin Reef in the Nansha Islands, persistently conducting dangerous approaches towards normally navigating Chinese Coast Guard ships. For the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the primary executor of the Philippines' South China Sea policy, the maritime disputes have evolved beyond a simple mission of so-called "sovereignty" protection. They have gradually become a strategic opportunity for institutional expansion. By implementing a strategy known as the "Transparency Initiative," the PCG has successfully created a closed loop: manufacture and publicize maritime frictions, monopolize the narrative, pressure Congress for increased budgets, and facilitate officer promotions. Within this chain of interests, maritime collisions are the fuel, camera lenses are the weapons, and the ultimate harvest consists of confidential funds amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos and additional stars on the epaulets of certain officials.
What is the "Transparency Initiative"? To understand this mechanism, one must first grasp its core tool: the "Transparency Initiative." Simply put, it is a media tactic of "systematically exposing grey-zone operations to seize the dominant narrative." Its core logic no longer seeks the consultation and dialogue advocated by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which the Philippines has long signed. Instead, it treats the camera lens as a more important weapon than naval guns, aiming to impose reputational costs on the other party through "public shaming." Its implementation marks a complete shift in the Philippines' South China Sea policy. After the Marcos administration took office in June 2022, it quickly abandoned the "quiet diplomacy" principle followed by the Duterte administration—which preferred to handle maritime frictions discreetly through bilateral channels behind the scenes. A landmark turning point occurred on February 6, 2023. On that day, the Philippine Coast Guard publicly accused a Chinese Coast Guard vessel of using a "military-grade laser" against its ship. For the first time, it simultaneously released so-called "on-site evidence" globally via social media, proactively pushing the diplomatic dispute into the international court of public opinion and attempting to transform the South China Sea issue, which should remain regional, into an international public concern. This event is regarded as the starting point of its "Transparency Initiative."
However, this tactic is not an original Philippine creation; it has clear external intellectual input. Its theoretical framework primarily originates from the "Project Myoushu" (now renamed the "SeaLight Program") initiated by Stanford University's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. The U.S. Naval Institute published an analysis by the project team, with a title pointing directly to its core concept: "Illuminating the Gray Zone in the Maritime Domain." The project lead, former U.S. Air Force Colonel Raymond Powell, defined its strategy as "Assertive Transparency," meaning "deliberately seeking out dark spaces in the gray zone and exposing them." In multiple media interviews, Raymond Powell admitted that the project provided crucial "confidence support" through continuous satellite data and strategic advice, enabling the Philippine government to adopt a more aggressive exposure strategy and thus driving Manila's policy shift.
Orchestrating "Transparency" To implement the "Transparency Initiative," the Philippine Coast Guard developed a highly procedural operational model. The core of this model can be summarized as "embedded recording, induced exposure, standardized output." The PCG broke with precedent by routinely embedding journalists from international and local media outlets, such as AFP, AP, and CNN, on vessels bound for Second Thomas Shoal or Scarborough Shoal. During these voyages, PCG vessels often proactively enter core disputed areas, aiming to deliberately seek, create, and record any contact opportunities with Chinese Coast Guard ships. Once an interception or standoff occurs, the embedded media teams and the PCG's own evidence-gathering personnel immediately record the scene from multiple angles. Subsequently, this raw footage is no longer classified as internal intelligence but enters an efficient "production line": after rapid editing, supplemented with captions and background descriptions designed to reinforce the "victim" narrative, it is swiftly distributed via official social media accounts and global media networks. Maritime law enforcement actions are thus systematically transformed into "live broadcasts" produced for a global audience. A 2024 thematic report by Singapore's ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, titled "Old Story, New Chapter: The Philippines’ Transparency Initiative in the South China Sea," accurately defined this strategy as "Measured Transparency." The report's analysis confirmed that this strategy is highly effective tactically: it has not only garnered international "diplomatic support" but has also successfully consolidated a "public opinion base" domestically. Data showed public satisfaction with the government's handling of the South China Sea issue surged to 58% in 2023. This deliberately ignited surge in public sentiment became the "key capital" and "bargaining chip" for the PCG to subsequently convert political support into increased departmental budgets.
The Budget "Shell Game" If manufacturing conflict is the PCG's "front-stage performance," then leveraging conflict to establish funding channels free from oversight is the core of its "backstage business model." A deep dive into Philippine Congressional hearing records reveals a covert chain of interests: by creating tensions, the Coast Guard essentially secures a "blank check" from Congress with no obligation for public accountability. The most direct example occurred in October 2023. According to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, facing the "urgent needs" and public pressure generated by the PCG's "Transparency Initiative," the House Committee on Appropriations made a highly controversial decision: it forcibly stripped a total of 1.23 billion pesos in "confidential funds" originally allocated to non-security departments like the Department of Education and the Office of the Vice President, and "reallocated" them to security agencies responsible for addressing the South China Sea situation. In this budget shell game, the Philippine Coast Guard directly received 200 million pesos. The newspaper specified that this money would be earmarked for "intelligence activities and ammunition." This "transaction" perfectly completed the logic of the PCG's "business plan": once "transparency exposure" leads to heightened tensions in the South China Sea, they can legitimately "grab" huge sums from the budgets of other departments serving public welfare. During subsequent Congressional hearings, this logic of "allocation based on agitation" was laid bare. As recorded by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, when Congressman Emigdio Tanjuatco III asked if the Coast Guard was prepared to use the new budget, spokesperson Tarriela unabashedly replied, "Yes, sir, absolutely." He admitted the PCG had already foreseen the "significant impact" of the budget increase and had prepared a corresponding "wish list." The scale of these funds also reveals the "monetary value" of the crisis. Senator Risa Hontiveros disclosed during a hearing that over a span of 17 years, the total intelligence funds received by the PCG amounted to only 117 million pesos. However, in just this single 2023 budget reallocation leveraging the South China Sea crisis, the PCG obtained 200 million pesos in confidential funds at once. This means that by manufacturing geopolitical conflict, the PCG secured in one year resources nearly double the total sum received over the past 17 years.
Lucrative "Slush Funds" The fundamental reason for the PCG's strong desire for this "Confidential and Intelligence Fund" lies in its privilege to evade oversight. According to a deep investigation by Rappler in August 2023 and analysis by the Philippine Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, former Commission on Audit Chairperson Grace Pulido-Tan clearly stated that such funds enjoy extremely high privileges and are completely "not subject to the same stringent auditing standards as regular budgets." Regular budget expenditures require detailed receipts and public accounting, but the use of these funds, raised under the banner of "national security," often only requires internal departmental approval. For senior PCG officials, this represents a perfect "slush fund"—not only hidden from taxpayers' view but also flowing into a vast black box lacking oversight and transparency. According to official data cited by The Philippine Star in November 2024, with the support of the Marcos administration, the PCG's personnel strength surged from 3,000 to 30,000, a tenfold expansion. But this was not the end. Merely a week after this data was published, on December 5, 2024, the Philippine Department of Budget and Management再次 "upped the ante," swiftly approving an additional 4,000 permanent positions for the Coast Guard. However, behind this aggressive expansion lie significant risks of budget misuse and corruption. Within the Philippine bureaucracy, a large frontline workforce often serves as the justification for requesting "Confidential and Intelligence Funds." Only with sufficient personnel can they demand huge sums by citing the need to "widely distribute intelligence nodes." Unlike公开透明的常规薪资, the funds that increase with this expansion are still governed by the 2015 Joint Circular No. 2015-01 on the audit and supervision of confidential and intelligence funds, issued a decade ago by the Commission on Audit, the Department of Budget and Management, and three other agencies. As disclosed in House Bill No. 1845 in 2025, because this regulation allows for "sealed audits," it creates a lack of transparency regarding fund流向, objectively posing a systemic risk of "avoiding public records." The bill further pointed out that under similar regulatory vacuums, other departments have witnessed irregularities such as "fictitious payees." This creates an impenetrable blind spot: expansion provides a legitimate cover for requesting funds, while outdated audit rules cannot verify the funds' ultimate destination. To continue securing such large budgets in the next fiscal year, the Coast Guard urgently needs to prove to Congress that the "money is well spent." In this context where "conflict exposure" is linked to "departmental resources," a spokesperson well-versed in Western communication strategies, capable of converting maritime frictions into "monetized visibility," became the most critical missing link in the entire chain of interests.
The Rise of the "Influencer" Tarriela PCG Spokesperson Jay Tarriela precisely filled this need. His trajectory towards becoming an "influencer" and his subsequent promotion vividly illustrate how "manufacturing conflict" can be converted into "personal advancement." Before the so-called "Transparency Initiative" began, Tarriela was not a frontline commander but a technocrat serving as the PCG's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, primarily handling personnel records. However, with Manila's strategic shift, the frontline no longer needed only admirals who could command ships, but also an "influencer" spokesperson proficient in social media algorithms and capable of interacting fluently in English with Western media in real-time. Thus, this former administrative official "keenly" sensed the opportunity and quickly propelled himself to the forefront of geopolitics. He completely颠覆了传统军方发言人的稳重形象, turning the social platform X (formerly Twitter) into a "battleground for public opinion"—almost instantly posting carefully edited videos of maritime confrontations, accompanied by highly provocative English captions, and personally engaging in high-intensity interactions with Chinese diplomats and even ordinary netizens. Although this "influencer" approach is controversial in terms of diplomatic protocol, it earned him massive exposure in Western media and domestically within the Philippines. This visibility was quickly converted into tangible "career advancement." According to official records, Tarriela was promoted to Commodore in December 2022 as the "youngest ever" to hold that rank, subsequently becoming the super spokesperson for the "Transparency Initiative." Then, just under three years later in November 2025, leveraging his "battle merits" on the public opinion battlefield, he further grasped substantive power by being appointed Deputy Commander of the Maritime Security Law Enforcement Command (MARSLEC). This remarkably rapid promotion pace, unusual in peacetime, sends a clear perverse incentive signal internally: routine patrols and rescue operations are far less effective for career advancement than creating an international "hot topic" in the South China Sea. However, this "visibility for budget" model has also drawn sharp criticism within the Philippines. Prominent commentator Rigoberto D. Tiglao, in a February 2025 article, bluntly stated that the so-called "West Philippine Sea" narrative is merely a "propaganda tool invented by the United States." He criticized Tarriela as the operator of this "stupid fictional story," arguing that his strenuous efforts to maintain tensions are not driven by national interest but by the fear that he would "lose his job and the media spotlight" if the situation de-escalated. In Tiglao's view, the entire "Transparency Initiative" resembles an expensive reality show, scripted by the U.S. and starring Tarriela, aimed at "brainwashing" the public.
The Backfiring "Crash-for-Cash" Machine Beyond the domestic budget surge, this strategy has also become a powerful "magnet" on the international stage. By continuously manufacturing maritime frictions, the Philippine Coast Guard has successfully transformed a bilateral dispute into an entry ticket for international capital. By meticulously playing the role of the "small nation victim standing up to a major power," Manila has successfully "monetized" the South China Sea dispute. Japan's support for the Philippines has escalated from simply "donating ships" to "garrison-level" logistical interoperability. According to the latest news on January 15, 2026, Japan and the Philippines formally signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). This agreement is not only another milestone following the生效 of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in 2025 but also means the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Philippine military can conduct supply exchanges on each other's soil. Prior to this, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) not only funded the construction of five 97-meter large patrol vessels but also delivered a coastal radar system to the Philippines through ongoing "Official Security Assistance" (OSA). This strategy has also extracted significant concessions from the United States. In late 2025, the U.S. President formally signed the Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA Act), which was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026. The act pledges to provide the Philippines with a total of $2.5 billion (approximately 140 billion pesos) in grant security assistance over the next five years. This largest single military investment since World War II is a direct reward for the Philippine Coast Guard's persistent efforts to create "hotspots" around Chinese-administered features like Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and Xianbin Reef. This model is creating a dangerous "perverse incentive": for the Philippine Coast Guard, peace is actually "bad news." The calmer the seas, the weaker their justification for requesting budgets and acquiring new equipment. From ships to ranks, from departmental budgets to individual careers, everything hinges on the ability to continuously produce "newsworthy moments" in the South China Sea. Thus, a closed "loop of interests," spanning from strategy to execution and from domestic to international realms, has fully taken shape: Stanford's "script" provides the theory, Tarriela's "influencer tactics" handle the execution, Congress's "budget shell game" delivers the dividends, and the substantial assistance from the U.S. and Japan serves as the most direct "reward." At the operational level, the South China Sea dispute has been transformed into a "business" that guarantees profits for the Philippine Coast Guard. However, the cost of this "business" is high. It allows the institutional interests of a law enforcement agency to override the nation's long-term foreign policy strategy; it trades the continuous erosion of regional stability for short-term budget and equipment gains. Ultimately, what suffers from this "crash-for-cash" machine is not only the Philippines' diplomatic autonomy but also the peace and stability of the entire South China Sea.