Many of us have likely heard of Goldman Sachs' conclusion that housing prices will continue falling until 2027 before stabilizing (a view shared by many property bloggers, including myself, who also see 2027 as a turning point, after which a gradual, prolonged decline cycle may begin), but few have actually read the original research report. The phrase "we expect the deleveraging trend to pause in 2026E-2027E and might re-lever again when a fundamental (job market, income growth outlook) turnaround takes place," while cautiously worded, conveys a clear core message—so-called "deleveraging" is essentially another term for selling properties. The report forecasts that by 2026-2027, alongside price stabilization, total asset values will begin to recover. Goldman Sachs' view is that after housing prices stabilize around 2027, the proportion of real estate in household assets will drop from the current approximately 70% to around 50%. My own calculations for Shanghai reflect a similar trend: at the peak in 2022, property accounted for about 70% of household assets; after a 25% price correction, this ratio has fallen to 63%. The analysis suggests that if average selling prices decline by a further 20%-30% (or revert to 2015-2017 levels), a considerable portion of high loan-to-value (LTV) housing sold during the second half of 2021 through 2023 would be at risk of negative equity. Banks are already feeling some pressure, as evidenced by the noticeable increase in bank-owned properties being sold at discounts—a shadow of the challenges if widespread mortgage defaults were to occur. The analysis of the potential funding scale required from the government for inventory reduction and project completion calculates a total need of Rmb8tn in funding support, equivalent to 5.8% of the estimated 2025 GDP. After calculating the massive Rmb8tn requirement, Goldman Sachs also acknowledges the impracticality of such a scale and proposes a more feasible alternative—directly allocating Rmb600bn to purchase existing homes in the secondary market. The forecast indicates that the volume of secondary market listings will account for about 3% of the total estimated housing stock by 2027, with homeowners likely remaining incentivized to sell vacant properties or second homes until the macroeconomic backdrop stabilizes and the job market outlook improves. Subsequently, Goldman Sachs provides forecasts for supply, sales, and inventory for both new and existing homes in tier-one and tier-two cities. Downside risks highlighted include the potential for any recent market rebound to soften again if government stimulus is insufficient or lags behind supply increases and price cuts in the secondary market, similar to previous easing episodes during this downturn. Goldman Sachs emphasizes two critical judgments here. Second, a comparison is drawn with Japan in the 1990s. The analysis attributes the short-term rebound in average selling prices (ASP) in Japan's case to several reasons: 1) the government's cancellation of lending controls to the real estate industry by financial institutions in December 1991; 2) increased financial support for housing purchases and reduced transaction taxes; 3) policies promoting better quality supply in core locations, which attracted population inflow to Tokyo. Why was the recovery short-lived? Analyzing Japan's historical case, I notice many parallels with our current actions: we have already relaxed financing restrictions for property developers (at least for state-owned enterprises); reduced property transaction taxes; converted some prime urban commercial land to residential use; and relaxed plot ratio controls. As for why Japan's prices failed to recover sustainably, Goldman Sachs summarizes reasons that also seem applicable to our situation: banks' non-performing loan ratios are rising rapidly; the overall economy is being dragged down by the property sector's decline; and there is limited room for fiscal stimulus—the will exists, but financial capacity is constrained. Upside risks are seen by referencing the 2014-2015 cycle, when government efforts helped turn an oversupply downturn into an upcycle, with property prices increasing by 50-100% from their 2016 lows across China over the following 2-3 years. Goldman Sachs then compares the current situation with that of 2014. The GDP contribution from the real estate industry has declined to below 6% since 2023, retreating to a level comparable to 2014. Goldman Sachs also presents an insightful chart reflecting housing affordability for residents. A strong connection is noted between tier-one city average selling prices and stock market performance. Goldman Sachs' research report is highly valuable, offering novel perspectives and data not commonly found in domestic analyses, including figures I haven't encountered even within internal sources like Lianjia, making it a significant reference.