From October 20 to 22, by the banks of the Huangpu River in Shanghai, the 2026 Sustainable Global Leaders Conference returns once again. Nobel and Turing Award winners will take the stage to discuss the future and trends of technology, and the internet-famous professor who "rescues" people from anxiety and involution—Macfarlane—will hold a live dialogue with Xiang Biao!

Limited seats available, first come first served. Let us join together for the sustainable appointment! [Click to register] For stock trading, rely on Gold Qilin analyst reports—authoritative, professional, timely, comprehensive, helping you uncover potential thematic opportunities! A: There are funds available for investment in urban investment platforms in the Anhui region, looking for interest subsidy parties. Reliable interest subsidy parties are welcome to cooperate. General budget revenue should preferably start at 2 billion, with AA+ rated urban investment platforms participating in the transaction structure. Cooperation WeChat: ibonds2. B: A certain AAA-rated bond-issuing urban investment platform in Hebei, a certain AAA-rated platform in Zhengzhou, several AAA-rated platforms in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and several AA+ rated platforms in Guangdong and Anhui are looking for non-standard funds. Interested direct fund providers please private message. C: Undertaking audit report business for urban investment platforms nationwide, lowest price in the country, welcome cooperation from those in need. D: Undertaking FDI indicator business for local governments nationwide, those with interest subsidy conditions come to discuss. Additionally, undertaking compliant entry channels for overseas funds. E: Undertaking short-term bridge financing business for urban investment platforms in Anhui, Hebei, Hubei, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu-Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Shaanxi regions. Funds available on account for investment. F: There are funds available for urban investment platforms in the Tianjin region. Reliable construction interest subsidy parties are welcome to connect. The previous stop was Chengdu, with 106 urban investment platforms—the most in the nation. This stop is Chizhou, which has only 6 in the entire city. Economic aggregate ranks second to last in Anhui, yet growth rate ranks first in the province. Land finance is the smallest in the province, and the debt burden is also the lightest. Three hard-tech tracks: semiconductors, new materials, and commercial aerospace.

Introduction: The previous stop was Chengdu, with 106 urban investment platforms—the most in the nation. This stop is Chizhou, which has only 6 in the entire city. What does 6 mean? Chengdu's Jintang County alone has 12. Chizhou's total urban investment outstanding bonds amount to 4.42 billion yuan, not even enough for Chengdu Xingcheng alone to issue in a single quarter. But don't rush to categorize Chizhou as a "weak small city." This city hides a highly contrasting combination: economic aggregate ranks second to last in Anhui, yet growth rate consistently ranks among the top in the province. Land finance is the smallest in the province, and the debt burden is also the lightest in the province. Yet its industries have bet on three hard-tech tracks: semiconductors, new materials, and commercial aerospace. The twentieth face: traveling light. Small can be an advantage.

1. The "Top Student" Ranked Second to Last

First, look at the fundamentals. In 2025, Chizhou's GDP was 122.5 billion yuan, growing 5.3%. Among Anhui's 16 prefecture-level cities, it ranks 15th—only higher than Huangshan. The population is 1.309 million and still experiencing net outflow (a decrease of 15,000 in one year). A standard "invisible" starting position. But looking at the growth rate, it is a completely different city. During the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, Chizhou's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.09%, ranking first in the province, crossing four ten-billion-yuan thresholds consecutively. In 2025, general public budget revenue was 10.075 billion yuan—breaking through ten billion for the first time, with a growth rate of 4.7%, ranking first among Anhui's 16 cities. The fiscal self-sufficiency rate climbed from 39.86% to 41.1%—still low, but moving upward. Manufacturing tax revenue was 2.606 billion yuan, up 9.4%, accounting for 41.2% of total industry tax revenue, an increase of 1.8 percentage points from the previous year—the quality of revenue growth is real, not padded with non-tax revenue. The real pain point is land. In 2024, the city's government fund revenue was 1.141 billion yuan, the smallest among the province's 16 cities, with a year-on-year plunge of 70.5% according to Lianhe Ratings. The city level was forced to reduce the fund budget by 1.228 billion yuan during the year, with the reason stated bluntly: "the real estate market is sluggish, developers' willingness to purchase land has decreased, and revenue from the transfer of state-owned land use rights has plummeted." For Chizhou, land finance is not "contracting"—it essentially does not exist. Guichi District's district-level fund revenue in 2024 was only 101 million yuan—a municipal district with annual land sale revenue of just 100 million. This also explains one thing: why Chizhou's debt problem is actually not acute. Without the great rise of land finance, there is no great fall of special bonds being tied to land. Small boat, small waves.

2. The Minimalist Structure of 6 Urban Investment Platforms

Chizhou's urban investment landscape is the most "minimalist" seen in 63 stops of this scanning series. According to Caihui data, the city has 6 bond-issuing urban investment platforms: 4 at the city level (Chizhou Investment Holding AA+, Chizhou Construction Investment AA, Pingtianhu Investment Holding AA, Jiangnan Concentration Zone Construction Investment AA), and 2 at the district/county level (Guichi Jinqiao Investment AA, Dongzhi Urban Investment AA-). Qingyang County and Shitai County—no bond-issuing platforms. For comparison: Chengdu has 106, Bijie has dozens, and even many ordinary prefecture-level cities have twenty or thirty. Chizhou has 6, at the bottom of the province, holding hands with Huangshan. What's cleaner is the outstanding balance. As of the end of September 2026, the city has 16 outstanding credit bonds with a balance of 6.235 billion yuan, of which only 9 are urban investment bonds totaling 4.42 billion yuan. In 2024 alone, 18 platforms exited the financing platform list—more exited than currently exist, indicating that Chizhou conducted a round of batch cleanup in earlier years. This "lightness" also has a hard indicator endorsement: according to Lianhe Ratings, by the end of 2024, most prefecture-level cities in Anhui saw their urban investment cash-to-short-term-debt coverage ratios decline, and Chizhou was the only one that improved; for "total debt of bond-issuing urban investment platforms + government debt" not exceeding 100 billion yuan, only Chizhou and Huangshan qualified in the entire province. But one account needs to be clarified: government debt itself is not light. The balance at the end of 2024 was 43.681 billion yuan, and at the end of 2025 it is expected to be 50.019 billion yuan, with a quota utilization rate of 97.4% and special bonds accounting for 68.3%. Using "general public budget + fund revenue" of 10.769 billion yuan as the denominator, the narrow-caliber debt ratio is approximately 405.6%—a scary number. How to understand this 405%? The denominator is too small. Chizhou's revenue pie is only just over 10 billion yuan, and any debt divided by it looks ugly. But look at another caliber: the debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately 40.8%, within a controllable range. Chizhou's debt problem is not "borrowing too much"—it is "having a thin asset base." The numerator is normal; the denominator is meager.

3. Districts and Counties: One District Dominates and Two Extremes

Chizhou has only 4 county-level administrative divisions, yet differentiation is still clear. Guichi District dominates: GDP of 46.637 billion yuan, accounting for 47.2% of the four districts and counties combined; revenue of 2.936 billion yuan accounting for 47.9%; self-sufficiency rate of 54.8% and tax ratio of 74.4%, both ranking first in the city. The only district/county-level bond-issuing platform, Jinqiao Investment, is also in Guichi, with 3 bonds totaling 800 million yuan, all with provincial-level guarantee enhancement. Dongzhi County is a cautionary example: GDP of 28.54 billion yuan is not small, but revenue is only 1.46 billion yuan with a growth rate of 1.3%, tax ratio of 51.4%, and self-sufficiency rate of 29%. Debt balance is 9.111 billion yuan, with a debt-to-revenue multiple of 6.2 times. The most troublesome part is the platform—Dongzhi Urban Investment is rated AA-, and its corporate bond application filed in 2022 remains stuck in "accepted" status, with zero issuance during the period. Direct financing channels are effectively closed, leaving only bank loans. Shitai County is an extreme small county: GDP of 4.654 billion yuan, only 4% of the city's total; revenue of 368 million yuan, with a self-sufficiency rate of 17.3%, the lowest in the city; but the debt-to-revenue multiple is 8.4 times, the highest in the city. An ecological small county supported by a selenium industry, with expenditures of 2.13 billion yuan, the bulk of which relies on上级 subsidies (1.372 billion yuan). Fortunately, there is no bond-issuing platform—no platform means no platform risk. Qingyang County takes the cultural tourism + magnesium-based path: at the foot of Jiuhua Mountain, total tourism revenue is 22.6 billion yuan; in 2025, GDP growth rate of 6.1% ranks first among the city's counties and districts. The Baomei light alloy project has invested 8.7 billion yuan over four years, the world's largest single magnesium alloy base, pulling Qingyang from a mining county into the new materials track.

4. Semiconductors, Rockets, and a Small City's Ambition

The most counterintuitive part of Chizhou is here: a small city with a GDP of just over 100 billion yuan and a population of 1.3 million has industrial bets entirely on hard tech. Semiconductors: starting from 2012 when electronic information was designated as the primary industry, after more than a decade of work, it now gathers over 130 enterprises, covering the entire chip industry chain, and is the only city in southern Anhui with a complete semiconductor ecosystem. In 2025, output value exceeded 30 billion yuan, with value-added growing 13.1%. Anxin Electronics' automotive-grade 6-inch wafer annual capacity is 360,000 pieces, supporting Chery and JAC in import substitution with costs 20-30% lower; 6 national-level specialized and sophisticated "little giant" enterprises, two of which have IPO applications accepted on the Beijing Stock Exchange. "15th Five-Year Plan" target: semiconductor output value exceeding 60 billion yuan. New materials: citywide output value has exceeded 80 billion yuan. Qingyang Baomei's vertical tank magnesium-based smelting technology has single-tank output 4 times that of traditional methods. In 2024, it produced 33,700 tons of magnesium with an output value of 1.2 billion yuan, aiming for annual production of 100,000 tons and output value of 3 billion yuan; 68 signed projects in the industry chain with total investment of 43.5 billion yuan. Commercial aerospace: the most "created from nothing" track. Without a launch site or a coastal port, relying on test stands converted from idle mountain mining pits and cost advantages in the Yangtze River Delta hinterland, it has signed 18 projects with total investment of 17.42 billion yuan. Galactic Energy's "Zhishenxing-1" rocket is assembled in Chizhou, the hundred-ton-class liquid oxygen kerosene engine test was successful, and the "Chizhou-1" satellite is expected to launch within the year—with payloads made locally in Chizhou. In 2025, new materials + semiconductors combined pulled industrial growth by 7 percentage points; high-tech manufacturing value-added grew 22%. During the "14th Five-Year Plan," above-scale industrial growth averaged 11.8% annually, 3.6 percentage points higher than the province. The investment side is also undergoing a blood transfusion: in 2025, real estate development investment fell 50.1%, but infrastructure investment grew 25.6%, with 502 emerging industry projects of over 100 million yuan each. The old is retreating, the new is advancing—but the volume advancing is not yet enough to fill the hole left by the retreating (2025 fixed investment overall -7.6%).

5. Two Tables

Chizhou Fundamentals Overview (2024-2025). Indicator / Value / Provincial Position. GDP (2025): 122.5 billion yuan / +5.3% / 15th (only above Huangshan). General public budget revenue (2025): 10.075 billion yuan / +4.7% / 15th in scale, 1st in growth. Government fund revenue (2024): 1.141 billion yuan / sharp decline / smallest in province. Fiscal self-sufficiency rate: 39.86%→41.1% / lower tier, but climbing. Government debt balance (end of 2025): 50.019 billion yuan / quota utilization rate 97.4% / —. Narrow-caliber debt ratio: approximately 405.6%→446% / caused by small denominator. Debt-to-GDP ratio: approximately 40.8% / controllable. Bond-issuing urban investment platforms: 6 / smallest tier in province. Urban investment outstanding bonds: 4.42 billion yuan / smallest tier in province. Platforms exited in 2024: 18 / —.

Chizhou's 6 Urban Investment Platforms Panorama (January 2024 to September 2026). Entity / Level / Rating / Issuance in Period / Notes. Chizhou Investment Holding Group / City-level / AA+ / 1 bond, 1.5 billion yuan / Only AA+; 26 Chizhou 01 coupon rate 2.23%. Chizhou Construction Investment Group / City-level / AA / 2 bonds, 460 million yuan / Subsidiary of Chizhou Investment Holding. Pingtianhu Investment Holding Group / City-level / AA / 1 bond, 500 million yuan / Only infrastructure entity in the economic development zone. Jiangnan Concentration Zone Construction Investment / City-level / AA / No new issuance in period / —. Jinqiao Investment Group / Guichi District / AA / 3 bonds, 800 million yuan / All with provincial guarantee enhancement. Dongzhi Urban Operation Investment / Dongzhi County / AA- / No issuance in period / Corporate bond application stuck for 4 years, channels closed.

6. The Small Boat's Wind-Resistance Logic

In the bond market, Chizhou's presence is equally minimalist: 14 bonds issued over two years and nine months, totaling 5.075 billion yuan. In 2024, net outflow was 340 million yuan; in 2025, net outflow was 1 billion yuan; in the first three quarters of 2026, it turned positive only through "26 Chizhou 01," a 1.5 billion yuan refinancing for old debt. The underwriting landscape is dominated by local brokerages—Huaan Securities leads with a 26.6% share, and major brokerages basically do not participate. There is one blemish to record honestly: in October 2025, Chizhou Investment Holding received a warning letter from the Anhui Securities Regulatory Bureau because part of the proceeds from "23 Chizhou 01" were not used for the agreed purposes. The bond itself was repaid on schedule in July 2026, seamlessly continued by new debt—the blemish is at the governance level, not the repayment level. Viewed against the broader backdrop of debt resolution, Chizhou's story has three layers of meaning. First, provincial-level coordination is providing a backstop. Anhui is one of only two comprehensive pilot provinces for fiscal scientific management in the country, conducting a province-wide no-hidden-debt pilot. In 2024 and the first nine months of 2025, it issued 112 billion and 98 billion yuan in special refinancing bonds respectively, with 185 entities across the province announcing platform exits. Chizhou's 18 exits in one year are a pawn in this big game—provincial coordination in a small province is actually easier to penetrate to every county than in a large province. Second, traveling light is the result of active choice. Six platforms, 4.4 billion in outstanding bonds, 18 exits—Chizhou did not frantically expand platforms during 2015-2020 like many cities. The cost of not expanding is slower infrastructure, but the dividend is almost no historical baggage to digest during the debt resolution cycle. While Chengdu and Chongqing are swapping hundreds of billions in urban investment debt, Chizhou only needs to manage 6 platforms. Third, industry is the only answer. Semiconductors at 30 billion, new materials at 80 billion, commercial aerospace at 17.4 billion in investment—Chizhou's bet is not "debt resolution" but "blood transfusion." The smallest land finance in the province means it was forced earliest to survive on industrial tax revenue; the first-place revenue growth rate and 41.2% manufacturing tax share show that this path has worked more than halfway. Of course, risks are obvious: population is outflowing, fixed investment is declining, Dongzhi's platform channels are closed, and Shitai's debt multiple of 8.4 times is hanging. The precondition for a small boat to resist wind and waves is—don't let the waves get too big, and don't stop rowing. The nineteenth face examined Chengdu's "extremes," and the twentieth face is Chizhou's "traveling light": big cities have big cities' maneuvering room, small cities have small cities' cleanliness. When it comes to debt, "small" is not always a disadvantage; "heavy" is always the problem. The twentieth face: traveling light.