Where does the future of photovoltaics lie? Sometimes, the answer requires looking beyond the industry itself—towards close relatives like energy storage, or wind power. During the peak of the photovoltaic sector in 2022, many in the industry held a somewhat dismissive view of wind turbine manufacturers, a segment known for its intense competition where products were often sold by weight. However, tides have turned. Since last year, wind power has gained increasing appeal, while photovoltaic modules have seen their own standing diminish.
Recent attention on Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. is not solely due to how its globalization efforts compare with competitor Envision, but rather its remarkable prowess in investments. From Blue Arrow Aerospace, which is currently undergoing an IPO, to last year's sensational robotics-themed stock, Swancor Advanced Materials, Goldwind has had a presence in both. Despite being based in China's northwest, its investment strategy is cutting-edge. Is this a company relying on connections for its investments, or does it possess genuine skill? What lessons can photovoltaic companies learn from this manufacturer's strategic diversification beyond its core operations?
Goldwind: From Robotics to Rockets Years ago, a senior leader once lamented, why can't Shanghai produce a Jack Ma? Borrowing this sentiment, one might now wonder: why can't the photovoltaic sector produce a Goldwind?
Recently, the IPO status of Blue Arrow Aerospace, poised to be the first commercial rocket company listed on the STAR Market, changed to "under inquiry." The company aims to raise 7.5 billion yuan, with market estimates valuing it at around 75 billion yuan. Goldwind holds approximately 4.14% of the company through its investment platform. Based on post-issue calculations, Goldwind's stake could be worth about 2.8 billion yuan.
How much did Goldwind initially invest? According to its 2017 annual report, on December 14, 2017, Xinjiang Goldwind signed a capital increase agreement with the original shareholders of Beijing Blue Arrow, investing 50 million yuan for an 8.33% stake. In less than nine years, this investment has appreciated over 50 times.
This achievement is particularly notable given that private rocketry was a niche sector with cautious financing at the time, highlighting Goldwind's foresight and the breadth of its investment vision.
However, this is not an isolated case in Goldwind's investment portfolio. Swancor Advanced Materials, which became a top performer in 2025 due to its association with Zhiyuan Robotics, represents another classic investment by Goldwind.
This investment dates back even further. Goldwind's 2017 report notes that in March 2016, it acquired a 10% stake in Swancor (Shanghai) Fine Chemical Co., Ltd. from an independent third party for 300 million yuan. After holding the stake for ten years, Goldwind realized total returns of 323 million yuan from divestment and dividends. Had Goldwind retained its 8.06 million shares without selling, the stake's market value would have reached 1.13 billion yuan. Even at the time of Goldwind's announcement on August 28, 2025, the shares were valued at 700 million yuan.
The rationale behind this divestment was unclear, leading to speculation about undisclosed reasons. Nevertheless, these examples demonstrate that Goldwind is no novice in investing but rather a seasoned player.
Goldwind's landmark investment success story is JL Mag Rare-Earth Co., Ltd. In 2009, Goldwind invested 34 million yuan in the early-stage company, securing a key materials supply for its direct-drive permanent magnet turbines while also reaping substantial financial returns as the company grew and went public.
Over 17 years, Goldwind cashed out over 2.2 billion yuan. As of December 5, 2025, Goldwind still held 25,150,779 shares, or 1.83% of JL Mag, valued at over 900 million yuan. This represents an appreciation of over 90 times from the initial 34 million yuan investment.
Goldwind's star investment projects are numerous, extending beyond wind power to include companies like Hithium Energy Storage, Jinkai New Energy, and Hydrogenious Technologies. This track record stands strong even when compared to renowned investors like Zhang Lei of Hillhouse Capital and Neil Shen of Sequoia Capital China.
Decoding Goldwind's Investment Strategy An analysis of public information reveals that Goldwind's investment approach can be categorized into three types: synergistic investments within the wind power supply chain, ecological expansion investments in new energy systems, and strategic positions in future hard technologies. These categories are interconnected, following a logic where core operations provide scenarios and cash flow, while investments offer technological interfaces and growth flexibility, creating a mutually beneficial cycle.
The first category focuses on synergistic investments within the wind power industry chain, strengthening the core business. This foundational strategy aims to ensure supply chain security, reduce procurement costs, and enhance industrial resilience. Beyond JL Mag, Goldwind has invested in companies involved in critical areas such as bearings, gearboxes, wind measurement, and operations maintenance.
For instance, Delijia, a gearbox manufacturer, completed its IPO in 2025. The relationship with Goldwind includes both equity ties and business collaboration. Similarly, Goldwind has invested in companies specializing in wind measurement lidar and key bearings to secure essential supply chain components early.
The second category involves ecological expansion investments in new energy, cultivating secondary growth curves. Goldwind has extended its reach into related sectors like energy storage, hydrogen energy, and new materials, aligning with China's "dual carbon" policy goals.
Public records show Goldwind has participated in equity investments and business cooperation with several companies in energy storage, hydrogen, and materials. Swancor Advanced Materials, related to wind turbine blade materials, and Hithium Energy Storage, a standout in the energy storage sector, are examples.
The third category comprises forward-looking investments in hard technology, seizing future strategic high grounds. This is a key reason for the current focus on Goldwind.
Why has a company in the straightforward manufacturing sector, often perceived as involving heavy labor, managed to accurately identify and capitalize on major tech innovation trends?
In commercial aerospace, Goldwind participated in multiple funding rounds for Blue Arrow Aerospace and explored industrial synergies like "green power-fuel-launch." In industrial communication and chips, Goldwind Investment Holdings previously held shares in Yuto Microelectronics, as disclosed in its IPO prospectus, before exiting in July 2021.
Additionally, Goldwind has explored areas like power semiconductors, data elements, and intelligent operations through industrial funds or strategic investments.
By January 2026, Goldwind's portfolio included both listed companies and those in the IPO pipeline.
Investments have delivered超额 returns for Goldwind. For example, in its Q3 2025 report, "investment income" and "changes in fair value" amounted to approximately 641 million yuan and 787 million yuan, respectively, totaling about 1.428 billion yuan. This significantly supported the net profit of roughly 2.584 billion yuan for the period.
Goldwind's Investment Network Goldwind's sustained investment success is not accidental. While connections may play a role, it cannot be attributed solely to networking.
As a wind power leader, Goldwind naturally possesses rich industrial scenarios and project resources. It maintains long-term cooperation with major energy developers, understanding project implementation, cost amortization, and cash flow management. Its industrial capital nature also facilitates co-investment and joint due diligence with market-oriented funds.
Coupled with its布局 across Xinjiang, North China, and East China along the new energy chain, Goldwind has inherent advantages in accessing quality projects and key investment rounds.
Crucially, Goldwind is perceived more as an "industrial investor" than a pure financial backer. Its investments often come with expectations of business synergy—either securing supply chain links through equity or establishing合作 interfaces for system integration and new scenarios.
Goldwind's investment network is formidable, including top VCs and PEs like Hillhouse Capital, Sequoia Capital China, and Oriental Fortune Capital; state-owned capital like China Three Gorges Capital, ABC International, and CMB International; and financial institutions like China CITIC Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Hexie Health Insurance.
A strong network reflects one's own strength—capable individuals attract capable peers.
Goldwind employs a differentiated strategy: partnering with top VCs for early-stage projects and state-owned institutions for mid-to-late-stage ventures. This ensures technological acuity while enhancing resource integration. For example, in the Blue Arrow Aerospace project, collaboration with institutions like Shenzhen Capital Group resulted in a combined stake of 10.0962%, building a strategic position in commercial aerospace. In Delijia's IPO, a Pre-IPO investment with state-owned capital yielded stable returns.
Goldwind's investment philosophy can be summarized as: enter early, target small companies, ensure real synergy, and exit steadily.
"Enter early" means investing before industrial inflection points. Goldwind's representative investments show a preference for entering sectors before they become crowded. JL Mag involved pre-emptive positioning in core turbine materials; Blue Arrow Aerospace capitalized on the trend of commercial spaceflight moving from concept to engineering and scale; Swancor Advanced Materials demonstrated timing in capturing key materials and capital windows. This "half-step ahead" strategy stems from industrial capital's dual assessment of technology curves and supply chain positioning.
"Target small" focuses on start-ups and growth-stage companies. For industrial capital, early investment is less about chasing hype and more about "locking in a position." Entering when valuations are manageable and synergy feasible allows for greater growth potential at lower cost, with industrial resources helping portfolio companies navigate early-stage uncertainties.
"Synergy must be real" involves restrained intervention. A common mistake for industrial investors is excessive management post-investment. Goldwind typically focuses post-investment efforts on business synergy and resource对接, such as procurement合作, joint development, and pilot projects, to enhance certainty while avoiding heavy-handed daily management. This restraint preserves entrepreneurial decision-making efficiency and releases synergistic value within controlled boundaries.
"Exit steadily" means avoiding overstay and greed. A hallmark of Goldwind's approach is not seeking to profit from every peak; it exits decisively when portfolio companies reach reasonable valuations, profitability, and liquidity, locking in returns.
Moreover, Goldwind's investments display systematic decision-making and risk control, evaluating technology, products, commercialization paths, synergy value, valuation, and exit feasibility. In high-uncertainty hard tech sectors, this disciplined "calculate before betting" approach is crucial for long-term cyclical resilience.
Why Can't the Photovoltaic Sector Produce a Goldwind? As fellow clean energy equipment manufacturers, the photovoltaic industry's scale is no smaller than wind power's, with even higher global market share. It has produced leaders like LONGi Green Energy Technology, Tongwei Co., Ltd., and Aiko Solar, and attracted substantial engineering talent and industrial capital. Yet, photovoltaic firms rarely achieve a long-term virtuous cycle between core operations and industrial investment, let alone develop the systemic capability where "core business supports investment, and investment feeds back into the core business," as seen with Goldwind.
Recent awareness of photovoltaic companies' investment abilities often stems from speculation and substantial gains by个别 entities in futures markets, often involving information asymmetry and potential合规 issues like insider trading, which are beyond today's discussion.
Observations suggest photovoltaic company investments fall into three categories:
First, investments revolving around the industry chain, sometimes for major shareholders' personal arbitrage, unrelated to the listed company. While opportunities abound, many investments are made by shareholders or affiliates personally in suppliers or equipment makers, later "nurtured" with orders and resources from the listed company for personal gain. These often fail to benefit the company or minority shareholders and may raise concerns about related-party transactions and governance.
Second, personal limited partner (LP) investments, detached from core operations, prone to speculation. Many entrepreneurs, after earning profits, act as LPs with investment firms, but the focus often lacks relevance to their main business, chasing market trends instead. While beneficial personally and short-term, these rarely translate into replicable industrial investment capabilities for the listed company and do little to support core operations, unlike Goldwind's integrated approach.
Third, investing in capacity, not industry. The most typical investment in this cycle remains capacity expansion—scaling up during booms with local governments and financial institutions, leading to severe oversupply and internal competition.
This is not to dismiss all photovoltaic firms. Examples of industrial investment and cross-cycle strategies exist, such as TBEA Co., Ltd., also based in Xinjiang. Though not purely a photovoltaic company, TBEA started with power equipment and expanded into polysilicon and energy resources. Its investment logic resembles Goldwind's: solid related diversification from transformer manufacturing into polysilicon and PV plants for synergy, and a focus on resource assets like coal mines in Zhundong, with over 12 billion tonnes of reserves, to hedge against cycles. TBEA also holds gold mines, embodying a "we have resources" strategy.
Returning to the initial question: why can't the photovoltaic sector produce a Goldwind? Ultimately, the gap lies not in capital or talent, but in three areas: external perspective, investment discipline, and industrial synergy.
First, past profitability in photovoltaics created path dependency. Early success relied heavily on subsidies, cycles, and stock markets, leading to complacency. Despite having many PhDs and scientists, the industry tends to wait out downturns rather than seek external solutions.
Second, a preference for intra-chain expansion over extra-chain opportunities. For example, shareholders might personally invest in successful suppliers or equipment makers, then steer more orders their way to boost value for personal gain upon IPO, blurring the line between natural growth and利益 transfer.
In summary, the photovoltaic industry lacks not funds, talent, or industrial depth, but the systemic ability to integrate "industrial insight—capital tools—engineering execution—exit and reinvestment" into a closed loop.
To escape internal competition, the sector must first break cognitive barriers: not clinging to old models or mistaking short-term speculation for lasting capability. More importantly, it must redefine industrial investment from an optional sideline to an essential, professionally managed operational tool.
Learning from Goldwind's long-termism means being willing to bet early on uncrowded tracks; adopting its synergy mindset means acting as an industrial investor bringing certainty, not just capital; embracing its discipline means knowing when to take profits, reinvest, and calculate clearly; and expanding视野 and格局 means evolving from "PV manufacturers" to "energy system participants," seeking new growth in broader industrial integration.
After all, the future of energy is not solely photovoltaics, nor solely wind power.